(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Due process does not require that the government provide the accused with any and all information which has the possibility of being relevant to the ease. The scope of the constitutional protection is for exculpatory evidence: evidence which is “both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). Evidence qualifies as material exculpatory evidence if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. State v. Clobes, 422 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn.1988) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). In this case, it is beyond doubt that the journals sought by the defense were in no way favorable to the accused as to the issue of whether he violated MinnStat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) and would not have changed the outcome of the defendant’s trial.
The journals trace a sexual relationship between the defendant and the pubescent complainant over a number of years, as well as the profound, detrimental effect that this relationship had on the complainant.- Numerous journal entries relate how the defendant would enter the complainant’s bedroom late at night or stay with her in the television room in the basement after the other family members had gone to sleep and would become intimate with her. For example, on May 21,1991, the complainant describes how the defendant took advantage of the fact that her mother was on the phone to enter her room and Mss her and how, the same night, “Lyf came up to my room [and] everyone was sleeping and he stayed there [with] me in my bed for about an hour then left.” The journal then indicates that the following night “about 1:00 Lyf came into my room [and] Mssed me [and] told me to come downstairs [and] so I went down there and Lyf put on a condom, I’m glad he did. Then he just layed [sic] there holding me [and] he said that he misses that [and] I said so do I.” Other entries also attest to the physical nature of the contact. On July 19, 1991, the complainant writes how the defendant told her that “I look good, I smell good [and] I taste good.” On August 20, 1991, the complainant expresses her concern that she has not had her period in several months and might be pregnant, stating “If I’m pregnant I’ll drop dead right here [and] now.”
As the complainant grew older, her intimations in the journals about the nature of her contacts with the defendant became more direct. On April 8, 1993, the complainant writes about the defendant, “And all he likes me for is my body, but he will never ever touch it again.” On April 13, 1993, she writes, “[H]e sure isn’t gonna be £_king me in the near future. Even though he thinks he is. He’s not.” On May 31, 1994, the complainant writes about the sexual encounter that occurred with the defendant after she turned seventeen. However, the journal entry reveals more about what occurred when the complainant was younger, “I actually let myself believe that Lyf cared for me awhile again but it’s just the same * * * thing. All he wants me for is sex. * * * I just don’t think of him as a friend anymore [and] I’ll never trust him again cuz this is the second time now.”
These journals clearly attest to the ongoing, sexual relationship between the defendant and the complainant and, as such, incriminate, rather than exculpate, the defendant. The journals’ reference to the use of a condom, the defendant “tasting” the complainant, and the complainant’s fear of pregnancy, and the reference to “f_ing” strongly indicate that sexual pen*700etration occurred.1 The journals’ lack of detailed anatomical descriptions of the sex acts or the use of the word “sex” to describe the acts in a later journal but not in earlier ones are simply neutral facts which in no way negate the crime charged. Even if the journals’ lack of detail were considered to have some exculpatory value, there is no reasonable probability that the admission of the journals would have changed the verdict of the jury. Rather, the admission of the journals would have strengthened the prosecution’s case by corroborating the complainant’s testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.
The admission of the journals would have corroborated the complainant’s testimony that she was only eleven or twelve when the sexual exploitation began. In one entry of May 1993, complainant wrote, “I hate Lyf so much. * * * Why did he f_ing have to do that to me. He ruined my life. ⅜ ⅜ * God, I was only 12 f_ing [years] old.” The journals would have also corroborated the complainant’s testimony regarding the defendant’s modus operandi in sneaking into her room late at night and her testimony regarding the circumstances under which she and the defendant engaged in sexual activity in her older brother’s room. On May 28, 1991, the complainant wrote, “My mom and my brother went to the lake cabin [and] my Dad went on Saturday night. Me [and] Lyf [and] my sister stayed home. In the morning, I went downstairs [and] me [and] Lyf stayed down there [and] then we went in [brother’s] room so [sister] wouldn’t come in on-us * * *.” Additionally, the August 20, 1991 journal entry stating the complainant’s fear of pregnancy resulting from her overdue menstrual period would have corroborated complainant’s testimony and statement in her phone call to defendant that she feared pregnancy following sexual intercourse with the defendant. The journals would have also corroborated complainant’s testimony about the bad, guilty feelings that grew over time as the complainant matured and wrestled with her feelings about the sexual acts of the past. On June 14, 1993, the complainant wrote “Lyf couldn’t do anything or say anything right now to make me not hate him. I can’t believe what he did. * * ⅜ I wonder if he ever worries about me telling someone the truth about him. He would have no life left then. He’d be in jail.”
