dissenting: I do not concur in the majority opinion. I concede, however, that some jurisdictions have adopted the view set *233forth therein. Even so, in my opinion, such view finds no support in the decisions of our Court.
Let us examine the nature of the provision set forth in the plaintiff’s deed. “The foregoing lands are conveyed subject to the condition or restriction that no structure shall be erected by the grantee within 550 feet of the Pineville-Matthews Road, it being understood and agreed that the 100 foot strip leading to said tract of land from the Pineville-Matthews Road shall not be used for purpose of constructing any building thereon, and this restriction shall likewise apply to Lot No. 4, retained by the grantor, said Lot No. 4 being adjacent to lands hereby conveyed.”
It will be noted that the grantor did not covenant or agree to insert a similar restriction in her deed, if and when she conveyed Lot No. 4; she only provided that this restriction shall apply to Lot No. 4 retained by the grantor. What is this restriction? Simply that the grantee in the deed to Lot No. 3 shall not erect any structure within 550 feet of the Pineville-Matthews Road. The parties then defined the meaning and applicability of the restriction in the following language: “. . . it being understood and agreed that the 100 foot strip leading to said tract of land from the Pineville-Matthews Road shall not be used for purpose of constructing any building thereon, . . .” Was the application to Lot No. 4 for the benefit thereof, or was it intended to be a servitude thereon? Be that as it may, we adhere to the rule in this jurisdiction that restrictive servitudes being in derogation of the free and unfettered use of the land, the covenants imposing them are to be strictly construed in favor of the unrestricted use of the property. Callaham v. Arenson, 239 N.C. 619, 80 S.E. 2d 619; Craven County v. Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E. 2d 620; Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, 127 S.E. 697; 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, section 212, page 621.
If it be conceded, however, that the intention of the parties was to the effect that no building shall be constructed on Lot No. 4 nearer than 550 feet of the Pineville-Matthews Road, as construed in the majority opinion, I do not think the restriction can rightfully be construed to be anything more than a personal contract or covenant between the parties to the instrument conveying Lot No. 3. Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N.C. 290, 37 S.E. 2d 895.
Our decisions emphasize the fact that to be effective the restrictive covenant to be enforced must be a part of a general plan or scheme of development which bears uniformly upon the area affected. Craven County v. Trust Co., supra; Sedberry v. Parsons, 232 N.C. 707, 62 S.E. 2d 88; Humphrey v. Beall, 215 N.C. 15, 200 S.E. 918.
The law generally applicable to a plan or scheme for imposing restrictions upon land for particular purposes is succinctly stated in 26 *234C.J.S., Deeds, section 167(2), page 1143, et seq., as follows: “Where the owner of a tract of land subdivides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to separate grantees, imposing restrictions on its use pursuant to a general plan of development or improvement, such restrictions may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee, either on the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration, or on the ground that mutual negative equitable easements are created.” Maples v. Horton, 239 N.C. 394, 80 S.E. 2d 38; Craven County v. Trust Co., supra; Sedberry v. Parsons, supra; Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E. 2d 661; Vernon v. Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E. 2d 710; Brenizer v. Stephens, 220 N.C. 395, 17 S.E. 2d 471; Franklin v. Elizabeth Realty Co., 202 N.C. 212, 162 S.E. 199; Bailey v. Jackson, 191 N.C. 61, 131 S.E. 567; Johnston v. Garrett, 190 N.C. 835, 130 S.E. 835; Homes Co. v. Falls, 184 N.C. 426, 115 S.E. 184.
There is no contention that a general scheme or plan was ever contemplated in connection with the lands involved in this appeal. The grantor, Sallie W. Shannon (widow), conveyed tracts 1 and 2, containing 3 and 3.75 acres respectively, without imposing any restrictions whatever thereon. Moreover, these tracts lie between tract 3 and the Pineville-Matthews Road, except for the 100 foot access corridor to the highway. Furthermore, while it appears that Lot No. 4, consisting of 42.32 acres; Lot No. 5, consisting of 30.9 acres; and Lot No. 6, consisting of 9.5 acres, all fronting on the Pineville-Matthews Road, there is no suggestion that any of these lots, including Lot No. 4, when conveyed by Mrs. Sallie W. Shannon (widow), contained any restrictions whatever.
