Stewart v. Southeastern Regional Medical Center

GREENE, Judge,

concurring.

I write separately to state in somewhat different language this Court’s answer to the issue raised in this case: Does a resident superior court judge have the authority to grant a Rule 9(j) statute of limitations extension affecting all defendants in a case, even though some of the acts giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim arose outside the superior court judge’s county of residence.

Rule 90) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “a resident judge of the superior court of the county in which the [medical malpractice] cause of action arose may allow a motion to extend the statute of limitations for a period not to exceed 120 days to file a complaint.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (1999) (emphases added). A cause of action arises in the county where the acts or omissions that constitute the basis of the cause of action occurred. Pitts Fire Safety Service, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 42 N.C. App. 79, 81, 255 S.E.2d 615, 616 (1979). As there can be multiple acts or omissions constituting the basis of a single cause of action, see 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 83 (1994), a cause of action may arise in multiple counties. It thus follows a Rule 9(j) statute of limitations extension can be issued in any county where the acts or omissions constituting the basis of a plaintiff’s claim occurred and is valid in any such county as to all defendants named in the plaintiff’s complaint. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (extension granted as to cause of action rather than as to claims against individual parties); Webb v. Nash Hosp., Inc., 133 N.C. App. 636, 639-40, 516 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (extension applies to all the defendants named in the plaintiff’s complaint regardless of whether those defendants were named in extension order), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 122, — S.E.2d — (1999).

*465In this case, there is no dispute that the acts and omissions constituting the basis of plaintiffs malpractice claim arose in Robeson and Cumberland Counties. Thus, a resident superior court judge in either Robeson County or Cumberland County had authority, under Rule 9(j), to order an extension of the statute of limitations as to all defendants who are alleged to have contributed to plaintiffs injuries. Judge Floyd, a resident superior court judge in Robeson County, therefore, had authority to order an extension of the statute of limitation and this extension is valid and binding on all defendants. It thus follows Judge Cashwell’s order dismissing plaintiffs claims against certain defendants (whose alleged negligent acts occurred in Cumberland County) must be reversed.