I respectfully dissent.
The supplemental statement of facts provided by petitioner, I agree, is properly before us. Nonetheless, I dissent from the discipline imposed.
This is the third occasion it has been necessary to discipline petitioner. It seems inappropriate to impose a token suspension (probation for two years with conditions including thirty days actual suspension). “[T]he creation of the attorney-client relationship imposes upon the lawyer the obligation to represent his client with ‘ “such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of tasks which they undertake.” ’ ” (Wright v. Williams (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 802, 809 [121 Cal.Rptr. 194] quoting from Ishmael v. Millington (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [50 Cal.Rptr. 592].) “Ordinary skill” includes not only the heart of lawyering, research and analysis, but also those responsibilities of administration and supervision without which a law office cannot function. Mr. Wells’ treatment of Mr. Witter and Ms. Michaels shows a dereliction of those duties.
There is a need to protect the public from lawyers who repeatedly fail to discharge their obligations as attorneys to the best of their knowledge and abilities (see Simmons v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 719, 729 [87 Cal.Rptr. 368, 470 P.2d 352].) For these reasons I feel Mr. Wells should receive three months actual suspension.
Barry-Deal, J.,* and King, J.,* concurred.
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.