concurring specially.
“ ‘Let your fingers do the walking’ is a commercial jingle urging use of the yellow pages of telephone directories. That such classified sections are regarded as valuable by business is shown in the instant case.” (Emphasis supplied.) F. N. Roberts Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 132 Ga. App. 800 (209 SE2d 138) (1974). See also Discount Fabric House v. Wis. Tel. Co., 345 NW2d 417 (Wis. 1984), where it was pointed out that this service is of “essential importance to the public.” (Emphasis supplied.) In another exemplary case, which highlights judicial deference to an exercise of broad discretion, an advertiser, with an AAA alphabetic and almost addictive alliterative affliction or affinity analysis, actually attempted to attain, achieve and accomplish arithmetically an acme, apex, and alpha position in the directory by adding twenty-three A’s to form its name. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 373 P2d 31 (Okla. 1962).
1. There seems to be no dispute that the threshold question in *311the instant case concerned classifying publication of the yellow pages as a purely private enterprise or as a matter connected with the telephone company’s responsibilities as a public utility. The appellee correctly notes that if its publication of the yellow pages is a matter of private enterprise, it could reject with impunity any offers to place advertisements. This court in fact once suggested by obiter dictum that “publication of the yellow pages is apart from Southern Bell’s public service ...” Southern Bell v. C & S Realty Co., 141 Ga. App. 216, 221 (233 SE2d 9) (1977), overruled on other grounds, Ga.-Carolina Brick &c. Co. v. Brown, 153 Ga. App. 747, 752 (266 SE2d 531) (1980). As pointed out by the majority opinion, the language in Southern Bell v. C & S Realty Co. was cited with approval in the whole court case of Southern Bell v. Coastal Transmission Svc., 167 Ga. App. 611, 612 (307 SE2d 83) (1983), concerning whether Southern Bell’s contractual limitation of liability for ordinary negligence violated, public policy. Nevertheless, it is clear that in neither case was the precise issue, presented by the instant case, before this court. I find preferable the view that “[t]he telephone company has an exclusive private advertising business which, if not legally monopolistic, is tied to its public utility service of providing telephone service.” Discount Fabric House v. Wis. Tel. Co., supra at 421. Mere nomenclature or form (technically private) must always yield to substance or reality (partly public). Thus, “[i]n the absence of regulation by the State [as in the instant case with the yellow pages directory], the whole subject of the making of rules and regulations is left to the [public utility], subject only to control by the courts of their reasonableness or discriminatory character.” Railroad Comm. of Ga. v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 140 Ga. 817, 826 (80 SE 327) (1913). See also Videon Corp. v. Burton, 369 SW2d 264 (Mo. App. 1963), and AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra. Accordingly, the appellee has considerable discretion in selecting the contents of the yellow pages advertising, although that exercise of discretion may be controlled by the courts if it is unreasonable or discriminatory. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA in particular emphasizes judicial deference to the exercise of this broad discretion unless it is arbitrary, unjust, or unreasonable.
I believe that the trial court (as well as the majority opinion) incorrectly classified the appellee’s publication of the yellow pages directory as a private enterprise, although the trial court did, nevertheless, ultimately review the decision to reject the appellant’s advertisement as if the appellee were a public utility. In doing so, the trial court concluded that the appellee’s decision to exclude the specific advertisement was based upon a valid and rational business determination, and I agree. This test of a rational business determination by the ethics committee was the proper standard and was *312correctly applied. It appears to be a higher standard ór test than a board of directors’ business judgment rule. The latter duty of informed good faith/honest belief is directed mostly toward protecting stockholders and depositors, while the former is a higher and larger duty for protecting the public at large.
The appellee maintained a set of standards for determining whether to accept an advertisement, and section 5.26 of those standards provided that advertisements with regard to homosexuals may be rejected on the grounds that such may be offensive to a segment of the directory users. The appellee obviously was not discriminatory in its application of this standard, as no other advertisements similar to that of the appellant were accepted for publication. The sole issue is whether the appellee’s decision to reject the advertisement was arbitrary.
