(dissenting):
In Helsten v. Schwendiman, Utah, 668 P.2d 509 (1983), we set aside the revocation of a driver’s license (two justices dissenting) because the officer’s report, which stated that the driver was under the influence of alcohol and refused to take the breathalyzer test, “was not signed in the presence of a notary_” Id. at 512. In the present case, the officer signed the report in the presence of a notary. However, the majority holds that the officer’s signature did not result in the required “sworn report” because he did not “affirmatively swear to that report” since he “failed to verbally affirm or swear to the validity of the contents of the report” while he was before the notary. Consequently, the majority holds, the subsequent proceedings are void.
This holding is apt to cause incalculable complications in the administration of criminal and civil law. To cite only three examples, our statutes require documents that are “sworn” or “on oath” to obtain a search warrant, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23-3, to commence a criminal prosecution, § 77-35-4(a), or to file a mechanic’s lien, § 38-1-7. Are the results of these proceedings subject to invalidation upon showing that the initiating person merely signed the document before a notary, as in this case? If not, what is the distinction between this case and those?
*32The clear weight of authority declines to apply the kind of technicality the majority implements in this ease. The reasoning in Atwood v. State, 146 Miss. 662, 111 So. 865, 51 A.L.R. 836 (1927), quoted with approval in State v. Douglas, 71 Wash.2d 303, 310, 428 P.2d 535, 539 (1967), is illustrative:
The affiant went to the justice of the peace for the avowed purpose of obtaining a search warrant, and the justice of the peace knew that he came for that purpose. Both of them knew that an oath was necessary to be administered before the warrant could be issued, and with that knowledge each of them did what he considered proper for the administration of the oath. The affiant, in the presence of the justice of the peace, signed the affidavit; the justice of the peace thereupon affixed his jurat thereto, and issued the search warrant in proper form. Although not a word was said by either in reference to an oath, they both knew an oath was necessary and both intended that the necessary thing should be done in order to obtain the search warrant. We think, by construction, what occurred amounted to the taking of the necessary oath by the affiant. One may speak as plainly and effectually by his acts and conduct as he can by word of mouth. It follows from these views that the trial court committed no error in admitting the evidence obtained by the search warrant.
(Emphasis added.)
The foregoing reasoning was applied to the precise circumstance of this case — a sworn report in an alcohol-related driver’s license suspension proceeding — in Blackburn v. Motor Vehicles Division, 33 Or. App. 397, 576 P.2d 1267 (1978). Both Blackburn and Douglas cite numerous other state court decisions to the same effect.
The majority in the instant case relies principally on Spangler v. District Court, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943). I submit that this case is not authoritative for the majority’s result. The opinion is ambiguous. Subsequent decisions of this Court discredit or overrule it. And, as applied to the facts of this case, the Span-gler rule is wrong in any event.
In this case, the officer complied with the test the majority quotes from Spangler: by appearing and signing a written oath in the presence of a notary, the officer committed an “outward act” from which we may infer his “consciousness ... that he was taking an oath .... ” 104 Utah at 591, 140 P.2d at 758. However, the Spangler opinion says later that “the mere appearing before the justice and signing, a criminal complaint does not constitute swearing to it, and therefore the complaint under the foregoing statute was not a valid one....” 104 Utah at 592, 140 P.2d at 758. I respectfully submit that this aspect of Span-gler is wrong, as is evident from the way that case has been discredited by subsequent decisions of this Court.
In State v. Mathews, 13 Utah 2d 391, 375 P.2d 392 (1962), a deputy county recorder convicted of misusing public moneys sought to have his conviction reversed for failure to prove that he was a public official. The defendant relied on the absence of evidence that he had taken the required oath of office, citing the Spangler case. While conceding that “certain statements contained in that opinion might seem to lend comfort to defendant,” 13 Utah 2d at 393, 375 P.2d at 393, this Court rejected defendant’s argument and affirmed his conviction. The holding on this point is directly applicable to the present case:
To hold, in the instant case, that the defendant’s conviction should be set aside merely because the State did not show with conclusiveness that the defendant went through some formal ritual, with the raising of his right hand, in taking the oath would be a travesty and permit a super technicality to defeat the ends of justice.
Id., 375 P.2d at 393.
In McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963), cited by the majority in this case, this Court held the oath to be valid. The Court’s reasoning, as well as its holding, establishes that *33the officer’s report was properly “sworn” in the present case. McKnight involved the validity of a sworn application filed with the State Land Board. The affiant signed the applications before a notary in blank. Later, on February 2, 1962, while the affiant was in Denver, the applications were completed by affiant’s agent and presented to the notary, who notarized them as “Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2nd day of February, 1962 at Salt Lake City, Utah.” The Court found that the affiant “did not subscribe and swear to said applications on said date; but he did confer with [the notary] by telephone at various times on said date” about the applications. 14 Utah 2d at 241, 381 P.2d at 728.
Relying on the Spangler case, the adversary contended that the oath was invalid and therefore the applications were invalid. In rejecting that contention, this Court specified the duties of the officer administering the oath: “[H]e is required to know and state [that] the person who took the oath did declare himself to be the person mentioned in the oath, and ... he manifested an intention to be bound by it.” 14 Utah 2d at 249, 381 P.2d at 733. Next, the Court listed the essentials of an oath, as quoted by the majority in this case. Immediately thereafter, the Court added this caution: “The administration [of the oath] need not follow any set pattern. The ritual is of secondary importance and does not affect the validity of the oath.” Id., 381 P.2d at 734 (emphasis added).
The administration of the oath in the instant case met all of the requirements defined in the McKnight case. If the oath was proper on the facts of that case — as this Court held — then the sworn statement in this case is valid also.
To turn back the clock to the literal language in Spangler — as the majority does— exalts a technicality beyond all reasonable limits and establishes a principle that will haunt the administration of every criminal and civil proceeding that relies on oaths or sworn statements. Such a holding is unnecessary because subsequent opinions in Mathews and McKnight have erased that technicality. It is unwise because it serves no useful purpose. I would rely on our most recent cases and affirm the judgment of the district court.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of OAKS, J.