dissenting.
In a result-oriented decision, the majority proceeds to create a new species of immunity for Virginia. I cannot join that endeavor.
*497The trial court ruled, correctly in my opinion, that these State employees were entitled to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the trial court required the plaintiff to establish that the defendants were grossly negligent in the discharge of their discretionary duties and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, sustained when her throat was slit by a juvenile delinquent who had been released from the State corrections system. The trial court’s ruling was in accord with the body of law on the subject developed over the years in this State. The jury found, in a verdict confirmed by the trial court, that defendants’ release of the juvenile delinquent was grossly negligent in view of the information concerning his history and propensity for violence and aggressive behavior.
Nevertheless, the majority now extends a type of judicial immunity to persons outside the class of judicial officers that are described in the Virginia cases cited in the majority opinion. Until today, this class included “the highest judge in the State” and extended “to the lowest officer who sits as a court and tries petty causes.” Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131, 139 (1885). Now, the Court adds to the class an aftercare supervisor, a rehabilitative counselor, and a learning center supervisor in order to insulate those persons from tort liability for grossly negligent conduct.
I believe the trial court accorded these defendants all the immunity to which they were entitled. Thus, I would affirm the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.