Plaintiff-Respondent (André) brought an action in California against defendants-appellants (Morrows) contending that the Morrows had committed a fraud on André’s conservatee, Beatrice Morrow. André requested the California court to impose a constructive trust on certain real property located in Idaho, in which the Morrows held legal title and which they had allegedly acquired with the proceeds of the fraud.
On June 13, 1979, while the California case was still pending, André filed a complaint in Idaho County District court based on the identical allegations contained in the California action. André requested the Idaho court to also recognize the existence of a constructive trust in the Idaho property-
After a full trial, the California court rendered judgment on June 20, 1979, for André, awarding him compensatory and punitive damages, and imposing a constructive trust on the Idaho property. The Morrows did not appeal this decision.
On June 27, 1979, André filed a copy of the June 20,1979, California judgment with the Clerk of the District Court for Nez Perce County, Idaho, pursuant to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, I.C. §§ 10-1301-1308. The Nez Perce action was commenced to enforce the constructive trust imposed by the California decree.
On July 12, 1979, the California Court issued a Minute Order which ordered that the June 20, 1979 judgment be deemed entered on July 12, 1979. The June 20, 1979 judgment was apparently prematurely entered by the clerk of the court. A new document was not issued to replace the June 20, 1979 judgment, but rather the June 20th judgment received a new entry date.
On December 12, 1979, André amended his Idaho County complaint to include Count XII, which stated that the California judgment had been entered in his behalf. On this basis, André requested the Idaho County court to adopt the California judgment and enforce the equitable decree contained therein. On February 29, 1980, André filed a motion for summary judgment in Idaho County, contending the California judgment should be given full faith and credit in Idaho, and requesting the Idaho court to transfer title to the Idaho property to André. On May 28, 1980, the Idaho County action and the Nez Perce County action were consolidated.
In September, of 1980, the Morrows filed for a Chapter XIII bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court vacated the automatic stay *458order to allow the Idaho action, based on the California judgment, to proceed. On April 10, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the California judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in the bankruptcy court and in the Idaho state courts, and “that to the extent the California Judgment create[d] a constructive trust upon the property in Idaho, as determined by the Idaho state court,” the bankruptcy court would recognize and honor such a trust.
On May 26,- 1981, André renewed his motion for summary judgment, requesting the court to grant full faith and credit to the California judgment. On February 12, 1982, the Idaho County district Court heard André’s motion for summary judgment and the Morrows’ motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion to dismiss, and held that the issue of full faith and credit had already been litigated in the bankruptcy Court, and the judgment therein precluded relitigation of the validity of the California judgment. Thus, full faith and credit was given to the California judgment which the court held was entered on July 12,1979, the effective day of the judgment. The court further held that the issue of when the Idaho property became impressed with the constructive trust had not been fully briefed, and allowed this issue to be resubmitted with additional briefing.
On November 10, 1982, the Idaho County district Court determined that the constructive trust arose in the Idaho property at the time the Morrows acquired the property. The judge ordered the Morrows to convey the property to André. When the Morrows failed to comply with this order, the court amended the summary judgment and vested all interest in and title to the Idaho property in André. The Morrows have appealed.
I.
The thrust of this appeal is whether the California judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in Idaho. However, this appeal was taken from the Idaho County district Court’s order which granted “res judicata” effect to the Bankruptcy Court’s order. We first examine whether the Idaho court erred in granting “res judicata” to the Bankruptcy Court decree.1
The Idaho court held that
“[t]he issue of whether the California court’s judgment should be given full faith and credit in the Idaho courts was litigated in the bankruptcy court and both parties submitted extensive briefing to the bankruptcy judge on this point. The bankruptcy court decided this issue as stated above, and that issue should not be relitigated in this court. The principal of res judicata will be applied.”
The doctrine of res judicata generally prevents the relitigation of matters which have proceeded to a final conclusion between the parties to the litigation or their privies. Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697, 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 552 P.2d 776 (1976); *459Gaige v. City of Boise, 91 Idaho 481, 425 P.2d 52 (1967). Thus, when the Idaho court applied res judicata to the issue of whether the California judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, the litigants were foreclosed from relitigating this issue.
