dissenting. I agree with Judge Pannell’s dissent, and add the following thereto: This court has recently adopted two different theories respecting whether or not accord and satisfaction, and certain other similar affirmative defenses, must be pleaded before the pleader can obtain relief thereunder.
The first case is that of Chastain Finance Co. v. Sherwood, 117 Ga. App. 556 (161 SE2d 401) written by Judge Pannell, concurred in by Judges Jordan and Deen, decided April 1, 1968, and which holds that such defense must be pleaded. The second is that of Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 342 (2a) (173 SE2d 723) written by Judge Eberhardt, concurred in by *30Judges Jordan and Pannell, dated March 6, 1970, which holds that such defense may be raised for the first time in a motion for summary judgment.
Both of these decisions were rendered subsequent to enactment of our summary judgment law, and are obviously in conflict with each other. Under the rule of stare decisis (see Hartley v. Nash, 157 Ga. 402, 405 (121 SE 295)) I feel that we are bound by the oldest decision rendered subsequent to enactment of the new law on summary judgments. I therefore concur in Judge Pannell’s dissent.
It seems to me that a full court should overrule one or the other of these two conflicting decisions. If Chastain, supra, should be overruled, I would be willing to vote for Judge Quillian’s majority opinion.