(dissenting) — While I concur with the majority's affirmance on the right to the easement and trespass claims, I disagree with its reversal of the award of damages to New West Federal Savings and Loan Association on its counterclaim for slander of title and, therefore, dissent.
In my view the majority has confused the right of access to property with the right of possession, the latter being commonly considered as an incident of title or ownership of property.
As the majority has observed, Schwab sued "to enjoin trespass by residents of the other lots, including lots 2 and 3, and to quiet title in him to the property across which ran *753the easement to 24th Street S.W." Majority, at 745. Since the disputed easements impacted the servient estate, his own property, one would expect that he would file the lis pendens on that strip. But Schwab did not do that. He filed the lis pendens on lot 5 less the property he acquired from the Andrewses, while not claiming any interest to that property whatsoever.
A more appropriate definition of title can be found in the Restatement:
In common and legal speech the word "title" normally signifies (1) ownership or, when used with appropriate limiting words, a claim of ownership, or (2) the totality of the evidence, that is, the operative facts which result in such ownership or on which the claim of ownership is based.
Restatement of Property § 10, at 28 (1936).
The case of Tucson Estates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 151 Ariz. 600, 729 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1986) gives no support to the majority's position. As the majority points out the disputed covenant in Tucson Estates if approved would confer on certain residents the right to the exclusive use of the golf course, a right incident to the ownership of their respective lots with a corresponding burden on the golf course. This resulted in a positive incident of title on the individual lots and a negative incident of title on the golf course. No wonder that the court approved the lis pendens on those certain lots and the golf course. Consistent with its analysis the Arizona court disapproved the lis pendens on other property not affected by the covenant. Tucson did not involve a right of access to either the golf coruse or the respective lots and does not justify the majority's conclusion that right of access equates to a right of possession.
While New West's ability to market its property may have been affected by the status of the easement, its title was not at all impacted by the ultimate resolution of that status. Its title was in no way enhanced nor diminished by the presence or absence of the easement. New West held all the incidents of ownership and title, including among others *754the right to possession of its property, to the exclusion of others.
Even if possession alone of lot 5, as opposed to the right to access over the disputed easement, was involved, I would point out that the Washington Supreme Court has concluded that a contract vendee's right of possession does not rise to the dignity of title, either legal or equitable. Lawson v. Helmich, 20 Wn.2d 167, 173, 146 P.2d 537, 151 A.L.R. 930 (1944).
Assuming without conceding that the denial of the easement right across the servient estate limited New West's ability to use its property and thus somehow infringed upon its right to possession, I am satisfied that our statute does not authorize the filing of a lis pendens on New West's property. In Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 462, 131 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1976), the court was concerned with a claim to a similar easement — use of a private road over the servient estate. A lis pendens was filed on both the servient and dominant estates. At issue was the appropriateness of the lis pendens on the dominant estate only. Unlike the Washington statute, the California statute authorized the use of lis pendens not only in actions affecting title but also in actions affecting the right of possession of the real property. The California court was careful to preserve the distinction between the two applications of lis pendens. It held that although loss of an easement would affect the market value of real property, it would not affect title, but approved the lis pendens on the other statutory ground, because loss of an easement would affect the "right of possession" of the dominant estate. The court stated that although "title to the dominant tenement is unaffected when an easement is [landlocked and therefore] virtually unusable", the right of possession is affected because "it includes the right to have access to and to occupy such property." 60 Cal. App. 3d at 468. See also Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (1951) (dominant estate's loss of easement does not affect title). Since our statute limits use of a lis pendens to *755actions affecting title only, the use of the lis pendens here under that analysis was not authorized.
The majority's concern that potential buyers and encum-brancers would receive no notice of actions concerning easements is readily allayed. If the lis pendens is filed on the servient estate over which the easement runs, potential buyers and encumbrancers would be placed on notice that easement rights are disputed. This may or may not be of concern depending upon the availability of other potential avenues of access. In any event, title to the dominant estate is not affected.
Some easements are minor in nature and do not involve the only means of access to the dominant estate. Does it seem fair that someone objecting to a minor easement should be able to cloud title to the dominant estate merely by inteijecting a lis pendens? I think not. Such a result would be intolerable and has the potential as a means of legal blackmail.
I would affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.