(dissenting). The issue in this case is whether Jon Schuster’s public school retirement allowance is subject to legal process under the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act.1 I agree with defendants that the Public School Employees Retirement Act (the pension act)2 precludes the state from attaching Mr. Schuster’s retirement allowance payments. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion in this case. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
i
The State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act was enacted to allow the government to seek reimbursement from certain prisoners for the cost of their incarceration. 1984 PA 282. Under it, reports are compiled regarding prisoner assets and the cost of prisoner care. MCL 800.402; MSA 28.1702. The Attorney General must seek reimbursement from a prisoner who has sufficient assets to permit recovery of *421the statutorily prescribed portion of the prisoner’s cost of care.3
In the instant case, the Attorney General discovered that Jon Schuster, who was serving a prison term for criminal sexual conduct, was receiving approximately $2,000 a month from his public school pension. Consequently, applying the reimbursement act, in 1992 the state sought part of Schuster’s pension to reimburse it for his care. MCL 800.403; MSA 28.1703.4 In its complaint, the state alleged that it has already expended approximately $22,000 for Schuster’s care and would continue to expend money for the duration of his incarceration. In their answer, defendants responded that the state could not take any portion of Schuster’s public school retirement allowance because it had been exempted from legal process by the pension act. MCL 38.1346(1); MSA 15.893(156)(1).
The trial court concluded that, despite the pension act, the pension could be considered in evaluating Jon Schuster’s ability to pay the cost of his incarceration. The court did not allow the state to attach or garnish the pension directly. Rather, it permitted the state to obtain the funds after they had been paid to Schuster. Then, having considered Schuster’s legal and moral obligations to his wife and dependents, the *422court ordered Schuster to pay the state $1,000 a month, approximately half his retirement allowance.
The Court of Appeals reversed. 215 Mich App 347; 547 NW2d 332 (1996). Applying the rules of statutory construction, it held that the retirement allowance payments were protected by the pension act from legal process under the reimbursement act. It reasoned that the pension act was the more specific statute and controlling. Id. at 351-353. It also held that the payments were not subject to attachment once Jon Schuster received them. Id. at 354. We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to resolve the apparent conflict between the pension act and the reimbursement act. 454 Mich 894 (1997).
II
A
As noted above, the reimbursement act provides that not more than ninety percent of a prisoner’s “assets” may be recovered in an action by the state for prison reimbursement. MCL 800.403; MSA 28.1703. In 1992, assets were defined by the reimbursement act as:
property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due a prisoner or former prisoner including income or payments to such prisoner from social security, worker’s compensation, veteran’s compensation, pension benefits, previously earned salary or wages, bonuses, annuities, retirement benefits, or from any other source whatsoever, but does not include any of the following:
(i) The homestead of the prisoner up to $50,000.00 in value.
*423(ii) Money received by the prisoner from the state as settlement of a claim against the department from the prisoner.
(iii) A money judgment received by the prisoner from the state as a result of a civil action in which the department was named defendant and found to be liable.
(iv) Money saved by the prisoner from wages and bonuses paid the prisoner while he or she was confined to a state correctional facility. [MCL 800.401a; MSA 28.1701(1).][5]
Looking at the reimbursement act in isolation, one would have to conclude that public school retirement allowances are subject to attachment. Pensions are specifically mentioned as a type of asset recoverable by the state. However, the pension act expressly provides the contrary. It states, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a retirement allowance, an optional benefit, or any other benefit accrued or accruing to a person under this act, the reserves created by this act, and the money, investments, or income of those reserves are exempt from state, county, municipal, or other local tax and are not subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, the operation of bankruptcy or insolvency laws, or other process of law. The right to a retirement allowance, an optional benefit, or any other benefit accrued or accruing to a person under this act is unassignable, except as specifically provided in this act. [MCL 38.1346(1); MSA 15.893(156)(1).][6]
Therefore, according to the express provisions of the two statutes, a conflict exists. The pension act *424declares that retirement allowance payments are not subject to legal process.7 The reimbursement act declares that a portion of prisoners’ pensions can be taken to pay for the cost of incarceration.
When two statutes conflict, we must interpret them to resolve the conflict. The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 212; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Rules of statutory construction have been developed to assist in determining intent. The Legislature is presumed to be familiar with the rules. Ballog v Knight Newspapers, Inc, 381 Mich 527, 538; 164 NW2d 19 (1969).
Whenever possible, conflicting statutes should be interpreted to give each full force and effect. In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 Mich 148, 163; 362 NW2d 580 (1984). However, if it is not possible, and one is specific to the subject matter and the other only generally applicable, the specific statute prevails. Id.
The state argues that the reimbursement act addresses the subject matter involved in the case sub judice, reimbursement for prison expenses, whereas the pension act is silent on the subject. Hence, the reimbursement act must be found to be the more specific statute. I reject that reasoning. The conflict in the statutes is over the attachability of pension benefits, not over reimbursement for prison expenses.8 *425The pension act deals specifically with all aspects of retirement allowance payments. The reimbursement act mentions them only as one of many possible sources of reimbursement. Therefore, the pension act is the more specific statute and is controlling.
