dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case, as I do not believe this appeal is properly before this Court. Nor can I agree with the new provisions of law on appellate jurisdiction which the majority announces today.
This case involves the grant of a declaratory judgment and mandamus relief after developer E. T. Carlyle Company challenged the validity of Lamar County’s comprehensive solid waste management plan, based upon a variety of State statutes. The trial court found that Lamar County had no valid comprehensive solid waste management plan as required by OCGA § 12-8-31.1, therefore the County’s attempted regulation of solid waste landfills was invalid, and mandamus relief was mandated. Lamar County originally filed an application for discretionary appeal from this order in the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court because a writ of mandamus was granted. However, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal, and it must be returned to the Court of Appeals.
*695Under our Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction over “cases involving extraordinary remedies.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (5). Generally, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. It is also a discretionary remedy. See Schrenko v. DeKalb County School Dist., 276 Ga. 786, 794 (3) (582 SE2d 109) (2003). However, in this case, the trial court exercised no discretion in granting mandamus relief, nor did it grant any other extraordinary remedy. Rather, mandamus relief simply flowed from the trial court’s determination, pursuant to Carlyle’s request for a declaratory judgment, that Lamar County had no valid comprehensive solid waste management plan as required by OCGA § 12-8-31.1, and that its attempted regulation of solid waste landfills was therefore legally ineffective. Quoting Tilley Properties v. Bartow County, 261 Ga. 153, 155 (2) (401 SE2d 527) (1991), the trial court further determined that, in such a circumstance, “there is no valid restriction on the property, and the [applicant] has the right under the law to use the property as it so desires. . . . Because there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal right ... a writ of mandamus will lie to compel the officer to issue a certificate of land use. . . .” Thus, the trial court’s grant of mandamus relief was merely ancillary to its determination of the legal issues upon which the declaratory judgment action was based; in this circumstance, mandamus is not an extraordinary remedy within the meaning of our Constitution.1
Such treatment is not new. Although orders transferring cases between the appellate courts of this State are not usually published, it is clear that this Court has historically transferred mandamus cases to the Court of Appeals when “the mandamus relief sought is ancillary to the underlying issues of law raised on appeal.” Board of Trustees of Fulton County &c. v. Mabry, 221 Ga. App. 762, 763, n. 3 (472 SE2d 542) (1996) (mandamus relief awarded by the trial court). See also King v. Board of Ed. &c., 214 Ga. App. 325 (447 SE2d 657) (1994) (writ denied in the trial court).
Additionally, the principle that an ancillary remedy does not bring a case within this Court’s jurisdiction is in keeping with the oft-stated tenet that it is the underlying subject matter that controls questions of appellate jurisdiction. See Howard v. Lane, 276 Ga. 688, 689 (581 SE2d 1) (2003) (involving a petition for a writ of prohibition, which is also “an extraordinary remedy.” See Weaver v. State, 275 Ga. 136 (562 SE2d 183) (2002)). See also Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 275 Ga. 255, 257 (1) (564 SE2d 715) (2002); Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). This principle is *696most often seen in cases examined under this Court’s jurisdiction over “equity cases.” See Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (2). When the relief sought is simply ancillary to the determination of the underlying legal issues, the case is not within this Court’s equity jurisdiction. Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn., 271 Ga. 745 (524 SE2d 464) (1999). The reasoning this Court has applied in examining its equity jurisdiction is equally applicable to this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over “cases involving extraordinary remedies.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (5). This Court’s jurisdiction over both “equity cases” and “cases involving extraordinary remedies” is found in the same paragraph of the Constitution, and the same analysis should apply to each class of case.2
Further, applying this reasoning to mandamus cases, and other cases involving “extraordinary remedies,” is obviously the correct course given the specific language of this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution. Under Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph III of the Constitution, there are three classes of cases for which this Court is determined to have appellate jurisdiction of “cases involving ...” a particular class. One of these classes is “cases involving extraordinary remedies.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (5). The other two classes are “cases involving title to land” and “cases involving wills.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (1) and (3). In both title to land and wills cases, this Court applies the “underlying subject matter” analysis and transfers cases to the Court of Appeals when the issues involving title to land or wills are merely ancillary to the underlying issues to be decided on appeal. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gwendolyn H. Lott, 251 Ga. 461 (306 SE2d 920) (1983) (“cases involving wills”); Mobley v. Sewell, 226 Ga. App. 866, n. 1 (487 SE2d 398) (1997) (“cases involving title to land”). There is no apparent reason, and the majority advances none, why the constitutional provision concerning “cases involving extraordinary remedies” should be treated any differently. The consistency of this Court’s decisions is not advanced when such a distinction is created without basis.