One of the necessary prerequisites to granting full faith and credit, is that the rendering court must have had valid jurisdiction. {See Part II.A(1)., infra.) Appellant asserted, both before the district court and now on appeal, that the California court lacked jurisdiction or competence to render a judgment directly affecting title to real estate in Idaho. However, by granting res judicata effect to the issue of the validity of the California decree, appellant was prevented from litigating in the Idaho courts, whether the California court indeed had jurisdiction. This result is contrary to our holding in Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455,195 P. 625 (1921), wherein we held that:
“[A] judgment by a tribunal without authority, or which exceeds or lies beyond its authority, is necessarily void, and may be shown to be so in collateral proceedings, even though it be a court of general jurisdiction, because no authority derived from the law can transcend the source from whence it came.”
33 Idaho at 462, 195 P. at 627 (emphasis added), cited with approval in Spaulding v. Childrens’ Home Finding and Aid Society of North Idaho, Inc., 89 Idaho 10, 25, 402 P.2d 52, 67 (1965). We have also stated that “[a] void judgment is a nullity, and. no rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be collaterally attacked at any time.” Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50, 382 P.2d 910, 915 (1963) (citations omitted).
Thus, the issue of whether a court has exceeded its jurisdiction is always open to collateral attack in Idaho. Hence, the Idaho district court may not grant res judicata effect to the Bankruptcy Court’s order, because such an order would prevent any opportunity in the Idaho courts to contest whether the California court indeed had valid jurisdiction.
Where an order of a lower court is correct, but based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory. Foremost Insurance Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 627 P.2d 317 (1981); Revello v. Revello, 100 Idaho 829, 606 P.2d 933 (1979); Eimco Corp. v. Sims, 100 Idaho 390, 598 P.2d 538 (1979); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 595 P.2d 709 (1979). While we disagree with the theory upon which the trial court dismissed appellants’ action, we affirm the trial court’s order on principles of full faith and credit.
II.
Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution of the United States provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”
This Court has previously held that “[t]he purpose of the full faith and credit clause is to integrate and unify the nation by according finality to a prior final judgment issued by another state or federal court.” Mitchell v. Pincock, 99 Idaho 56, 57, 577 P.2d 343, 344 (1978). However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive or final effect in the forum state than it has in the rendering state. People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947); Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 11 S.Ct. 773, 35 L.Ed. 464 (1891). Because of this general principle, the recognition and enforcement of a sister state judgment under the full faith and credit clause rests upon the existence of several criteria: (A) a valid and (B) final judgment, which is (C) rendered on the merits of the case. Simonsen v. Simonsen, 414 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Civ.App.1967); Roberts v. Hodges, 401 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Civ.App.1966).
*460A(l).
For purposes of full faith and credit, a valid judgment itself consists of several factors. First, a valid judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent subject matter jurisdiction, and either jurisdiction over the person or persons whose rights are to be adjudicated, or over the res if the judgment purports to adjudicate interest in a tangible thing. People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, supra; Thorley v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 144 Cal.Rptr. 557 (1978); Stevens v. Stevens, 44 Colo.App. 252, 611 P.2d 590 (1980); Sierra Life Insurance Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 586 P.2d 1068 (1978); National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Taylor, 225 Kan. 58, 587 P.2d 870 (1978); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92 (1971); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889 e. (1947).
A(2).
Second, a valid judgment must be rendered in compliance with the constitutional requirements of due process. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635 (1946); Thorley v. Superior Court, supra; Barker v. Barker, 94 N.M. 162, 608 P.2d 138 (1980); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okl.1970); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92 (1971).
A(3).
Third, a valid judgment is one that is in compliance with the rendering state’s requirements for the valid exercise of its power. Comfort v. Comfort, 17 Cal.2d 736, 112 P.2d 259 (1941); Epstein v. Chatham Park, Inc., 153 A.2d 180 (Del.Sup.Ct. 1959); Hanshew v. Mullins, 385 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1964); Murphy v. Murphy, 581 P.2d 489 (Okl.Ct.App.1978); In re Marriage of Quenzer & Quenzer, 42 Or.App. 3, 599 P.2d 1217 (1979); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 92 comment j (1971); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889 c. (1947).
