Appellant Robert Godwin entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to deny God-win’s motion to suppress. 121 Idaho 517, 826 P.2d 478. We granted Godwin’s petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision and now affirm.
The Court of Appeals described the facts as follows:
The facts of this case began during the late evening hours of April 14, 1989, when Officer Chris Yount, of the Idaho State Police, stopped a vehicle driven by Alicia Whitifield because of an equipment violation. As Officer Yount contacted Ms. Whitifield, another vehicle, operated by Godwin, stopped on the highway approximately 100 yards ahead. While Yount was conversing with Whiti*492field, Bonner County Deputy Sheriff Todd Barbieri happened to drive by and, upon seeing the situation, activated his rear deck lights and pulled in behind Godwin’s vehicle. Deputy Barbieri notified dispatch that he was making a “motorist assist.”
As Deputy Barbieri exited his vehicle, he was told by Officer Yount that Whitifield believed her driver’s license was in her purse which was in Godwin’s vehicle. Deputy Barbieri approached Godwin’s vehicle and was told that Godwin was following Whitifield to her residence because she had been having problems with her vehicle. Godwin located Whitifield’s purse, but neither Godwin nor Barbieri were able to find her driver’s license. Deputy Barbieri then asked Godwin for his driver’s license, and Godwin gave him a Washington license. Deputy Barbieri returned to his vehicle and conducted a driver’s license check. Dispatch shortly thereafter notified him that Godwin’s license had been suspended by the State of Washington.
Because Deputy Barbieri had never dealt with such a situation, he requested assistance from Officer Yount. Officer Yount then spoke with Godwin about the status of his license and subsequently arrested him for driving with a suspended license.
After Godwin’s arrest, Deputy Barbieri did an inventory search of Godwin’s vehicle. [footnote omitted] When Deputy Barbieri looked under the front seat he found three plastic bags. The first contained a white powdery substance, the second held a number of bindles, and the third contained a green leafy substance. The powdery substance and bindles field-tested positive for cocaine.
Godwin was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Counsel for Godwin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the inventory search. The district court denied God-win’s motion, holding that the request for Godwin’s driver’s license and subsequent record check were reasonable. The charges against Godwin were subsequently reduced to possession of cocaine, and he entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to pursue this appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s denial of Godwin’s motion to suppress, concluding that “the officer’s request for Godwin’s license and his subsequent record check pass the Fourth Amendment’s test of reasonableness____” We granted review of the Court of Appeals decision and now affirm.
Regarding our standard of review, when we are asked to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, we review the opinion of the district court directly. While we seriously consider the views of our Court of Appeals, we are not bound by those views. Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 814 P.2d 917 (1991); State ex rel Evans v. Barnett, 116 Idaho 429, 776 P.2d 438 (1989).
In a broad sense, the issue we face in this case is whether the trial court correctly denied Godwin’s motion to suppress. However, in order to make such a determination, we must answer the following, more specific questions: (1) did a seizure occur; (2) if so, when did it occur; and (3) was it reasonable?
Both sides concede, and we agree, that Godwin was clearly “seized” at some point on the night of April 14, 1989. The parties do not agree, however, as to precisely when that seizure occurred, and both sides, at various points in this case, have changed their position on this issue. In its original brief before the Court of Appeals, the State wrote: “Admittedly, at the time Deputy Barbieri asked for Godwin’s driver’s license and then asked Godwin to wait in his vehicle while he did a wants check and driver status check a limited seizure of Godwin occurred.” Later, however, at oral argument before this Court, counsel for the State denied that the seizure occurred when Officer Barbieri asked for Godwin’s driver’s license and instructed him to remain in his car. Instead, the State argued that a seizure did not occur until Officer Yount actually arrested Godwin, after Offi*493cer Barbieri had taken and checked the license. Counsel for Godwin has also changed her position on when the seizure occurred. Apparently, Godwin’s counsel argued before the Court of Appeals that the seizure occurred when Officer Barbieri asked for Godwin’s driver’s license. However, at oral argument before this Court, counsel conceded that Officer Barbieri’s conduct in merely asking for the driver’s license may have been too limited to be considered a seizure in the constitutional sense. Instead, counsel argued before us that the seizure occurred when Officer Barbieri took Godwin’s license to run a record check and instructed Godwin to remain in his car.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in the persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated____
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that even a brief stop may be considered a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578-79, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), the Court stated: “The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest____ ‘[Wjhenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that person,’____” 422 U.S. at 878, 95 S.Ct. at 2578-79 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Idaho has adhered to this view. See, Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401, 403 (1988) (“It is true that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away—even briefly—the officer has ‘seized’ that person.”); State v. Simpson, 112 Idaho 644, 645, 734 P.2d 669, 670 (Ct.App.1987) (“Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants will be deemed a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, ‘even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.’ ”); State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 783 P.2d 874 (Ct.App.1989).
