dissenting.
If we are to be fair and consistent in our application of the workers’ compensation law, the parties in this cause must be afforded 1) notice of the competency and probative value of the medical evidence and 2) opportunity to stand on the evidence adduced or to supplement the evidence. In this cause both the claimant and the employer offered medical reports to be admitted into evidence. Objections to the competency and probative value of each medical report were made at trial. The judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court admitted the medical reports, taking the objections under advisement. The judge did not rule upon these objections. Rather, the judge entered an order denying the claim, setting forth only one finding — that the claimant suffered no accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment — and only one ruling — that compensation is denied.1
The claimant appealed, challenging the competency and probative value of the employer’s medical report. Victorious in the trial court, the employer did not challenge the claimant’s medical report on appeal. Upon review in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, claimant today has notice that the employer’s medical report constitutes competent, probative evidence and is sufficient to support a denial of the compensation claim. However, unless this cause is remanded, claimant will never be given notice of the legal sufficiency of his medical evidence, nor will he be afforded an opportunity to supplement or replace his medical evidence.
We have recently remanded several workers’ compensation claims for further proceedings because of failure of medical proof. In Houston v. Zebco, 821 P.2d 367, 62 O.B.J. 3662 (Okla.1991), the trial court ruled that claimant’s medical evidence was incompetent and wholly without probative value. We agreed with the trial court, but remanded for further trial proceedings because the trial judge should have afforded claimant an opportunity to stand on her incompetent medical report or supplement it prior to denying compensation. In Branstetter v. TRW/Reda Pump, 809 P.2d 1305 (Okla.1991), the claimant objected to the employer’s medical evidence, but the trial court denied the claim. On appeal, both the Court of Appeals and this Court found that the employer’s medical evidence was not competent, probative evidence. The cause was remanded for new trial. In York v. Burgess-Norton Manufacturing Company, 803 P.2d 697 (Okla.1990), the trial judge found the claimant’s medical evidence was not competent. The claimant appealed. We found that the employer’s medical evidence was not competent and remanded for a new trial. In Gaines v. Sun Refinery and Marketing2, objections were made at trial to all medical evidence. The trial court took these objections under *596advisement. The trial court then denied the claim finding no work-related injury, as in the case at bar. The claimant appealed. We found all the medical evidence incompetent and remanded for further proceedings to allow the parties an opportunity to present further competent evidence as is necessary to definitely settle the claim. In Zebco v. Houston, 800 P.2d 245 (Okla.1990), claimant appealed the trial court’s ruling that her medical evidence has no probative value. We agreed with the trial court, but remanded for further trial proceedings to allow the claimant another opportunity to prove her compensation claim. And, in Wheat v. Heritage Manor, 784 P.2d 74 (Okla.1989), the employer, in imprecise terms, objected to the probative value of the claimant’s medical evidence. The trial court implicitly resolved the objection in favor of the employer. A three-judge panel affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the claimant's medical evidence is competent. We found the claimant’s medical evidence to be without probative value and remanded with directions to allow claimant an opportunity to stand on her medical evidence or substitute another evaluation for the flawed medical report.3
Affording a claimant another opportunity to present competent, probative medical *597evidence is in keeping with the spirit of the workers’ compensation laws and notions of fairness.4 Ronnie Davis should be afforded another opportunity to support his claim for workers’ compensation. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Any attempt to arrive at a conclusion as to the evidence considered by the trial court would be mere speculation. The record on appeal does not reveal whether the trial court considered either medical report or whether the trial court determined both medical reports to be competent and probative, allowing greater weight to the employer's medical report.
. 790 P.2d 1073 (Okla.1990). In Part I. of Gaines, this Court held that a medical report evaluating a claimant’s respiratory impairment at 0% does not facially comply with the 1984 A.M.A. Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment and is not competent evidence unless the report shows that "three tests [are required to] confirm that an examinee fits that category (Class one)_” Id., at p. 1076. Under Part I., the employer’s medical report in the instant cause is not competent evidence. I do not join in today’s overruling of Part I. of Gaines. However, if it is to be overruled, it should be overruled with prospective application. Gaines was mandated May 4, 1990. Cer-tiorari was granted in this cause on December 4, 1989.
In Part II. of Gaines, we held that objections to evidence offered at trial before the Workers’ Compensation Court must comply with the specificity requirements of 12 O.S.1981, § 2104. Noting departure from clear past precedent, we announced prospective application of this holding. This holding contemplates that the judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court will rule on the specific objections and the parties may *596then preserve the objection for appellate review. The objections made at trial herein were general in nature, based on a failure to comply with the AMA Guidelines. Even so, the Workers' Compensation Court judge should have ruled on the objections with notice of the rulings given to each party.
And, in Part III. of Gaines, we overruled our “jackpot" rule in LaBarge v. Zebco, 769 P.2d 125 (Okla.1989) and Perlinger v. J.C. Rogers Construction Co., 753 P.2d 905 (Okla.1988). We reasoned that it would be inconsistent to reward litigants who remain silent at trial, but then successfully nullify the victorious opposition’s only medical evidence on appeal. In this cause, the trial court’s failure to rule on the objection to claimant’s medical evidence has effectively nullified claimant’s right to appeal and anothér opportunity to present competent, probative medical evidence.
