dissenting:
The majority holds that Shorey, as a third-party beneficiary of a collective-bargaining agreement, may sue the school district for breach of the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. I disagree. Shorey’s grievance is that the school district failed to comply with a provision in the collective-bargaining agreement and proceed to a level-three arbitration hearing. Accordingly, her remedy is to have the Association pursue her grievance through the grievance procedures set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement. See Thomas v. Thompson Sch. Dist. R2-J, 749 P.2d 966 (Colo.App.1987). Since the Association has brought suit to enforce the collective-bargaining agreement and compel level-three arbitration on her behalf, Shorey has no standing to bring a separate breach claim under article 34-4-3 of the agreement. Until the Association, as Sho-rey’s bargaining agent, terminates its representation of her, the claim is premature and should be dismissed.
I.
The Jefferson County Education Association (the Association) and the Jefferson County School District No. R-l Board of Education (the District) were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement (the collective-bargaining agreement or the agreement). Under this agreement, the Association is “the exclusive representative of teachers employed by the District.” Article 3-3. The agreement also sets forth a grievance procedure “to provide a fair, formal and expeditious manner of resolving differences” “concerning the interpretation or application of the Agreement or related matter.”
On November 5, 1987, Shorey received notice that she had been granted a transfer for a position at a high school in Jefferson County. Later that month, she was notified that her transfer had been granted in error and that the position had been given to another teacher who had a greater length of service in the district. On November 30, 1987, pursuant to article 7-4-1-1 of the collective-bargaining agreement, Shorey and the Association initiated a level-one grievance by filing a grievance with the office of employee relations. The grievance alleged that the District had violated article 34-4-3, which lists criteria that *847the District must follow in selecting a teacher for a voluntary transfer.1 This grievance was signed by an Association representative, as required by article 7-4-1-1. After a meeting between Shorey and her immediate supervisor, the grievance was denied.
Pursuant to article 7-4-2-1, the Association then filed a level-two grievance, requesting a level-two hearing. After a hearing, the level-two umpire denied this grievance. Upon receiving this decision, the Association reviewed Shorey’s grievance, pursuant to its duties under article 7-4-3-1,2 and determined that the grievance was meritorious. Accordingly, the Association requested a level-three hearing. The school district denied the Association’s request for a level-three hearing.
The Association and Shorey filed a complaint in district court against the District. The Association alleged that the District failed to comply with articles 34-4-3 and 7-4-3-1. The Association requested that the court compel the District to arbitrate, issue an injunction, and assess damages. Sho-rey, individually, alleged that the District had breached the agreement when it “failed and refused to comply” with Article 34-4-3. She based her claim on a third-party beneficiary theory, and requested reinstatement and damages.
The majority agrees with Shorey, and concludes that she has an independent right to sue the District for its failure to comply with article 34-4-3. I disagree. In so concluding, the majority disregards the basic premise of labor law and collective-bargaining agreements that a union is the exclusive representative for an employee who claims a grievance based on violations of a collective-bargaining agreement.
II.
The general rule in labor law is that individual employees covered by a collective-bargaining agreement must redress their contract grievances through the grievance procedure established in the collective-bargaining agreement. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); Roman v. United States Postal Serv., 821 F.2d 382, 386 (7th Cir.1987); Commack Univ. Free Sch. Dist. v. Ambach, 70 N.Y.2d 501, 522 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835, 517 N.E.2d 509, 513 (1987); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Rhoads, 196 Colo. 159, 161— 62, 582 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1978) (recognizing that employee may not maintain a lawsuit unless the employee has exhausted grievance procedures in collective-bargaining agreement). “Unless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his [or her] behalf.” Maddox, 379 U.S. at 650, 85 S.Ct. at 614. As the Court stated in Maddox,
[a] contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it. In addition to cutting across the interests already mentioned, it would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances.
Id. at 653, 85 S.Ct. at 616-17.
If the union breaches its duty of fair representation, an employee can bring a *848suit for breach of the collective-bargaining agreement. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Robert C. Gorman, Labor Law Unionization and Collective Bargaining § 8, at 721 (1976); Bailey v. Beaver Precision Prods., Inc., 678 F.Supp. 684 (E.D.Mich.1988) (union member’s failure to exhaust internal grievance procedures was not excused absent any allegations that union had wrongfully refused to proceed with grievance).3
The majority, based on a third-party beneficiary analysis, states that “[a]s a remedy for the school district’s alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement, Sho-rey has a right to sue for damages on her breach of contract claim.” Maj. op. at 843. This conclusion is in direct conflict with the general principles stated above.4 By recognizing that Shorey has an independent claim for relief, Colorado will be the first jurisdiction — federal or state — that allows an employee to “sidestep” a grievance procedure in favor of a lawsuit, where a union is the employee’s exclusive representative and is enforcing the Agreement on the employee’s behalf.
Shorey’s grievance involves “a dispute, disagreement or controversy concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or related matter.” The collective-bargaining agreement sets forth a grievance procedure to remedy such disputes and designates the Association as the exclusive representative of the employees. As long as the Association is fairly representing Shorey and pursues her grievance, we do not need to consider whether Shorey has independent standing to sue.
A.
In support of its conclusion, the majority finds the District’s argument that the grievance and arbitration procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement are Shorey’s exclusive remedy for breach of the Agreement lacks “merit under the circumstances of this case.” Maj. op. at 843. The majority states that, even though the grievance procedure is the exclusive remedy, Shorey still has standing to sue because “the school district repudiated level-three arbitration and thereby prevented Shorey and the association from exhausting the grievance process.” Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
The majority relies on dicta in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), to support its contention that the District’s conduct in this case amounted to a repudiation of the Agreement.5 In my opinion, however, the District’s conduct was not a repudiation of the arbitration provision or the Agreement.