Based on these cases, we agree with what appears to be the middle ground between the various views taken by each side and conclude that a limited seizure occurred when Officer Barbieri took God-win’s license and told him to remain in his car. At this point, Godwin was arguably not free to leave. Brignoni-Ponce; Terry v. Ohio; Clayton, supra.
Having concluded that a limited seizure occurred when Officer Barbieri told Godwin to remain in his car, we must next determine whether, under the circumstances, the seizure was reasonable. We find that it was.
In State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App.1984), a somewhat similar case, the defendant claimed that a requirement that he show proof of insurance to a police officer upon request during a traffic stop was in violation of his fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Reed, the Court of Appeals concluded:
[T]he fourth amendment is not offended by a requirement to produce the documents on request. Our view is consistent with a uniform body of court decisions upholding the constitutionality of statutes requiring drivers’ licenses to be produced upon police request. See An-not., 6 A.L.R.3d 506 (1966); cf. State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 923, 523 P.2d 523, 526 (1974) (characterizing a policeman’s request to see a driver’s license as a “legitimate request” incident to a traffic stop.
107 Idaho at 165, 686 P.2d 842. The Court of Appeals then held that “[o]nce the stop had occurred, nothing in the fourth amendment would preclude the officer from routinely asking the motorist to exhibit his driver’s license, the vehicle registration and an insurance certificate.” 107 Idaho at 165, 686 P.2d 842.
Several other jurisdictions which have confronted this, or a similar issue, have held that a limited seizure, such as that which occurred in this case, to check a driver’s license is reasonable. We find *494State v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis.2d 91, 464 N.W.2d 427 (App.1990), particularly persuasive.
In Ellenbecker, a police officer stopped behind a disabled vehicle on the side of the road to see if the passengers needed his assistance. Although he ultimately determined that the driver and passenger did not need his help, he nevertheless asked the driver, Ellenbecker, for his driver’s license. After running a check on the license, the officer learned that it had been revoked. Ellenbecker was subsequently arrested, and during a search of both Ellenbecker and his car, the officer discovered, among other things, packets of marijuana, vials of hash oil, and twenty-nine packets of LSD. Similar to the issue in this case, the issue in Ellenbecker was “whether an officer who learns that a motorist needs no assistance may still demand to see a driver’s license and conduct a status check at the scene.” Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d at 428.
Holding that the officer’s actions were reasonable, the Wisconsin court stated that “the public interest in permitting an officer to request a driver’s license and run a status check during a lawful police-driver contact outweighs the minimal intrusion on the driver.” 464 N.W.2d at 428. The Ellenbecker court reasoned:
There are several reasons for permitting a police officer performing a motorist assist to ask for a driver’s license. In many cases, police officers are required to make a written report of contacts with citizens. An officer needs to know whom he or she is assisting in the event a citizen later complains about improper behavior on the part of the officer or makes any kind of legal claim against the officer. Moreover, even seemingly innocent activity, such as refueling a disabled car, could later turn out to be theft of a car that was left on the shoulder of the highway.
Section 343.18(1), Stats., implicitly recognizes this public interest by giving a law enforcement officer the authority to require a driver of a motor vehicle to display his or her license on demand. Police officers do not have unfettered discretion to stop drivers and request a display of a driver’s license____ However, this case does not concern an instance of unfettered discretion. Ellenbecker was not singled out for a spot check of his license. His car was already stopped when the inspector offered help. The request for Ellenbecker’s license was reasonable in these circumstances. There is also a public interest in permitting a police officer to run a status check on a license. The statutory authority for police to demand a driver’s license would mean little if the police could not check the validity of the license. The reason for allowing police to request a driver’s license on demand is to deter persons from driving without a valid license, since a license is a statement that the driver can be expected to comply with the state’s requirements for safe driving. Where it is reasonable for a police officer to ask for a license, running a status check on the license is simply carrying out this deterrent function of the law.
While there is a legitimate public interest in a police officer requesting a driver’s license during a motorist assist and in running a status check on the license, these interests must outweigh any intrusion on the citizen in order for the police action to pass the fourth amendment test of reasonableness____ Requesting a license and conducting a status check after a lawful contact is but a momentary occurrence. The intrusion is minimal at best.
464 N.W.2d at 429-430 (emphasis added). See also, State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 434-35 (Or.1980) (“We are aware of no prohibition against an officer asking a driver for an operator’s license when a driver is validly stopped, whatever be the reason for the stop. Oregon motorists are required to have a valid operator’s license in their possession while operating a car and, upon demand, to show it to any peace officer.”); State v. Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. 57, 782 P.2d 1225, 1229 (1989) (“We ... hold that the police has the power and authority to demand from the driver of a vehicle the pro*495duction of both [a driver’s license and proof of insurance] whenever the vehicle is validly stopped.”).