. The transcript of the proceeding in Tulsa, Oklahoma, before the Honorable Ozella M. Willis, Judge of the Workers’ Compensation Court, on October 19, 1988, does not support the statement in the majority opinion that Judge Willis ”... ruled on the objections by admitting both reports without reservation and did not withdraw the admission.” In compensation law, this Court has separated the issues of admissibility and probative value of evidence. See, Whitener v. South Central Solid Waste Authority, 773 P.2d 1248, 1249, note 1 (Okla.1989), distinguishing a probative value objection from an admissibility objection. Whitener requires Judge Willis to rule on the objections to the probative value of the medical evidence even though the medical evidence has been admitted. Judge Willis did not rule on the probative value objections. The transcript, at pages 20-24 reads:
THE COURT: Mr. Doty do you have anything else?
MR. DOTY: Yes, Your Honor, we would introduce the deposition of Dr. G.C. Miller which was taken on December 2, 1987.
THE COURT: Claimant’s 1 is a deposition of Dr. G.C. Miller taken on the 2nd day of December, ’87; any objections?
MR. GEE: Yes, Your Honor, competency and probative value. The competency objection, Your Honor, goes to the fact he admits his spirometer did not comply with the ATS standards and therefore the AMA Guidelines. The probative questions—
THE COURT: Just a minute. Are you talking about the medical report or is this in the deposition proper?
MR. GEE: In the deposition where he admits that the spirometer did not comply.
THE COURT: Do you have a page number on that?
MR. GEE: Let me find that real quick, Your Honor. I’m sorry, I should have made a note on that. I made a note on one of the others. Okay, Your Honor, page 6.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. GEE: I would also call to the Court’s attention — this is a probative objection, Your Honor; page 10 of the deposition the answers that the doctor gave in regard to the cigarette smoking and the industrial exposure.
THE COURT: Page 10?
MR. GEE: Of the deposition. The answers that the doctor gave to our questions about the cigarette smoking and the industrial exposures; it’s strictly a probative.
THE COURT: I’ll read it, sir.
MR. GEE: I would call to the Court’s attention that even though Dr. Miller attempted to evaluate upper airway impairment he admits that the ears, nose, the nose and throat were within normal limits and his report reflects that.
THE COURT: What kind of objection is that, Mr. Gee?
MR. GEE: It’s primarily a probative in that he admits that there’s no objective pathology to the nose and throat.
THE COURT: Talking about the medical now?
MR. GEE: Yes, ma’am, the medical report itself reflects there’s no pathology.
THE COURT: You may respond if you care to, Mr. Doty. You don't have to.
*597MR. DOTY: Your Honor, the Doctor states he did his state [report] according to the American Thoracic Society’s; also I would note on page 6, the only reason his machine did not comply with the, with the American Thoracic Society’s standards is that his spirometer did not have a printout; it was just a digital.
THE COURT: Is not the digital acceptable, Mr. Gee?
MR. GEE: The ATS standards, and he admits that the ATS standards which are called for in the AMA Guidelines, require producing a printout.
THE COURT: I’ll read all that and take it under consideration. Anything else, Mr. Gee? Are those all your objections?
MR. GEE: Yes, I’m sorry.
(Claimant’s Exhibit No. 1 admitted.)
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Doty?
MR. DOTY: We rest.
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Gee.
MR. GEE: If the Court please: We would ask that the Court mark Dr. Mahaffey’s medical report of November 25th, 1987 as an exhibit and be introduced into evidence.
THE COURT: Respondent’s 1 is a medical report dated November the 25th, 1987 from Dr. Mahaffey; any objections?
MR. DOTY: Yes, Your Honor, I object to the report that it's incompetent and lacks probative value. I object to it that it does not comply with the AMA Guides and that it’s speculative.
THE COURT: Where does it not comply to the AMA Guides?
MR. DOTY: He did not give a D.C.O. test; since Mr. Gee’s brought up the ATS standards I note that the Doctor doesn’t give any spirome-tric printout in this evaluation and I don’t believe he complied with Table 5, page 160 in his evaluation of the upper airways. But that would be a probative value in that.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have a response, a brief response?
MR. GEE: Yes, ma’am, very brief. Dr. Ma-haffey’s machine does produce a printout and it is in compliance with the ATS standards. He did not attach it. If he wanted it attached all he had to have done was ask us and we could have provided it to him.
THE COURT: Why didn’t you attach it though?
MR. GEE: It wasn’t sent to me whenever it came to me and whenever he has cross examined Dr. Mahaffey he’s asked for them and we’ve always provided them. He is aware of the fact that his machine does produce a printout.
MR. DOTY: No, I’m not. I have never cross examdined [sic] Dr. Mahaffey.
MR. GEE: Okay, somebody over at your office has.
THE COURT: I’ll go ahead and admit it.
(Repondent’s Exhibit 1 admitted.)
THE COURT: Anything else, gentlemen? Is this case submitted?
MR. GEE: Case submitted as far as we are concerned, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, you may be excused.
(End of Proceedings.)
. The intended results of our workers’ compensation laws are to provide a "workable means of securing compensation to injured employees and to have industry bear its burden of the wear and tear on the human machine or man power.” Smith & McDannald v. State Industrial Commission, 133 Okl. 77, 271 P. 142, 143 (1928). [Emphasis added.] To accomplish these results, the workers’ "compensation laws should be construed fairly, indeed liberally, in favor of the injured workman_” Stasmos v. State Industrial Commission, 80 Okl. 221, 195 P. 762 (1921). [Emphasis added.]