(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree fully with the majority’s discussion and conclusion regarding Issue I, the subject matter jurisdiction of the probate court to determine paternity. However, I disagree with the majority’s view on Issue II and respectfully dissent therefrom.
Although neither res judicata nor claim or issue preclusion is strictly involved here because of the intervention of the statute, much of the same analysis that would be required under those doctrines should be utilized here. See generally Crestwood Golf Club, Inc. v. Potter, 328 S.C. 201, 216-17, 493 S.E.2d 826, 834-35 (1997). There is, however, one significant difference. The statute requires an adjudication of paternity, not merely an opportunity for an adjudication. In the final analysis, I do not believe the divorce decree constituted an adjudication of paternity within the contemplation of the statute.
A review of the divorce proceeding is revealing. The action was commenced by a complaint containing six brief factual paragraphs together with two even more brief paragraphs setting forth the relief requested. The only factual paragraph related to paternity alleged that to the union one child, Nancy Jane Neely Wells, was born “who is now married and no longer dependent on the plaintiff for support.” No relief was requested of the court relating to this child, the prayer being limited to a divorce and “any other and further relief as to the court may seem just and proper.” The defendant, John Thomas Neely, defaulted. A reference was held before a special referee. In the minutes of the reference, one question was asked about the child, as follows:
Q: I believe there was one child born to this union and that child is now grown and married?
A: Yes, sir.
That is the sum and substance of the testimony as to paternity. The referee then issued his report, which contains only *529one sentence related to the child: “The evidence further showed that the parties to this action are the parents of one child, who is now grown and married, and that since this child is now married, there is no question of custody or support.” None of the findings and recommendations by the special referee relate to the child or the question of paternity. There followed a perfunctory decree of the court adopting in full the recommendations of the special referee and awarding the plaintiff a divorce, without even mentioning the existence of a child.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that this action established only that the parties were entitled to a divorce from one another. However, the issue of the paternity of the child was not necessary to that conclusion. Paternity was never actually litigated, nor did it have to be.
I would, therefore, affirm the probate court on this issue.