dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
As the majority points out, the law is well settled in Georgia that “[i]n most misdiagnosis cases, the injury begins immediately upon the misdiagnosis due to the pain, suffering or economic loss sustained by the patient from the time of the misdiagnosis until the medical problem is properly diagnosed and treated. [Cit.] The misdiagnosis itself is the injury and not the subsequent discovery of the proper diagnosis.” Whitaker v. Zirkle, 188 Ga. App. 706, 707 (374 SE2d 106) (1988), cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 913. See also OCGA § 9-3-71 (a); Charter Peachford Behavioral Health System v. Kohout, 233 Ga. App. 452, 455 (504 SE2d 514) (1998); Ford v. Dove, 218 Ga. App. 828, 831 (3) (463 SE2d 351) (1995); Henry v. Med. Center, 216 Ga. App. 893, 894 (2) (456 SE2d 216) (1995); Crawford v. Spencer, 217 Ga. App. 446, 448 (3) (457 SE2d 711) (1995); Frankel v. Clark, 213 Ga. App. 222, 223 (444 SE2d 147) (1994); Bryant v. Crider, 209 Ga. App. 623, 626 (3) (434 SE2d 161) (1993). The fact that the plaintiff did not know the medical cause of her suffering does not affect the running of the statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) where the injury has occurred and physically manifested itself to her. Henry v. Med. Center, 216 Ga. App. at 894; Frankel v. Clark, 213 Ga. App. at 223. It is apparent from the law stated above that in order to make the change advocated by the majority opinion, the majority is overruling a long line of cases, not just the two named in the opinion.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court of Georgia has clearly held that the plain language of OCGA § 9-3-71 does not permit the interpretation advanced by the majority. In Crowe v. Humana, Inc., 263 Ga. 833, 834 (439 SE2d 654) (1994), the court held:
The Crowes, however, ask us to hold that the cause of action “arose,” and thus the period of limitation commenced, when they discovered that the appellees’ negligence caused Ashley’s injuries. We find that initiating the period of limitation in a medical malpractice action when the alleged negli*344gence is first discovered would be contrary to the plain language of §§ 9-3-71 and 9-3-73.
(Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding and cited to Ford v. Dove and Crawford v. Spencer as authority in Hunter, Maclean &c., PC. v. Frame, 269 Ga. 844, 849 (507 SE2d 411) (1998). In that case, the court held that the statute of limitation was not tolled in legal malpractice actions simply because the attorneys continued to represent the plaintiff. “That result would essentially be an adoption of the ‘continuing representation rule,’ which has been consistently rejected by Georgia courts in the malpractice context, [citing to Ford v. Dove and Crawford v. Spencer,] and which we expressly decline to adopt in this case.” Id. at 849. Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the continuing treatment rationale advanced by the majority. This Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI; Dester v. Dester, 240 Ga. App. 711, 712 (523 SE2d 635) (1999).
Finally, even if the Supreme Court had not already spoken, the majority opinion overrules a long line of cases interpreting OCGA § 9-3-71 (a).
The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the performance of a well-ordered system of jurisprudence. In most instances, it is of more practical utility to have the law settled and to let it remain so, than to open it up to new constructions, as the personnel of the court may change, even though grave doubt may arise as to the correctness of the interpretation originally given to it.
Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 357 (519 SE2d 210) (1999).
Even those who regard stare decisis with something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight where the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute. A reinterpretation of a statute after the General Assembly’s implicit acceptance of the original interpretation would constitute a judicial usurpation of the legislative function.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 358.
Although the majority claims there are important public policy reasons for changing our interpretation of this statute, the legislature has not seen fit to do so, and any attempt on our part to make this change goes beyond the limits of judicial restraint and into the area of unauthorized judicial legislation. Clabough v. Rachwal, 176 *345Ga. App. 212, 215 (335 SE2d 648) (1985).
Decided December 1, 2000 Reconsideration denied December 14, 2000 Greer, Klosik, Daugherty & Swank, Frank J. Klosik, Jr., Robert J. McCune, Jason R. Mantón, for appellant. Watson, Spence, Lowe & Chambless, Thomas S. Chambless, Dawn G. Benson, Charles K. Wainright II, for appellees.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.