dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because of the ruling in Division 3.
“The general character of the parties and especially their conduct in other transactions are irrelevant matter unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or proper the *200investigation of such conduct.” OCGA § 24-2-2. “If a defendant in a criminal case . . . testifies, ... no evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue.” OCGA § 24-9-20. It is the first of these two general rules on prior conviction evidence which is the starting point in our consideration of the evidence objected to in this case, as it was offered in the State’s case-in-chief and not in response to any issue of character injected by defendant.
In this connection, the Supreme Court stated that evidence that defendant had committed another “wholly independent” crime “is irrelevant and inadmissible,” as a “universally recognized . . . general rule.” Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262 (71 SE2d 615) (1952). The reason it is inadmissible is that “it tends to put the defendant’s character into evidence. State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654 (272 SE2d 321) (1980).” Chastain v. State, 260 Ga. 789, 790 (3) (400 SE2d 329) (1991). The principle has been affirmed most recently in Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649) (1991).
Certain exceptions have been recognized, however, for limited purposes and under prescribed conditions. The burden is on the State to establish its admissibility.
First of all, the evidence must be relevant to some issue in the case, such as that the prior conviction tends to show that the identification of defendant as the perpetrator of the crime on trial is correct, or that the defendant had a motive or a plan or a scheme, or was of a particular bent of mind, or followed a particular course of conduct. Chastain, supra; Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 543 (255 SE2d 5) (1979). See also Williams, supra at fn. 2. Its admission must have a legitimate purpose.
In addition, the State must show that the evidence meets two conditions: “First, there must be evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime. Second, there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged, that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. [Cit.]” State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655 (1) (272 SE2d 321) (1980).
The impact of this evidence has such significance in the trial that a procedure has been instituted to put the defendant on notice and require the State to establish admissibility at a pretrial hearing, whenever it wishes to introduce such evidence in derogation of the general rule. USCR 31.3. It is clearly stated in this Uniform Rule that “[t]he burden of proving that the evidence of similar transactions or occurrences should be admitted shall be upon the prosecution.”
The issue before us was raised in the following manner. Pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3, the State gave appellant notice of its intention to present evidence of a similar transaction consisting of a certified copy of his indictment, plea of guilty, and sentence to an *201indictment charging him with sale of cocaine in Coweta County in 1988, as well as the testimony of Officer Tony Brown, concerning the prior conviction. See Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 (6) (405 SE2d 483) (1991); Banks v. State, 201 Ga. App. 266 (1) (410 SE2d 818) (1991); Howard v. State, 194 Ga. App. 443 (390 SE2d 662) (1990); Fambro v. State, 165 Ga. App. 445, 447 (3) (299 SE2d 114) (1983).
Although the uniform rule does not require it, the notice did not state the purpose for which this evidence was intended, that is, what issue in the case it was related to and would enlighten. See Williams v. State, supra. After the State filed notice of its intent, defendant responded in writing that the proposed evidence was not legally relevant, that it was remote in time and unconnected to the present charge, that its probative value was vastly outweighed by it prejudicial impact, and that its admission would require him to defend against collateral matters.
A hearing was held before trial. The State never stated the purpose for which it intended to offer the evidence, even though defendant asked what it was. Nor did the State establish “a prima facie case of similarity.” Neither did the court make a “finding of sufficient similarity.” See, in these regards, Stephens, supra at 468-469 (6). See also Williams, supra at (2b), which holds that “before any evidence of independent offenses or acts may be admitted into evidence, . . . the state must make [at the pretrial hearing] three affirmative showings as to each independent offense or act it seeks to introduce.” Nevertheless, despite the defendant’s repeated and “vehement” objection, the court ruled that it would probably permit the State to introduce the prior conviction “[f]or whatever weight the Jury might choose to give it as far as it might show scheme, bent of mind, or motive on the part of the defendant in this case.” Defendant had earlier argued that these and some of the other exceptional purposes were not issues in the case. His defense, he said in response to the court’s questioning, was based on an alibi. One of the arguments with which defendant repeatedly supported his objection that the intended evidence did not come within an exception to the general preclusionary rule was that “the prior transaction has no relevancy.”
At trial, the State did not articulate the purpose for which the evidence was offered but merely presented it over defendant’s objection. The court did not “make a determination that each of these three showings has been satisfactorily made by the state as to that particular independent offense or act,” which Williams confirmed was required. Without a transcript of the State’s closing argument, we cannot determine whether and how it was connected to the issue of guilt.
