concurring specially.
I concur, but we should point out to the extent they cite with approval or depend on a principle which the Supreme Court concluded is not the law.
We originally ruled that the City of Riverdale could not be liable because mere negligence is insufficient to support a cause of action for nuisance, citing City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga. App. 312, 316-317 (439 SE2d 95) (1993). Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 219 Ga. App. 457, 458 (1) (465 SE2d 486) (1995). The Supreme Court held that to be incorrect; if the city acquires a duty to maintain property, then a failure to do so (i.e., negligence) constitutes nuisance if it is continuing or repetitious and the city can be held liable. It cannot be held liable for a single act of negligence under the theory of nuisance, however, because in order to constitute nuisance it must be a contin*892uing or repetitious act which is being complained of. Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 267 Ga. 337 (478 SE2d 121) (1996).
City of Lawrenceville quotes the erroneous principle also. Although the court initially applies it only in a “moreover” context, 211 Ga. App. at 316, quoting the problematic principle from Denson v. City of Atlanta, 202 Ga. App. 325, 327 (414 SE2d 312) (1991), the Court finally holds: “Even assuming arguendo that the City was responsible for maintaining the drainage system, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed at most that the City was negligent, and, negligence is insufficient to support a cause of action for nuisance. Denson, supra.” Id. at 317 (3). So City of Lawrenceville reached the right result, because “there [was] no evidence that the City exercised any control over this drainage system.” Id. It was right for this reason but wrong in the reason the Court gave.
Denson, a whole court case, seems to be the source of the error. It misstates a principle which it says is found in City of Atlanta v. Roberts, 133 Ga. App. 585 (211 SE2d 615) (1974). Denson states, “If the act, omission, or defect alleged to constitute a nuisance is merely negligence, no matter how egregious the result, the municipality will not be liable for damage suffered.” Id. at 327. A correct statement would have been, “If the act, omission, or defect alleged to constitute a nuisance is merely a single isolated act of negligence, no matter how egregious the result, the municipality will not be liable for damage suffered.” See the dissent, which analyzes the case in accordance with City of Bowman v. Gunnells, 243 Ga. 809 (256 SE2d 782) (1979), the same case the Supreme Court uses in Hibbs, and concludes there was evidence of nuisance so as to support the verdicts because all three guidelines were met.1
Denson’s statement misstates what City of Atlanta v. Roberts stands for. It upheld the grant of partial summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s nuisance claim because only “a single isolated act of negligence” was shown, “‘and this is not sufficient to show such a negligent trespass constituted a nuisance.’ ” City of Atlanta v. Roberts, supra at 587 (2). We also held that the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to defendant city “as to the negligence phase of the case in obstructing the street.” Id. at 587 (1). That was a separate count.
*893Decided July 15, 1997 Reconsideration denied August 5, 1997 James A. Eidson, for appellants. Foster & Foster, Larry A. Foster, Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Theodore Freeman, Donald J. Grate, Nena K. Puckett, for appellee.The record should be set straight, else the error be compounded.
Note that with respect to the first Gunnells guideline, which is that “[t]he defect or degree of misfeasance must be to such a degree as would exceed the concept of mere negligence,” the dissent understands “degree” to relate to quality of the defendant’s act and cites evidence that the degree of dangerousness was acute. The Supreme Court in Hibbs, supra at 338 (1), however, says that the first guideline means quantity: “the defect or degree of misfeasance must exceed negligence (as distinguished from a single act).” Thus it would appear that the breach of duty involved need not be egregious.