In Phillips v. Wearn, supra, 262 lots in 26 different blocks of a development were sold without restrictions, and 433 lots in 31 blocks were sold with restrictions. The lots sold without restrictive covenants in the deeds as well as those sold subject to restrictions were scattered throughout the development. It was held that the development had never been subject to any scheme or general plan whereby the restrictive covenants in the deeds could have been enforced by the grantees inter se. Humphrey v. Beall, supra. And that since the locus in quo had never been subj ect to any general plan of development the restrictive covenants in the deeds executed by the original developer or its successors, were never enforceable except as personal covenants. DeLaney v. Hart, 198 N.C. 96, 150 S.E. 702; Thomas v. Rogers, 191 N.C. 736, 133 S.E. 18; Snyder v. Heath, 185 N.C. 362, 117 S.E. 294.
In the case of Ivey v. Blythe, et al., 193 N.C. 705, 138 S.E. 2, the plaintiff contracted to sell and the defendants to purchase Lot No. 10 of Square 5 of Piedmont Park in the City of Charlotte. The Piedmont Realty Company had subdivided a tract of land containing 83 acres. This company conveyed lots, including the lot in controversy, *235to F. C. Abbott. The deed to the property contained restrictions as to the use of the lots fronting on Central Avenue and Seventh Street. Later, Abbott reconveyed Lot No. 10 in Square 5, which fronted on Central Avenue, to Piedmont Realty Company. This company thereafter sold and conveyed this lot to J. B. Ivey without restrictions, but the following appeared in the description: “Being the same lot No. 10, Square 5, conveyed by the Piedmont Realty Company to F. C. Abbott by deed, and recorded in the office of the register of deeds for Mecklen-burg County, in Book 150, p. 237.” The defendants refused to accept the deed which plaintiff tendered, upon the ground that the plaintiff could not convey a title free from restrictions. The court below held that plaintiff could convey a fee simple title to the property, free and clear of restrictions. Upon appeal to this Court, Brogden, J., speaking for the Court, said: “In Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, this Court held, upon the facts presented in that case, that Piedmont Park was not the result of a general plan or scheme of development of an exclusive residential community. . . .
“In the case at bar, the plaintiff holds a deed for the lot in controversy, which contains no restrictions whatever, but the defendants contend that the clause in plaintiff’s deed from Piedmont Realty Company, 'being the same lot No. 10, Square 5, conveyed by the Piedmont Realty Company to F. C. Abbott, by deed recorded in the office of the register of deeds for Mecklenburg County, in Book 150, p. 237,’ was intended to subject plaintiff’s land to the restrictions contained in the original deed from Piedmont Realty Company to Abbott, bearing date of 20 October, 1900. We do not think that this clause can be enlarged so as to create a restriction. Apparently the clause is a mere reference to a former conveyance for the sole purpose of aiding the identification of the land. A restriction of the free enjoyment and use of property should be created in plain and express terms; and, while perhaps it may be possible, by implication, to create restriction and encumber the free and untrammeled flow of property from purchaser to purchaser, such implication ought to appear plainly and unmistakably.”
A restriction on the use of land may be enforceable as a contract without regard to any general plan or scheme of development. However, in such instances, the enforceability of the contract rests squarely upon the terms and conditions of the contract being set out in the grantee’s chain of'title. Starmount Co. v. Memorial Park, 233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E. 2d 134; Phillips v. Wearn, supra.
In Turner v. Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E. 2d 197, in considering the enforceability of restrictions in a deed, Barnhill, J., later Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, said: “. . . it is the duty of a purchaser of land to examine every recorded deed or instrument in his line of title and he is conclusively presumed to know the contents of such instruments and *236is put on notice of any fact or circumstance affecting his title which either of such instruments reasonably discloses. He is not, however, required to examine collateral conveyances of other property by any one of his predecessors in title.”