B.
Assuming a judgment meets the criteria for a valid judgment, the second requirement for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, is that the judgment must be a final decision as determined by the law of the state of rendition. Jones v. Roach, 118 Ariz. 146, 575 P.2d 345 (Ct.App. 1977); Thorley v. Superior Court, supra; Newell v. Newell, 77 Idaho 355, 293 P.2d 663 (1956); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107 (1971); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889 c. (1947).
C.
The third element for recognition and enforcement under the full faith and credit clause is a judgment rendered on the merits of the case. Equity Corporation v. Groves, 30 Del.Ch. 68, 53 A.2d 505 (1947); Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 256 N.E.2d 254 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1970); Roberts v. Hodges, 401 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Civ.App.1966); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 110 (1971); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889 c. (1947).
III.
We turn now to examine whether the California judgment meets the specified criteria for recognition and enforcement under principles of full faith and credit. The Morrows first contend that the California judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit because the California court lacked jurisdiction to directly affect title to property located in Idaho. The Morrows rely on I.C. § 5-401-1 and Banbury v. Brailsford, 66 Idaho 262, 158 P.2d 826 (1945), as support for the proposition that actions relating to real property must be tried in the county where the real property is located.
Appellants’ reliance on Banbury is misplaced. The holding of Banbury was overruled by the subsequent case of Thompson v. Turner, 98 Idaho 110, 558 P.2d 1071 (1977). Moreover, in this case, unlike Ban-bury or Thompson, we are not concerned with proper venue but rather with proper subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
Appellants’ argument that the California court attempted to render a judgment directly affecting title to the Idaho property is without merit. The California judgment determined that appellants held the Idaho *461property in constructive trust for the benefit of respondent, and therefore, ordered the appellants to convey to respondent the property so held in trust. We previously stated in Rowe v. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747, 518 P.2d 1386 (1974), that a constructive trust arises when one who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey the property to another in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
“Under a constructive trust theory where the subject property is in possession of the person upon whom the constructive trust is imposed, the traditionally appropriate remedy is to compel the constructive trustee to convey the property to the constructive beneficiary. Scott, The Law of Trusts, § 462, 462.1, 462.3. Bogert & Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 472 (2d ed. I960).”
95 Idaho at 750, 518 P.2d at 1389.
While it is well settled that a judgment of a court of one state cannot directly affect title to realty located in another state, a personal judgment ordering a conveyance of the property by a party is a valid exercise of a court’s power.2 Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Idaho Gold Mining Co. v. Winchell, 6 Idaho 729, 59 P. 533 (1899); Miller v. Miller, 109 Misc.2d 982, 441 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1981); Blue River Sawmills, Ltd. v. Gates, 225 Or. 439, 358 P.2d 239 (1960); Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 74 Wash.2d 519, 445 P.2d 334 (1968); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889 h. (1947), Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34 Yale L.J. 591 (1925).
A(l).
The record discloses that the California court had subject matter jurisdiction over the original fraud action commenced in California by respondent. The California court also had in personam jurisdiction over the litigants to the fraud action. We therefore hold that the California court did not exceed its jurisdiction nor violate any jurisdictional principles in directing appellants to convey the Idaho property to respondent .by the force of an in personam order.
A(2).
Secondly, the California judgment was not awarded in violation of either litigant’s constitutional due process rights. The record discloses that appellants had notice of the California action initiated by respondent, and both parties had the opportunity to participate in the California action and did so.
A(3).
Regarding the third element of a valid judgment, appellants claim that respondent sued on the basis of the void, June 20, 1979 judgment (which was prematurely entered by the clerk of the court), and not on the basis of the valid July 12, 1979 judgment (which reflected the corrected entry date from the California court). In essence, appellants claim that a void judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit. While that is true, the evidence reflects that the corrected entry date of *462July 12, 1979, was presented to both the Bankruptcy Court and the Idaho district Court. Judge Swanstrom determined the effective entry date of the judgment was July 12, 1979. We agree. Despite the corrected entry date of the California judgment, there was only one California judgment, which serves as the basis for this action.