The majority rejects the application of this rule, finding that such a construction would defeat the main purpose of the reimbursement act. I agree that, in this case, the goal of the reimbursement act would be frustrated. The retirement allowance is the only asset belonging to Jon Schuster that the state can attach to reimburse his prison expenses. Unless the state can attach a portion of those payments, it will lose any chance of reimbursement.
However, if we gave priority to the reimbursement act, the primary purpose of the pension act would be nullified. I agree with the majority that one of the purposes of MCL 38.1346(1); MSA 15.893(156)(1), is to protect retirement allowance benefits from creditors and that the state is, technically, not a creditor. Nevertheless, the clear language of the statute protects retirement allowance benefits from “execution, garnishment, attachment, the operation of bankruptcy or insolvency laws, or other process of law.” MCL 38.1346(1); MSA 15.893(156)(1). (Emphasis supplied.) An action by the state seeking reimbursement under the reimbursement act must be regarded as a process of law. The provision is clear and unambiguous. It was intended to be all-encompassing. The Legislature has written specific exceptions for those situations where the protections are inapplicable.
*426B
Moreover, where two statutes conflict and one statute protects private property, the statute giving the protection should be given priority. Any doubt is resolved in favor of the property owner. See 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, § 285, p 448. Here, the Legislature has not clearly indicated whether it intended that public pensions be forfeited to the state to pay for the cost of incarceration. Under the circumstances presented, the retiree should be entitled to keep the pension.
In conclusion, the Legislature may not have anticipated a conflict between the pension act and the reimbursement act. However, it is presumed to know the rules of statutory construction when drafting statutes. Because the pension act is the more specific statute, it should be given priority.9I would hold that the state is not entitled to directly attach defendant’s retirement allowance.10
in
Next, the state argues that, even if the retirement allowance cannot be directly attached, the money can be taken once it is in Schuster’s hands. Such an inter*427pretation is contrary to the language in the pension act as well as to the statute’s purpose. The pension act states that “retirement allowances” are protected. Retirement allowance is defined as “a payment for life or a temporary period provided for in this act to which a retirant, retirement allowance beneficiary, or refund beneficiary is entitled.” MCL 38.1307(5); MSA 15.893(117)(5). Because the pension act protects payments to retirees, it must be interpreted to protect the payments immediately upon reaching the retiree’s hands. The limitation of entitlement does not change this conclusion. I interpret that to mean that, if a retiree is mistakenly given a retirement allowance or is given an excessive amount, the state can file an action to recover the improper payment. It is not a limitation of protection.
Moreover, allowing the state to reach the payments after the retiree receives them would run counter to the purpose of the statute, which is to protect such payments from process. It is logical that public servants, who may earn less than employees in the private sector and who serve the community, would have special protection for their retirement benefits. The protection would be frustrated if the state were to circumvent the clear language of the statute. Therefore, I would also hold that, under the facts of this case, the pension act protects the payments after they are received by the Schusters.11
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.MCL 800.401 et seq.; MSA 28.1701 et seq.
MCL 38.1301 et seq.; MSA 15.893(111) et seq.
The Attorney General must have good cause to believe that (1) a prisoner has enough assets to recover at least ten percent of the estimated cost of care of the prisoner or (2) ten percent of the estimated cost of care of the prisoner for two years, whichever is less.
The reimbursement act provides that not more than ninety percent of the assets of a prisoner may be taken for securing costs and reimbursement. MCL 800.403(3); MSA 28.1703(3). The trial court can award less than ninety percent after considering a prisoner’s legal obligations to support a spouse and minor children and moral obligations to support dependents. MCL 800.404(5); MSA 28.1704(5).
5 In 1996, the statute was amended. Subsections (ii) and (iii) were deleted. 1996 PA 286.
6 The pension act has given “retirement allowance” a specific definition. MCL 38.1307(5); MSA 15.893(117)(5). However, for purposes of this opinion, retirement allowance will be considered the equivalent of a pension.
The Legislature has expressly created exceptions to this rule. Retirement allowance payments are subject to alimony, child support orders, and eligible domestic relations orders. 1991 PA 47, MCL 38.1346(4), (6); MSA 15.893(156)(4), (6).
This case differs from State Treasurer v Gardner, 222 Mich App 62; 564 NW2d 51 (1997). There, the reimbursement act allegedly conflicted with MCL 600.6023; MSA 27A.6023, which governed the general relation*425ship between debtor and creditor. MCL 600.6023; MSA 27A.6023 did not deal solely with the attachability of pension benefits.
The pension act should be given priority even if one accepts the majority’s argument that the reimbursement act was amended more recently than the pension act. Where two statutes conflict, the specific is given priority over the general, even where the general statute was enacted last. Imlay Twp Primary School Dist No 5 v State Bd, of Ed, 359 Mich 478, 485; 102 NW2d 720 (1960).
I agree with the majority that taxpayers should not be obliged to shoulder the cost of prisoners’ incarceration insofar as the prisoners have the assets to pay for their care. However, it is not this Court’s job to manipulate the statutes and rules of construction to reach a result not clearly intended by the Legislature. If the Legislature wants public pensions to be treated the same as private pensions, the statutes can easily be amended.
There may come a point when the payments have been converted to nonexempt assets or commingled with other assets to the point where they lose their exempt character. However, in this case, no such allegations have been made. Therefore, we leave the question for another day.