In addition to the corroboration of the complainant’s testimony by the journals, the corroborating testimony of the complainant’s sister and other witnesses placed the overwhelming balance of the evidence in favor of the state: the testimony of childhood neighbors that they saw the defendant, with little or no clothes on, laying on top of the complainant and kissing her in her bed; the complainant’s sister’s testimony that she frequently saw the defendant and the complainant lying close together on the couch with a blanket over them; complainant’s high school friend’s testimony that, at the age of fifteen or sixteen, the complainant showed her semen stains on her bedspread and told her that complainant and defendant had performed oral sex on each other and that the defendant had “put his penis into her and *701they had sex,”2 and the defendant’s own admissions in a phone conversation with the complainant.3 The explicit testimony of the complainant and her high school Mend as to the sexual acts committed by the defendant provided the jury ample evidence that sexual penetration occurred; hence, the jury was not left to speculate on this issue.
In addition, the defendant did not suffer any violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by the trial court’s limiting his cross-examination on the subject of the journals. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (emphasis in original). The trial court has wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about prejudice, confusion of the issues, or “interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The trial court prohibited cross-examination on the content of the journals based on its determination that their content was irrelevant to proving whether the abuse actually occurred because, unlike business records, the journals were unreliable as a source of factual record. I agree with the trial court that the journals were only marginally relevant and would have been likely to distract the jury from the true issue at hand; whether the defendant violated Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g).
The defendant argues that the trial court “opened the door” for cross-examination on complainant’s journals by admitting the tape of the telephoné conversation between the defendant and the complainant discussing whether the complainant should present the journals to her therapist. However, the trial court instructed counsel to limit the use of the tape to showing the state of mind of the defendant upon hearing that some record of his actions might have been made. The prosecutor followed this instruction, restricting her remarks- about the journals in her opening and closing statements to the defendant’s reactions.4 The damning effect of the taped conversation lay in the defendant’s hasty reaction to learning of the possibility of a record, rather than in the complainant’s oblique references to her journals. Virtually within seconds of the complainant telling the defendant that she had started writing journals in the eighth grade and that one of the journals contained information about the instance when the neighbor children witnessed them together on complainant’s bed, the defendant told the complainant, “I’d destroy those if I were you * *
Furthermore, even if it was error to prevent cross-examination on this narrow issue, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a re*702viewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. "Whether an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon factors such as the importance of the witness’s testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting evidence on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Id.
Cross-examination on the content of the complainant’s journals would not have damaged the prosecution’s case, but on the contrary, would have only strengthened it by corroborating the testimony of the complainant and other witnesses. Additionally, the fact that the defendant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the complainant regarding the alleged abuse and develop his theories as to complainant’s motives for testifying minimized any possibility for prejudice stemming from this narrow limitation on cross-examination. Given the strength of the prosecution’s case and the corroborating testimony on the material fact of penetration previously noted, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to limit cross-examination on the issue of the contents of the complainant’s journals.
In sum, I fail to see how the defendant’s week-long trial was anything less than fair when the defense had ample opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and the corroborating witnesses at length regarding the details of the alleged sexual abuse and when the evidence excluded was unreliable, hearsay evidence which was overwhelmingly harmful and incriminating to the defendant.
.Although the high school friend had told investigators originally that complainant and defendant almost had sex, she cleared up this ambiguity in her testimony, stating that complainant told her that in the beginning, she and defendant would come close to having sex, but didn’t, but then at one point they did have "actual sex.” Confusion over this point likely stemmed from the fact that defendant was not able to completely penetrate the complainant vaginally and therefore, the complainant did not believe that this qualified as "sex.” Complainant expressed this misconception in her phone conversation with the defendant, when she mentioned that the journal related an instance in which she thought she was pregnant When the defendant responded that she couldn’t have been pregnant because they didn’t have intercourse, complainant responded "We sort of did though.” When defendant again denied having intercourse, the complainant stated "Yeah, I suppose, I didn’t know although I was so little I couldn’t tell the difference.”
. The defendant expressed his fear of getting into trouble over the contents of the journals because "it happened when you weren’t eighteen.” He also apologizes to the complainant stating, "And you know I can’t[,] I’m not gonna make an excuse for it that’s all it was it was a mistake and I wish I could of expressed things differently * * * .” When the complainant asked him if he meant expressing his feelings sexually, the defendant responded in the affirmative.
. The defendant did not request that the court provide the juty with a limiting instruction regarding the use of the tape pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 105 and therefore, the court did not give one.