I agree with the conclusion that despite some obvious and glaring deficiencies in his representation, petitioner was not prejudiced or denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. I write separately because I decline to endorse the gratuitous speculation by the majority that in Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993) 506 U.S. 364 [122 L.Ed.2d 180, 113 S.Ct. 838] the United States Supreme Court recast the prevailing standard for determining whether and when trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally inadequate. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 721-722.)
Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. 364, was decided on virtually unique facts: at trial, counsel failed to make a Collins objection (Collins v. Lockhart (8th Cir. 1985) 754 F.2d 258) challenging the constitutionality of the defendant’s death sentence because an element of the crime was also used as a factor in aggravation. The state Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s various ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct and collateral review because it had not yet addressed the merits of the underlying issue. By the time the matter reached the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on petition for writ of habeas corpus, that court had overruled Collins two years previously (Perry v. Lockhart (8th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2d 1384). Nevertheless, it found the defendant had been denied his constitutional right to effective counsel by virtue of the failure to object when Collins was extant law.
The United States Supreme Court reversed on the rationale that to apply a strictly “outcome determinative” test in these circumstances “may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. [Citation.]” (Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 370 [122 L.Ed.2d at p. 189, 113 S.Ct. at p. 843].) Despite conceded error, an omission of this type, “as a matter of law, ought not inform the [prejudice] inquiry. . . .” (Id., at p. 373 [122 L.Ed.2d at p. 192,113 S.Ct. at p. 845] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.); see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 695 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052] [“An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’ and the like.”]; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) All U.S. 365 [91 L.Ed.2d 305, 106 S.Ct. 2574] [failure to make a meritless Fourth Amendment claim not prejudicial]; Nix v. Whiteside (1986) *740475 U.S. 157 [89 L.Ed.2d 123, 106 S.Ct. 988] [no prejudice due to counsel’s failure to utilize perjured testimony].) Therefore, whether the trial was unfair or unreliable became the relevant inquiry. (Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at pp. 371-372 [122 L.Ed.2d at pp. 190-191, 113 S.Ct. at p. 844.].)
As Justice O’Connor explains in her concurring opinion, however, this result did not augur a new standard for testing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. On the contrary, the court’s “narrow holding” was limited to the “unusual circumstance” of that case. (Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at pp. 374-375 [122 L.Ed.2d at p. 192, 113 S.Ct. at p. 845.] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) Distinguishing those few and infrequent instances in which an assessment of fairness and reliability will supersede an outcome-focused analysis, Justice O’Connor emphasizes that the “decision will, in the vast majority of cases, have no effect on the prejudice inquiry under [Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668]. The determinative question —whether there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,’ [citation]—remains unchanged.” (506 U.S. at p. 373 [122 L.Ed.2d at p. 192].)
Here, petitioner’s assertions of ineffective assistance are not based upon any unusual circumstance involving “an advantage the law might permit him” on a “decidedly incorrect point.” (Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at pp. 374-375 [122 L.Ed.2d at pp. 192-193, 113 S.Ct. at p. 845] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) Quite the opposite: he principally makes the entirely routine claim counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Accordingly, if “there is a reasonable probability that, absent [such] errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death,” then petitioner has established prejudice under the only applicable standard. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 695 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 698].)
Since Strickland defines the appropriate measure for prejudice, there is no reason for the majority to generate possible confusion by quoting with apparent approval references in Lockhart v. Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. at pp. 368, 372 [122 L.Ed.2d at pp. 188-191], to questions of unfairness and unreliability. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 721-722.) Such inquiries are plainly irrelevant under the facts. In concluding petitioner has failed to establish prejudice under either standard (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 722, fn. 5,), the majority compound the potential for uncertainty by implying that both the general rule of Strickland and the limited exception articulated in Fretwell inform our inquiry. They do not; the latter has no bearing on the resolution of this case.
*741Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, has stood for more than a decade as the mainstay of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence governing the right to effective assistance of counsel. Before suggesting a transmutation or contemplating a departure, we should await a more definitive and explicit pronouncement from the high court as final arbiter. (Cf. In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 924 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 864 P.2d 474] (conc. opn. of Arabian, J.).)