(dissenting). The court's construction of sec. 943.45, Stats., makes subsection (4) meaningless. However, we are to construe a statute so as not to render any part of it superfluous, if such construction can be avoided. State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 560, 456 N.W.2d 143, 146 (1990). I conclude that the statute can be construed so that subsection (4) is not rendered superfluous. Such a construction requires that we reverse the judgment.
Subsection (1) of sec. 943.45, Stats. (1989-90), lists ways in which a person may attempt to obtain telecommunications service by fraud. Subsection (3) provides:
Whoever violates this section is guilty of:
(a) A Class A misdemeanor, if the charges for the service obtained, or attempted to be obtained, do not exceed $500.
(b) A Class E felony, if the charges for the service obtained, or attempted to be obtained, exceed $500.1
Count I of the information alleged that between October 8, 1985, and February 3, 1986, Davis fraudulently obtained telephone services in the amount of *726$6,647.71 through an account she opened in the name of Cheryl Sloan. Count II alleged that Davis fraudulently obtained telephone services between November 19,1985, and March 11, 1986, in the amount of $968.34 through an account she opened in the name of S. & L. Financial Consultants. I cannot disagree with the court's opinion that Counts I and II are not "identical in law and fact." State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 378 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1985). Therefore, if sec. 943.45, Stats., stopped at subsection (3), Davis would be guilty of two Class E felonies.
We cannot, however, repeal subsection (4) of sec. 943.45, Stats., by judicial construction. Subsection (4) provides:
When there has been more than one unlawful obtaining, or attempt to obtain, by an offender, the aggregate of the charges for the telecommunications service unlawfully obtained, or attempted to be obtained, shall determine the grade of the offense. [Emphasis added.]
Plainly, Davis obtained telephone service by "more than one unlawful obtaining." Because the aggregate of charges for the service she obtained exceeds $500, under subsection (3) she is guilty of a felony. However, by not giving effect to subsection (4), the trial court and this court permit Davis to be charged with, and convicted of, two felonies.
The plain language of subsection (4) is contrary to this result. The legislature has provided that in cases involving more than one "unlawful obtaining," the aggregate value of the charges for the telecommunications service obtained determines whether the offender will be charged with a misdemeanor or a felony, not *727whether the offender will be charged with more than one misdemeanor or more than one felony.
What if Davis had obtained telephone, services for which the charges were less than $500 on each count for which she is charged? Would the court allow the prosecutor to aggregate those service charges and charge Davis with a felony, or would it require that she be charged with two Class A misdemeanors? I submit that the legislature intended to permit the state to charge an offender under such circumstances with the more serious crime.
Section 943.45, Stats., was created by ch. 248, Laws of 1961 to read:
Whoever with intent to defraud obtains or attempts to obtain telecommunications service by any of the following means may be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned not more than 30 days, or both:
(1) Charging such service to an existing telephone number or credit card number without the consent of the subscriber thereto or the legitimate holder thereof.
(2) Charging such service to a false, fictitious, suspended, terminated, expired, canceled or revoked telephone number or credit card number.
Section 943.45, Stats., was repealed and recreated by ch. 489, Laws of 1963, to read substantially as does the present statute. Under the 1961 version, obtaining telecommunications service by fraud was á misdemeanor. Each unlawful act was a separate offense. I conclude that the legislature recognized that the 1961 law ■ was ineffective in dealing with the offender who repeatedly violated the statute. The 1961 version of the statute required the cumbersome charging procedure of treating each offense separately and prosecuting each as a misde*728meanor. In place of this cumbersome procedure, the legislature substituted the present procedure, where the persistent violator may be prosecuted as a felon if the charges for the service obtained, or attempted to be obtained, exceed $500.
The nature of the proscribed conduct lends itself to a legislative determination that the allowable unit of prosecution shall be a course of conduct in which the offender, by a series of acts, obtains telecommunications service by fraud. Each attempt, successful or unsuccessful, is likely to involve a relatively small charge for the service obtained or attempted to be obtained. Therefore, it was sensible for the legislature to prescribe punishment based upon the aggregate value of the charges for the service unlawfully obtained or attempted to be obtained. Further, because each attempt typically involves a relatively small charge, it was sensible to avoid the cumbersome procedure of multiple prosecutions where the offender is accused of numerous attempts to unlawfully obtain such service.
Finally, for the reasons expressed, it would be inappropriate for the legislature to prescribe multiple punishments for the conduct. In fact, the repeal and recreation of the 1961 law shows that the legislature concluded it was inappropriate to provide multiple punishments for the conduct proscribed by the statute.
For these reasons, I conclude that the legislature intended that the allowable unit of prosecution under sec. 943.45, Stats., shall be the course of conduct of obtaining telecommunications service by fraud. I do not, however, conclude that there is no temporal component which the state may consider in charging under sec. 943.45. A statute must be construed to avoid an unreasonable result. In this case, however, the telephone ser*729vices were obtained by Davis at the same address over periods of time which substantially overlapped.
Finally, I consider the appropriate remedy. Davis argues that the charges against her should be dismissed. I disagree. I conclude that the appropriate remedy is a remand for resentencing, with directions that the state dismiss one count to avoid the multiplicity.
In U.S. v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1992), defendants were impermissibly convicted on several counts for committing several acts in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud. They argued that the decision in U.S. v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991), required that the court reverse and dismiss all of their bank fraud convictions. The court disagreed: "We have explained that 'multiplicity addresses double jeopardy; and where the jury is allowed to return convictions on multiplic-itous counts, the remedy is to remand for resentencing, with the government dismissing the counts that create, the multiplicity.'" Saks, 964 F.2d at 1526 (quoting U.S. v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 347-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 80 (1991)). I conclude that the same remedy should be applied in this case.
Sections 3618c and 3619c, 1991 Wis. Act 39, amended sec. 943.45(3)(b), Stats., so that fraudulently obtaining, or attempting to obtain, telecommunications services in excess of $1,000 constitutes a felony.