The dissent contends that the California decree is invalid, and thus not entitled to full faith and credit in Idaho because the California court’s findings and conclusions do not furnish a basis for the entry of a constructive trust on the Idaho property. The dissent asserts that there was no finding which traced the proceeds of the fraud to the acquisition of the Idaho realty. It is the view of the majority that inherent in the California judgment was a determination that the proceeds from the fraud were used to acquire the Idaho property. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the California court neglected to make such a finding, our reading of the California case law does not support the dissent’s position — that the California decree would be invalid in California such that it would not be entitled to full faith and credit in Idaho. In re Ross’ Estate, 180 Cal. 651, 182 P. 752 (1919) (though findings do not support a judgment, such will not render the judgment void on collateral attack); Johnston v. San Francisco Sav. Union, 75 Cal. 34, 16 P. 753 (1888); Millar v. James, 254 Cal.App.2d 534, 62 Cal.Rptr. 338 (1967). See also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal.3d 942, 126 Cal.Rptr. 805, 544 P.2d 941 (1976); In re Keet’s Estate, 15 Cal.2d 328, 100 P.2d 1045 (1940); Milstein v. Turner, 89 Cal.App.2d 296, 200 P.2d 799 (1948); In re Gardiner’s Estate, 45 Cal.App.2d 559, 114 P.2d 643 (1941).
B.
The second main element for recognition under principles of full faith and credit is a final judgment. Under the law of California, “a judgment does not become final so long as the action in which it was rendered is pending ... and an action is deemed pending until it is finally determined on appeal or until the time for appeal has passed.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Nakano, 12 Cal.2d 711, 87 P.2d 700, 702 (1939) (citations omitted); see also Bendlage v. Kohlsaat, 54 Cal.App.2d 136, 128 P.2d 691 (1942). A judgment becomes final if not appealed from within sixty days from the entry of the judgment, unless the time has been extended following a motion for a new trial or a motion to vacate. Cal. Rules of Court 2(a). In the case at bar, appellants’ counsel conceded in oral argument that no appeal had been taken from the California decree. Furthermore, the record discloses that the time for appeal has since passed, and the time for appeal was not extended. Thus, the California judgment was a final decree in accordance with California law.
C.
Thirdly, the judgment must also have been rendered on the merits, and we hold the California judgment was indeed based on the merits of respondent’s fraud action against appellants.
In summary, we hold that the California judgment was a valid and final judgment rendered on the merits, and thus, that judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement in Idaho under principles of full faith and credit.
Other courts have also held that full faith and credit applies to equity decrees. McElroy v. McElroy, 256 A.2d 763 (Del.Ch. 1969); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.J.Super. 18, 222 A.2d 120 (App.Div.1966); Miller v. Miller, Supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 102 (1971); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889 h. (1947). Specifically, full faith and credit has been extended to foreign equity decrees which order an in personam conveyance of land located in another state. Varone v. Varone, 359 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Ivey v. Ivey, 183 Conn. 490, 439 A.2d 425 (1981); Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 102 *463comment d (1971). Such decrees have also been recognized and enforced under principles of comity. Allis v. Allis, 378 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953, 88 S.Ct. 337, 19 L.Ed.2d 363 (1967); McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961); Lea v. Dudley, 20 N.C. App. 702, 202 S.E.2d 799 (1974).
Because we grant full faith and credit to the California decree, appellants may not attack the merits of the California decree by contending that the California court did not adequately trace the fraudulently obtained funds to the acquisition of any specific property. Appellant had the opportunity to appeal the California judgment, but did not pursue an appeal. The time has now passed to appeal the California judgment and appellant may not challenge the merits of that decree in this Court. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940); 47 Am. Jur.2d Judgments § 919 (1969).
IV.
We turn now to discuss the manner in which the California order may be enforced in Idaho. “The local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 99 (1971).
“A typical case is when a court of State X orders the defendant to convey to the plaintiff land situated in state Y, and a suit to enforce the X judgment is brought in Y. The X judgment will be enforced in this situation if the Y courts follow the majority rule. To be sure, the X court would have no jurisdiction to affect title to Y land directly by its decree. Hence a decree of the X court providing simply that title to the Y land should henceforth be in the plaintiff would be void and not entitled to recognition. But in the case put the X court has done no more than order the defendant who was subject to its jurisdiction to do a particular act. This the court had power to do. Its order that the defendant should convey Y land is therefore valid.
