Norman and Sherry Jean McGowan were divorced in Texas in 1992. Under the Texas divorce decree, Ms. McGowan was awarded custody of the couple’s minor child. Mr. McGowan filed a petition for change of custody in Polk County Superior Court in May 1996 and also sought domestication of the Texas final judgment and divorce decree. Ms. McGowan answered and counterclaimed, seeking modification of visitation and child support. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mr. McGowan’s petition to modify custody and modified his child support obligations. The court also modified certain aspects of the Texas decree concerning visitation. Mr. McGowan’s motion for new trial was denied, and we granted his application for discretionary appeal. We cannot reach the merits of his contentions, however. Although an order of domestication as such is not necessarily required, the record does not show domestication of the Texas judgment and decree by any method, whether pursuant to Pearson v. Pearson, 263 Ga. 400 (435 SE2d 40) (1993), OCGA § 19-9-55, or any other legal procedure. The trial court consequently was not authorized to modify that decree. We must therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for consideration of Mr. McGowan’s request for domestication of the Texas decree.
In Pearson, the parties were divorced in Texas. Both then moved to Georgia, and Ms. Pearson filed a petition seeking to modify child support in Cobb County. She also amended her complaint to seek domestication of the Texas decree. The trial court never entered an order domesticating the foreign judgment but did modify the child *363support obligations set out by the decree. Id. The Supreme Court found that the final decree remained a Texas judgment because no prior order was entered domesticating that judgment in Georgia. Id. at 400-401. Distinguishing between enforcing judgments and domesticating judgments, the Court stated that “Georgia permits modification of a foreign divorce decree only after domestication of that judgment. [Cits.]” Id. at 401. Although neither party objected to the trial court’s entry of a modification order before it ruled on the request for domestication and neither raised .the issue on appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the appeal because “an order of domestication was a necessary prerequisite to the trial court’s authority to modify. [Cit.]” Id. We find no such order filed in this case, and, under Pearson, the trial court therefore did not have authority to modify the Texas decree.
We note that the law seems to be somewhat in conflict with regard to the procedure for domesticating a foreign divorce decree. In Pearson, supra, the Court relied on Blue v. Blue, 243 Ga. 22 (252 SE2d 452) (1979), for the proposition that “Georgia permits modification of a foreign divorce decree only after domestication of that judgment.” Pearson, supra at 401. This is indeed a correct statement of the holding in Blue in which the Court allowed modification of a domesticated sister state decree. Blue, supra at 23. Blue did not address, however, the issue of how a foreign custody decree can be domesticated. Such a decision would have been futile in any event, because Blue was decided prior to our legislature’s adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“the Act”), OCGA § 19-9-40 et seq., effective January 1, 1979. See Ga. L. 1978, p. 258. The Act includes its own provisions for domesticating and modifying foreign custody decrees. See OCGA §§ 19-9-54 and 19-9-55.
OCGA § 19-9-55 sets forth the requirements for domesticating a custody order of another state. Specifically, that section provides that “[a] certified and exemplified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any superior court of this state. The clerk shall treat the decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the superior court of this state. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 19-9-55 (a). This subsection clearly authorizes domestication by simply filing a certified and exemplified copy of the foreign decree and states that such a decree will have the “same effect” as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state. No other domestication provisions appear within the Act.
The prerequisites for modifying a foreign state custody decree are stated in OCGA § 19-9-54 (a): “If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this state shall not modify that *364decree unless: (1) It appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this article or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree; and (2) The court of this state has jurisdiction.”
Shortly after the Act was adopted, the Supreme Court decided Roehl v. O’Keefe, 243 Ga. 696 (256 SE2d 375) (1979). In Roehl, the appellant asserted that “since [a] North Carolina divorce was never domesticated, the Superior Court of Pike County had no jurisdiction to modify the visitation conditions set out in [the] divorce decree and consequently had no authority to hold her in contempt.” Id. at 696. In addressing the domestication issue, the Court found as a matter of fact that “[a]n authenticated copy of the foreign decree appears in the record of this case, Code Ann. § 38-627 (b) [now codified as OCGA § 24-7-24], but no order ha[d] been entered making it a Georgia judgment.” Id. The appellant contended that without a court order domesticating the judgment, “the Pike Superior Court had no subject matter jurisdiction to modify [the appellee’s] visitation rights.” Id. at 696-697. The Court disagreed. It found that under former Code Ann. § 74-515 (a) (2), (now codified as OCGA § 19-9-54 (a) (2)), a Georgia court can modify a custody decree of another state, if the Georgia court has jurisdiction. Id. at 697. The Court further found that under former Code Ann. § 74-516 (now codified as OCGA § 19-9-55) a foreign custody decree was enforceable “merely by filing a certified copy [of the decree] with the clerk of the superior court.” Id. at 697. Keeping in mind that the specific issue was whether the decree was properly domesticated for modification purposes, the Court held that “[s]ince a certified copy of the North Carolina decree appears in the record, it was properly ‘domesticated’ pursuant to [the] Act.” Id.
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pearson does not appear to be based on the Act, the Court again addressed the domestication issue. In Pearson, the appellant sought both to modify appellee’s child support obligations and to domesticate the Texas divorce decree. The trial court modified the child support obligations provided in the Texas decree, but it never entered an order in response to the petition to domesticate the Texas judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s modification order because “[o]n the record . . . [the] final divorce decree remains a Texas judgment, since there was no prior order domesticating that judgment in this state.” (Emphasis supplied.) Pearson, supra at 400-401.
Three things are clear from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pearson. First, the appellant did not attempt to domesticate the Texas decree pursuant to the Act by filing a certified and exemplified copy of the judgment. Rather, the appellant petitioned the trial court to issue an order domesticating the judgment. Second, the trial court *365never entered a domestication order in response to the petition. Finally, because the appellant only attempted to domesticate by petitioning the trial court for a domestication order, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether the Texas decree could have been domesticated and modified under OCGA §§ 19-9-54 and 19-9-55 of the Act. See Henderson v. Justice, 223 Ga. App. 591 (478 SE2d 434) (1996).
Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for consideration of Mr. McGowan’s request for domestication of the Texas decree.
Judgment vacated and case remanded.
McMurray, P. J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs specially.