The District has neither rescinded the Agreement, nor permanently refused to ar*849bitrate grievances. They have simply taken a stance contrary to Shorey and the Association with respect to the grievance. By concluding that this conduct constitutes a repudiation, the majority “confuses repudiation of the grievance procedure and a refusal to accept an employee’s position with respect to a grievance.” Rabalais v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir.1978). “An employer can obviously take a stance contrary to that of the employee during the grievance process without being deemed to have repudiated that process.” Id.6 See also Robbins v. George W. Prescott Publishing Co., 457 F.Supp. 915, 921 (1978) (rejecting repudiation claim and recognizing holding in Rabalais). Moreover, taking a contrary stance during the grievance process certainly does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance’’ under Albertson’s, Inc. v. Rhoads, 196 Colo. 159, 162, 582 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1978).
B.
The majority concludes that Shorey and the Association were prevented from exhausting the grievance process. As part III. of the majority’s opinion indicates, this is simply not the case. The majority holds that the District must arbitrate Shorey’s grievance. Maj. op. at 840-841. Thus, Shorey has not been prevented from pursuing arbitration.
In this appeal, once we determined that the District’s alleged breach was within the scope of the arbitration provision, the question of whether Shorey had an independent right to sue became moot. See 6A Corbin on Contracts § 1443, at 436 (1962) (If the court finds that the alleged breach is within the scope of the arbitration provision, “the court’s function is over (except to enforce arbitration).”).
The majority’s conclusion that Shorey was prevented from pursuing arbitration in this case also disregards and undermines the Association’s duties and responsibilities under the Agreement. The Agreement maintains that the Association is the exclusive representative of the employee. The Association fairly and adequately represented Shorey through the first two levels, and is continuing to represent her now.
III.
In part V.C., the majority rejects the District’s contention that “permitting an employee to sue the employer for breach of the collective-bargaining agreement would undermine the collective-bargaining process.” Maj. op. at 845. By doing so, the majority is in conflict with its discussion in part Y.B., where it stated that allowing Shorey to pursue her claim “would be disruptive of the grievance process established in the collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 845.
In this part of its opinion, however, the majority does not see any reason why allowing such a lawsuit would interfere with the Association’s ability to engage in collective-bargaining with the District. Id. at 845. This conclusion is inconsistent with the majority’s statement in part III.B. that Shorey “must afford the association the opportunity to to act on her behalf ... in resolving her grievance.”
This conclusion is also contrary to the generally accepted principles of collective-bargaining set forth in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960), as cited by the majority. Maj. op. at 837-838. “It must be remembered that grievance and arbitration procedures are part and parcel of the ongoing process of collective bargaining.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38,108 S.Ct. 364, 371, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). Under collective-bargaining agreements, “unless the contract provides otherwise, there can *850be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf.” Maddox, 379 U.S. at 650, 85 S.Ct. at 614.
To allow an employee to “side-step” the grievance procedure and bring a suit not only undermines the collective-bargaining process, but also undermines the Association’s position as the representative of the employees under the collective-bargaining agreement. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). The majority’s distinction between interest arbitration and grievance arbitration is mere semantics because such a distinction disregards the importance of the Association’s duty to represent an employee during a grievance proceeding brought under a collective-bargaining agreement.
I respectfully dissent.
. The criteria set forth in article 34-4-3 are:
A. Individual teacher qualifications.
B. Individual requirements of the open position, as specified in the job requisition.
C. Experience in the teaching field for which application is being made.
D. Proportionate distribution within a given faculty of experienced and inexperienced teachers.
E. When the foregoing are substantially equal, preference in assignment or transfer shall be given to the incumbent applicant with the greatest length of service in the District.
. This article provides as follows:
If the aggrieved person and/or the Association is not satisfied with the disposition of a grievance at Level Two, or if no decision has been rendered within ten (10) school days after the area superintendent [the Level Two umpire] has heard the grievance, the Association may, if it deems the grievance meritorious, request a hearing before an umpire. Such request must be submitted in writing within fifteen (15) school days after the Association receives a Level Two decision, or twenty-five (25) school days after the Level Two hearing, whichever is sooner.
. Case law and authorities also recognize that an employee can bring a breach of contract suit where there is proof of some independent employer wrong that amounts to a repudiation of the agreement, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div., Jewel Co., Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1391, 1396 (N.D.Ill.1988); Robert C. Gorman, Labor Law Unionization and Collective Bargaining § 8, at 721 (1976), or when resort to the grievance procedures would be futile. See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969).
. Furthermore, our statutes reflect a decided preference for private settlement of labor disputes without the intervention of the courts. Section 8-1-123, 3B C.R.S. (1986), provides:
The director shall do all in his power to promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of disputes arising under an existing written agreement between employers and employees and to avoid the necessity of resorting to strikes, lockouts, boycotts, blacklists, discriminations, and legal proceedings in matters of employment.
(Emphasis added.) This preference is also reflected in federal labor law. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).
. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), the employee sued his union, alleging wrongful discharge and that the union had unfairly represented him. One of the issues addressed by the court was whether the employee must exhaust his remedies under the grievance procedures if the union unfairly represents the employee. The Court concluded that the employee can bring an action against his employer without exhausting the grievance procedure if the employee can prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. at 184-86, 87 S.Ct. at 913-15. In dicta, the Court recognized repudiation as another exception to the exhaustion requirement.
. In Rabalais v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 566 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.1978), the parties participated in the first three stages of the grievance process, but neither the employer nor the union sought arbitration. The employee sued and the employer defended on the ground that the employee failed to exhaust his contractual remedies. Id. at 519. The employee argued "that there was a repudiation because the employer did not consider the claim a proper subject of a grievance." Id. at 520. The court rejected this argument.