Certainly the general reason to exclude, i.e., the policy of not publishing an advertisement that may be offensive to a segment of society, is not irrational or arbitrary. The appellant contends that the specific application of that policy in this case was arbitrary, claiming that no evidence exists to support the appellee’s determination that the appellant’s advertisement may be offensive, in view of the absence of any complaints when the same advertisement had been published some time earlier. That assertion, however, is based upon pure speculation. The tenor of the times cannot be conclusively measured by the number of complaints; it is just as likely (and speculative) that some silent portion of the populance grimaced and bore the offense. This court should not impose upon the appellee a burden of conducting a certified statewide poll to measure societal approval of an advertisement.
This writer notes with great interest the appellant’s contention that some people may consider the words “Christian,” “Mormon,” and “Islamic,” which are printed in the directory, to be just as controversial or offensive as the words “gay” and “lesbian.” This argument is not advanced to equate the last two quoted words on parity as a religion seeking equal treatment, exercise and protection with the first three quoted religions, but is articulated that similar treatment of advertisement in the yellow pages is sought because the latter is thought no less controversial and offensive to some than the former. In any event, the limited test to be applied in this case should be whether the publisher exercised good faith in making its determination that a particular advertisement may be offensive to a segment of society.
In the instant case, Edmund Gay (who was in charge of the directory) and the appellee’s ethics committee considered the interests of both the gay community and the non-gay community. Based upon their experience and perception of societal attitudes, Gay and the committee decided that the appellant’s advertisement may be offen*313sive to some people. There is absolutely no indication in the record that Gay and the committee were anything but sincere in that determination. In short, the appellee exercised discretion in making its determination, and there is nothing even to suggest arbitrariness. The accuracy of the appellee’s perception of societal reaction is another issue, and one that is immaterial in the review of the publisher’s exercise of discretion.
2. Where First Amendment speech interests are involved, radio and television broadcasters may be required to provide equal access, under a “fairness doctrine.” See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (89 SC 1794, 23 LE2d 371) (1969). This is because they use public airwaves and, with only limited, regulated competition, are essentially monopolistic. A newspaper publisher is not subject to similar regulation. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (94 SC 2831, 41 LE2d 730) (1974). Under the analyses employed in Red Lion and Tornillo, the position and duty of the appellee as a publisher of the yellow pages directory surely would lie somewhere between that of a radio/television broadcaster and a newspaper, although it would appear that the appellee is more akin to the former since some extra public duty exists. A parallel might be drawn with the responsibility and position of trustees of a public library. Such trustees obviously have a public duty to make available a broad selection of books. Nevertheless, certain limitations are obvious. Limited financial resources necessitate exclusion of some books, and the trustees may also exclude books which they determine in their discretion to be objectionable, provided that decision has a rational basis and is not discriminatory.
Since the appellee is a private entity, however, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the appellant no basis or right to have its advertisement included in the yellow page directory. (Assuming arguendo that it did, commercial speech interests would be at issue, which do not enjoy the degree of protection extended to pure speech interests.) It should be emphasized nevertheless that the present generation of “lawyers has an unparalleled opportunity to aid in the formulation of a state constitutional jurisprudence that will protect the rights and liberties of our people, however the philosophy of the U. S. Supreme Court may ebb and flow.” State v. Jewett, 146 Vt__(500 A2d 233) (1985). Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V of the Ga. Constitution provides that “[e]very person may speak, write, or publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” It may very well be that this state constitutional provision would have some bearing on the instant case, but unfortunately neither party raised this matter in the proceedings below, thus precluding this court from addressing it.
*3143. In summary, although I cannot concur with the classification of the appellee’s publication of the yellow pages directory as a private enterprise, it appears that the trial court actually reviewed the decision to reject the appellant’s advertisement as if the appellee were a public utility. Because the trial court thus properly analyzed the appellee’s duty in selecting advertisements for the yellow pages directory and correctly concluded that no abuse of discretion occurred, I agree that the trial court should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this special concurrence.