The majority makes much of the fact that this Court unanimously denied a motion to transfer this case. However, this Court erred in doing so.3 While the majority seems to accord this erroneous decision a high level of regard, it has no hesitation in disregarding *697this Court’s prior determinations in Board of Trustees of Fulton County &c. v. Mabry, supra, and King v. Board of Ed. &c., supra, only now, years later, declaring that this Court then erred.4 Similarly, the majority, only now, and with no substantive discussion, discards case law which has been followed from the earliest days of this Court concerning the discretionary nature of mandamus relief. See, e.g., Schrenko, supra; Harrison v. State Highway Dept., 183 Ga. 290 (2) (a) (188 SE 445) (1938); Van Valkenburg, supra; Smith v. Hodgson, 129 Ga. 494 (59 SE 272) (1907); Savannah &c. Canal Co. v. Shuman, 91 Ga. 400, 402 (17 SE 937) (1893); Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115 (1848). Such long-standing precedent should not be discarded simply because doing so protects the recent, but erroneous, decision of this Court on the earlier motion to transfer this case.
Further, the majority’s declarations weaken this Court’s efforts to protect the constitutional framework of appellate jurisdiction and to ensure that litigants do not use pleading maneuvers for appellate forum shopping. “Our precedent has repeatedly emphasized that. . . litigants cannot under any circumstances dictate the procedural or jurisdictional rules of this Court.” Ferguson, supra at 257. This Court does not “permit litigants to control the appellate procedure, contrary to legislative intent. . . .” O. S. Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 725 (2) (482 SE2d 295) (1997). Yet, this is what the majority opinion does. If, today, the majority of this Court was willing to continue to stand on the tenet that the underlying subject matter controls questions of appellate jurisdiction, the ability of litigants to decide which appellate court they wish to reach, and to draft their pleadings to achieve that end regardless of the underlying issues, would still be restrained.
When this Court makes a mistake, it has the responsibility to admit it. We erred when denying the motion to transfer in this case. Here, the underlying issue concerned a declaratory judgment that Lamar County had no valid comprehensive solid waste management plan. The decision on this issue is not within this Court’s jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction properly lies in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, this Court should not rule upon the merits of this case, as the majority does.
*698Decided March 22, 2004. Smith, Galloway, Lyndall & Fuchs, Newton M. Galloway, Dean R. Fuchs, Lindsey & Jacobs, Tamara Jacobs, for appellants. George E. Butler II, Vaughn, Wright & Stearns, James A. Vaughn, for appellee.The correctness of the trial court’s ruling on the declaratory judgment issues is a matter to be addressed by the Court of Appeals.
In fact, in Van Valkenburg v. Stone, 172 Ga. 642, 647-648 (158 SE 419) (1931), this Court engaged in a discussion on the similarities between mandamus relief and injunctive relief, and noted that the role of the trial court in each type of case was “ ‘intended to [be] . . . upon the same footing as to the question of discretion.’ ” Id. at 648.
The fact that this Court granted the application for discretionary review does not alter the proper determination that jurisdiction is properly in the Court of Appeals. See Cassells v. Bradlee Mgmt. Svcs., 161 Ga. App. 325 (291 SE2d 48) (1982); Fowler v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 159 Ga. App. 190 (283 SE2d 69) (1981).
The majority fails to mention that all current Justices of this Court concurred in the transfer of King v. Board of Ed. &c., supra, except for Justices Thompson and Hines, who were not then on the Court, and that all current Justices of this Court concurred in the transfer of Board of Trustees of Fulton County &c. v. Mabry, supra, except Justice Carley, who dissented.