concurring specially.
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately only for the purpose of noting that this case, like Kelley v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc., 230 Ga. App. 508 (496 SE2d 732) (1998) is one of the first opportunities for this Court to apply the revised doctrines of premises liability cases laid down for us by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997). As I indicated in my special concurrence in Kelly, the Supreme Court’s decision will greatly assist this Court in its work.
Because this Court lacks the authority possessed by the Supreme Court to make policy choices and change the substantive law to conform to those policy choices, frequent disagreements over decisions in premises liability cases were inevitable on this Court had the Supreme Court not intervened. In Robinson, the Supreme Court of Georgia made a clear-cut policy choice favoring plaintiffs in these cases. Further, the Supreme Court stated, plainly and emphatically, that “the ‘routine’ issues of premises liability, i.e., the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s lack of ordinary care for personal safety, are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, and that summary judgment is granted only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed.” Id. at 748.
Although we no doubt will continue to face difficult casés in this area, I have every expectation that this Court will apply Robinson fully, with the result that the vast majority of these cases, as the Supreme Court clearly intends, will be for jury determination. The cost hkely will be more litigation activity and expense at the trial *734court level; the benefit should be a significant decrease in the level of uncertainty surrounding these cases for trial judges, lawyers, and litigants. It appears the Supreme Court determined that this benefit is worth the cost. This Court and the trial courts now must implement the Supreme Court’s choice. That duty will present challenges, but I expect it to be less onerous than our task under pre-Robinson law.
Decided February 24, 1998 Walter D. Adams, for appellant. Lee, Black, Scheer & Hart, Steven E. Scheer, Christopher L. Rouse, for appellee.