We are convinced that the views expressed in both Reed and Ellenbecker are correct. In Brignoni-Ponce, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “As with other categories of police action subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of such seizures [brief detentions short of traditional arrest] depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” 422 U.S. at 878, 95 S.Ct. at 2579. Balancing the various public interests in this case, which we discuss below, against Godwin’s “right to personal security from arbitrary interference by law officers,” we conclude, as did the Ellenbecker court, that a police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment. The Court of Appeals very adequately explained why a subsequent check of Godwin’s license, after Officer Barbieri made the initial, lawful contact, was both reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances:
Here, Deputy Barbieri testified that there were two reasons he contacted the driver of the vehicle. He believed he needed to determine if a motorist stopped on the highway required assistance, and he was somewhat concerned for the safety of Officer Yount because he believed the two vehicles may have been traveling together. There are several reasons for permitting a police officer to ask for a driver’s license under these circumstances. In making any stop, whether the stop is to enforce the traffic laws or to carry out the officer’s community caretaker function, an officer should be allowed to identify, with certainty, the person with whom he is dealing. This is necessary to protect himself and other officers from danger, to accurately prepare any required reports concerning his contact with the motorist, and to allow the officer to adequately respond to allegations of illegal conduct or improper behavior. Moreover, where it was determined that the person traveling with Godwin was operating her car without a driver’s license, it was appropriate to determine whether Godwin had a driver’s license and whether it was valid.
There is also a valid public interest in permitting a police officer to run a record check on a driver’s license under these circumstances. The need to identify the person with whom a police officer is dealing would logically extend to making a correct identification and determining the validity and status of the driver’s license upon which the identification is based.
Even if there is a legitimate public interest in requesting a driver’s license and running a status check under the circumstances presented here, that interest must outweigh the nature of the intrusion in order to pass the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness. We note, however, that the intrusion here was minimal. Godwin was already stopped at the roadside when Deputy Barbieri arrived. The officer’s initial contact with Godwin was to determine whether he had Whitifield’s driver’s license. His further request for Godwin’s license and his check on the status of that license constituted a very limited further encroachment upon any privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. We therefore have little difficulty in concluding that such a limited intrusion was outweighed by the substantial public interest which supported Deputy Barbieri’s conduct. This view is consistent with a uniform body of court decisions in other states that a police officer who has made an otherwise appropriate contact with a motorist, may request the motorist’s license and run a check on that license without violating the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Also, as in Ellenbecker, I.C. § 49-3161 requires a driver to surrender a driver’s *496license to a police officer upon demand. This statute “implicitly recognizes” the public interest in allowing a police officer to ask for and check and driver’s license by “giving a law enforcement officer the authority to require a driver of a motor vehicle to display his or her license on demand.” Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d at 430. While the statute does not specifically authorize the officer to run a status check on the driver’s license, both the Court of Appeals and the Ellenbecker court correctly pointed out that “[t]he statutory authority for police to demand a driver’s license would mean little if the police could not check the validity of the license.” 464 N.W.2d at 430. Running a license check validly fulfills two functions: it allows the officer to correctly identify the person with whom he is dealing and to determine if the license is valid.
Furthermore, we are aware that, under Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), police officers may not stop drivers at random to check documents, etc. However, our holding today does not authorize such a result. As the Ellenbecker court also pointed out, “Police officers do not have unfettered discretion to stop drivers and request a display of a driver’s license____ However, this case does not concern an instance of unfettered discretion.” 464 N.W.2d at 430. In fact, neither Officer Yount nor Officer Barbieri stopped Godwin—he voluntarily pulled over to wait for Ms. Whitifield. Therefore, given the public interests discussed above, and in light of the fact that this all happened very late at night on a remote, lonely highway,2 Officer Barbieri’s conduct in asking for and running a status check on Godwin’s license was entirely reasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to deny Godwin’s motion to suppress.
BOYLE, J., concurs. McDEVITT, J., concurs in the result.. 49-316. License to be carried and exhibited on demand.—Every licensee shall have his oper*496ator’s or chauffeur's license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall, upon demand, surrender the license into the hands of a peace officer for his inspection. However, no person charged with a violation of the provisions of this section shall be convicted if an operator's or chauffeur’s license issued to the person and valid at the time of his arrest is produced in court.
. Indeed, as the trial court noted, “Given the fact that traffic stops are said to be one of the, statistically speaking, one of the hazardous things officers have to do when they approach persons unknown to them and I think to have for Barberie [sic] to have done what he did it was not unreasonable.”