Likewise, in the case of Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N.C. 426, 20 S.E. 2d 344, Barnhill, J., later Chief Justice, said: “Ordinarily, it is only when the subdivided property is conveyed by deeds containing uniform restrictions in accord with a general scheme and for the benefit of all within a specified area that the other grantees of the owner of the original tract may enforce the restriction.”
More recently, in the case of Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C. 240, 84 S.E. 2d 892, it appears that in 1948 J. L. Sides and wife, Ophelia M. Sides, began a residential development known as Wooded Acres. The development contained 40 lots. Thirty of these lots were sold and the deeds contained uniform restrictions, including racial restrictions. Nine of the lots were sold omitting the racial restrictions but containing all the other restrictions. The first restriction inserted in all thirty-nine deeds reads as follows: “1. All lots contained in this property known as Wooded Acres shall be used for residential purposes only.” J. L. Sides and wife agreed to convey Lots Nos. 10 and 11 of the subdivision to Hollis P. Allen and wife, Alma C. Allen, plaintiffs in the action, and they in turn agreed to sell these lots to the defendants C. G. Sellers and wife, Irene T. Sellers. Sides and wife conveyed to H. P. Allen and wife Lot No. 10 containing the same restrictions set out in the deeds to the thirty lots referred to above. At the request of Mr. Allen, Lot No. 11 was conveyed from Sides and wife directly to Sellers and wife without restrictions. Allen testified it was his understanding in parol with Sellers that the uniform restrictions should be inserted in the deed to Lot No. 11. Sellers testified there was no such agreement. Likewise, Sides and wife, who were also defendants, filed answer and denied any agreement with Allen and wife that restrictions should apply to Lot No. 11, the topography of it being unsuitable for a home site but could be used for something like a road. Sellers and wife were seeking to use Lot No. 11 for a street leading to other property. The court below held that the plaintiffs, among them numerous owners of lots in the '•subdivision, could not enforce the restrictions against Sellers and wife with respect to Lot No. 11. Upon appeal to this Court, Higgins, J., speaking for the Court, said: “The remaining question is whether the defendants C. G. Sellers and wife in accepting a deed without restriction, nevertheless were charged with such notice of the plans and purposes in the development of Wooded Acres as would make the uniform restrictions applicable to Lot No. 11. As has already been pointed out, no restrictions appear in the chain of title to that lot. No notice, there*237fore, can be found in the line of title. The recorded map shows no restrictions. ‘The law contemplates that a purchaser of land will examine each recorded deed or other instrument in his chain of title, and charges him with notice of every fact affecting his title which such examination would disclose. In consequence, a purchaser of land is chargeable with notice of a restrictive covenant by the record itself if such covenant is contained in any recorded deed or other instrument in his line of title, even though it does not appear in his immediate deed.1 Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E. 2d 661; Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N.C. 426, 20 S.E. 2d 344; Turner v. Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E. 2d 197. Since the effective date of the Connor Act, 1 December, 1885, in matters involving the title to land it is intended that the public registry should be the source of notice. Since then it is considered not enough to send word by the mail boy. Notice, however full and formal, cannot take the place of registered documents. Austin v. Staten, 126 N.C. 783, 36 S.E. 338; Hinton v. Williams, 170 N.C. 115, 86 S.E. 994; Blacknall v. Hancock, 182 N.C. 369, 109 S.E. 72.”
Our Court has held that where restrictive covenants in the nature of mutual negative easements have been inserted in the deed pursuant to a general plan of development, such restrictions will remain in full force and effect even though one or more of the mesne conveyances may omit the restrictions. Sedberry v. Parsons, supra; Higdon v. Jaffa, supra; Sheets v. Dillon, supra; Turner v. Glenn, supra; Bailey v. Jackson, supra.
I know, however, of no decision in this jurisdiction that upholds a building restriction in the nature of a negative easement when such restriction appears nowhere in the grantee’s chain of title, as in the instant case. Hence, I vote to reverse the judgment of the court below.
WiNBORNE, C. J., and HiggiNS, J., join in the dissent.