“The Y court has alternative methods of enforcing the X decree when the defendant is subject to its jurisdiction. The court may order the defendant to convey the Y land in compliance with the X decree and punish him for contempt if he fails to do so. Or, since the land itself is subject to its jurisdiction, the Y court may itself transfer title to the land to the plaintiff. If, however, the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Y court, the only way that the Y court may enforce the X decree will presumably be to transfer title itself to the Y land to the plaintiff.”
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 102 comment d (1971).
The Idaho court ordered the Morrows to convey the property to Andre’. However, when the Morrows failed to comply with this order, the court transferred title to the Idaho property to André. This transfer was well within the power of the Idaho court since the Idaho property was subject to the court’s jurisdiction.
The Idaho court held the constructive trust was impressed upon the Idaho property as of the time the appellants acquired it. We agree. A constructive trust takes effect at the time of the wrongful act, and traces funds gained by the act until the rightful recovery is made. Packer v. Donaldson, 16 Ariz.App. 294, 492 P.2d 1232 (1972); Markel v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 103 Ariz. 353, 442 P.2d 97 (1968); 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 146 (1955); 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 251 (1975). Thus, the Idaho property was never the appellants’ property such that a homestead declaration could be claimed thereon.
We hereby affirm the order of the district court transferring title to the Idaho real property to respondent.
After reviewing the entire proceedings of this case, we are left with the firm conviction that appellants’ claims were unreasonable, without merit and frivolously pursued. I.C. § 12-121; I.A.R. 41; I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1); Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 *464P.2d 1333 (1982); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 657 P.2d 1102 (Ct. App.1983); W.F. Const. Co., Inc. v. Kalik, 103 Idaho 713, 652 P.2d 661 (Ct.App.1982).
Judgment affirmed.
Costs and attorney fees on appeal to respondent.
HUNTLEY, J., and McFADDEN and SCOGGIN JJ., pro terns., concur.. There are two aspects to the doctrine of "res judicata." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877); C.I.T. Corp. v. Turner, 248 Miss. 517, 157 So.2d 648 (1963); 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments § 396 (1969). Under the principle of "res judicata” or claim preclusion, a judgment on the merits in a prior proceeding bars a subsequent lawsuit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action. Houser v. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441, 649 P.2d 1197 (1982); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980); Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 569 P.2d 358 (1977); Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 208 P. 241 (1922).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues actually litigated and decided in another action, even in connection with a different claim or cause of action between the same parties in any subsequent suit. Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697, 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530, 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418, 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969).
Although the Idaho court referred generally to "res judicata," it is apparent that it was referring specifically to the collateral estoppel part of that doctrine.
. The dissent asserts that the California court lacked authority to impose a trust because it lacked the authority to determine ownership of the property subject to the constructive trust. The following line of cases establish that a foreign court has the power to indirectly affect out-of-state property by means of a decree, based on personal jurisdiction over the parties, which determines the parties’ personal rights or equities in that property. Argent v. Argent, 396 F.2d 695 (D.C.Cir.1968); Allis v. Allis, 378 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953, 88 S.Ct. 337, 19 L.Ed.2d 363 (1967); Kennedy v. Morrow, 77 Ariz. 152, 268 P.2d 326 (1954); Beeler v. Beeler, 193 Cal.App.2d 548, 14 Cal.Rptr. 460 (1961); Barber v. Barber, 51 Cal.2d 244, 331 P.2d 628 (1958); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Buaas v. Buaas, 62 Nev. 232, 147 P.2d 495 (1944); Miller v. Miller, 109 Misc.2d 982, 441 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1981); Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.1964); Sharp v. Sharp, 65 Okl. 76, 166 P. 175 (Okl.1916); Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17 Mich.L.Rev. 517 (1919).
We are persuaded this is the correct approach and accordingly we confirm the California court’s determination of the property rights in the Idaho property between these parties, incident to the California court’s imposition of a constructive trust on that property.