When the evidence was presented, the court cautioned the jury that it was limited to the jury’s consideration of “intent or motive or *202knowledge or scheme or bent of mind of the defendant,” if it believed it relevant to any of these matters.
When finally charging the jury, the court instructed that “this evidence [of a prior crime] was admitted solely for the purpose of your considering it under those provisions of the law that provide that where knowledge, common design, modus operandi, motive, intent, bent of mind, plan, scheme, and course of conduct, identity, or other matters dependent upon a person’s state of mind are involved as material elements in the offense for which the defendant is on trial,” such evidence is “solely for your consideration as it might tend to illustrate the defendant’s state of mind in regard to the offense for which he is presently on trial, if you think such evidence does so illustrate that state of mind, and it is admitted for that purpose alone, and you should consider it for no other purpose.” See Council of Superior Court Judges, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, p. 33.
State of mind was not an issue. As defendant argued at the pretrial hearing, “in this case, intent, I would contend, would not even be an issue. In this case, a sale was made. It’s not did he want to sell or did he try to scheme. Bent is not an issue.” Identity was the issue. Defendant testified that he was working at his father’s bar the night of the alleged sale at a different location, and he presented alibi witnesses. Similar transaction evidence may be relevant when identity is an issue. Sanford v. State, 196 Ga. App. 103, 104 (1) (395 SE2d 373) (1990); Wilson v. State, 194 Ga. App. 261, 262 (2) (390 SE2d 609) (1990); Whitley v. State, 193 Ga. App. 192 (1) (387 SE2d 348) (1989). Thus, although appellant does not expressly complain of it, the evidence was not properly limited. See Hunter v. State, 177 Ga. App. 326, 327 (339 SE2d 381) (1985) (Beasley, J., dissenting). This is pointed out because it seems to be a commonly-occurring deficiency.
Appellant argues, inter alia, one of the aspects of relevancy, that the State’s proof of his prior conviction without proof of the details and manner in which the crime was committed does not establish a sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged so that it can be said that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. In other words, he urges, “due to insufficient proof on similarity of the prior crime such evidence was not legally relevant to identity and did not connect Defendant with the pending charge, ...” The recent decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court in Stephens, supra, and Williams, supra, support this.
At trial, Officer Brown testified that appellant had pled guilty to a charge of “distribution of cocaine” in 1988, and that he was present as the prosecuting officer when the plea was entered. He did not elaborate on the factual basis. The indictment showed that on or about April 29, 1988, in Coweta County, appellant “did then and there un*203lawfully deliver, distribute, dispense and sell cocaine. . . A female and three males including Tony Brown were named as witnesses on the back of the indictment, with no description other than that Brown was “prosecutor.” The sentence showed that appellant was sentenced on September 20, 1988, to five years’ imprisonment on his plea of guilty to this charge.
Decided December 5, 1991. Wood, Odom & Edge, D. Scott Cummins, for appellant. William G. Hamrick, Jr., District Attorney, Agnes T. McCabe, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.In Stephens, the appellant was convicted of the sale of cocaine. A prior conviction of sale of cocaine was admitted in evidence through certified copies of the indictment, guilty plea, and sentence. The exhibits in Stephens contained the bare allegation of the criminal act of the sale of cocaine, the date of the sale, the county in which the sale occurred, the guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. Banks, supra at 268. The Court in Stephens held this outline to be insufficient to establish “similarity.” In this case, it is even problematic whether the prior incident was a sale or a distribution or perhaps one of the other alternative acts charged.
It was recognized in Banks: “The majority [in Stephens] noted that had the State presented evidence of similarity in the case during trial as it had done in the USCR 31.3 (B) hearing at which the prosecutor stated in his place the relevant facts of the prior conviction, then the only question concerning a challenge on appeal as to similarity would be whether the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous. The record in Stephens reveals that the prosecutor stated in his place that the prior crime was a hand-to-hand undercover sale involving a confidential informant, the approximate quantity of drugs sold, and a dollar amount of the sale.” Id. at 268.
There was no such showing of similarity in this case. Consequently, defendant was not “insure [d] of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury.” Williams, supra at (2). The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the earlier crime, for which a foundation had not been laid. A new trial is required.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.