dissenting.
I believe that the trial court correctly ruled in this case for the reasons set forth by the Court of Appeals in Carlisle v. State, 257 Ga. App. 282 (570 SE2d 616) (2003). Accordingly, I dissent to the majority’s reversal of the Court of Appeals judgment which affirmed the *102trial court. As so clearly stated by Judge Mikell, writing for the Court of Appeals, “when it granted Carlisle’s request to withdraw her guilty plea, the habeas court expressly stated that ‘Petitioner’s plea of not guilty to all charges in said Indictment, as originally entered at her arraignment thereon, is reinstated in its entirety.’ [This Court] affirmed the habeas court’s decision. Wetherington v. Carlisle, [273 Ga. 854 (547 SE2d 559) (2001)]. Therefore, both Carlisle and the state should be in the same position they were prior to the entry of the guilty plea, as Carlisle’s plea of not guilty to the entire original indictment has been reinstated.” Carlisle v. State, supra at 284. Thus, I disagree with the majority that the State had to reindict in order to reinstate the charges nolle prossed because the habeas court, with the approval of this Court, has already done that.
Decided September 15, 2003. Brian Steel, for appellant. Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, David K. Keeton, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.