concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the opinion except for the holding, in Division 2, that “[a]s for that portion of the roof repaired by Riner, Canal is not obligated to provide coverage.”
Earlier in that division, the majority finds the policy’s intent is to provide coverage for “damage to property caused by defective workmanship in repairing the work” and to exclude “only property damage to the insured’s own work.” Blackshear’s underlying complaint alleges that Riner’s negligence caused “significant and substantial damages” to the roof of Blackshear’s tobacco warehouse. It alleges that flaws in the repair caused damages to the roof.
Riner repaired the roof, or attempted to do so, by spraying a urethane in liquid form on a section of the existing metal roof and on certain other spots where there were joints and seams. It was to insulate and seal the roof so it would no longer leak. The whole roof was not similarly covered with the urethane because of the limit on insurance funds available for the project. Riner testified that after he applied the urethane, the roof expanded and contracted and popped open one of the sections so water got in.
Griffis, one of the principals in Blackshear, testified that Black-shear had earlier installed the metal right over the old tar roof which was on the building when Blackshear bought it a few years earlier. Riner just covered the existing roof with the urethane to waterproof it.
Thus, to the extent the roof itself was damaged by work performed by Riner, whether that be portions of the roof underneath the urethane or portions of the roof not covered by the urethane, the policy would apply. The trial court’s order granting summáry judgment on this aspect of the case should be affirmed in that Blackshear does *641not seek recovery for damages to the insulation and sealant applied by Riner, that is, to his work product. The product produced was the .urethane cover, not the roof.
Decided July 11, 1997 Reconsideration denied July 28, 1997. Alexander & Vann, William C. Sanders, Allen E. Lockerman IV, for appellant. Kenneth E. Futch, Jr., for appellee.As quoted in Gary L. Shaw Builders v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App. 220, 223 (355 SE2d 130) (1987), “ ‘[the] purpose of this comprehensive liability insurance coverage is to provide protection for personal injury or for property damage caused by the completed product, but not for the replacement and repair of that product.’ [Cit.]” What is not covered are business risks; what is covered are occurrences giving rise to insurable liability. Id. at 224.