dissenting. The opinion of the majority construes the charge in question as an instruction on the issue of “permanent impairment of earning capacity.” I cannot agree with this construction because the charge, in addition to “the diminution of the capacity to earn money” also specifically authorizes recovery of “the reasonable value of such loss of earnings” reduced to its present cash value. There can be no doubt that the court in this instance intended to instruct upon the issue of loss of future earnings, since otherwise the instructions on reduction of such loss to its present cash value would not have been necessary. Chancey v. Shirah, 96 Ga. App. 91, 95 (99 S. E. 2d 365) and citation. In addition, tlie court stated subsequently that “another item of damages that is recoverable on account of personal injury is damages on account of pain and suffering, mental and physical.”
At the outset, a great deal of difficulty can be avoided by clarifying the distinction between the right to recover for a loss or diminution of ability to. work and labor, and the right to recover for a loss of future earnings. “Impairment of ability to work and labor is an element of pain and suffering for which damages may be recovered by one who1 is physically injured by the negligence of another. It is the fact of impairment or loss of ability to work, with or without compensation, that is to be considered by the jury in determining the amount to. be allowed for pain and suffering, and no evidence as to. earnings is necessary in such calculation, the only standard of measurement being the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors.” Railway Exp. Agency v. Standridge, 68 Ga. App. 836, 837 (24 S. E. 2d 504), and cases cited therein; City of Manchester v. Beavers, 38 Ga. App. 337, 342 *153(144 S. E. 11); Wall Realty Co. v. Leslie, 54 Ga. App. 560 (3) (188 S. E. 600). Such loss or impairment need not be pleaded as an item of special damages. Recovery therefor is a part of pain and suffering and need not be reduced to present cash value. Chancey v. Shirah, 96 Ga. App. 91, 95, supra, and citation. Where such recovery is sought for pain and suffering only, “the juiy may consider the circumstance of lost earning capacity under the head of pain and suffering.” City Council of Augusta v. Drawdy, 75 Ga. App. 543, 549 (43 S. E. 2d 569).
A different situation arises where recovery is sought for loss of future earnings as a separate element of damages. Such loss is pecuniary in nature and must be proved with reasonable certainty. Here again, the loss of earning capacity is pertinent, but it is the pecuniary loss resulting therefrom which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover upon proper proof. Therefore, in a suit for pecuniary loss of future earnings, simple proof of a loss of capacity to work and earn money is insufficient without additional proof of the pecuniary loss, if any, which will result therefrom. “In an action for damages on account of personal injuries, the pecuniary loss resulting from a diminution of the injured person’s earning capacity can not be determined solely from proof that as a result of the injuries the capacity to work has been impaired. There must be some data or facts from which the pecuniary value of such diminution can be determined.” City of Atlanta v. Jolly, 39 Ga. App. 282 (1) (146 S. E. 770). See also Nipper v. Collins, 90 Ga. App. 827, 830 (84 S. E. 2d 497). It is true that some cases refer to a diminution of “capacity to labor” or “capacity to earn money” as being element of damages (e.g. West v. Moore, 44 Ga. App. 214 (2), 160 S. E. 811; City Council of Augusta v. Drawdy, 75 Ga. App. 543, supra), but a close reading of these opinions will reveal that the actual element of damages in each case is the pecuniary loss of future earnings resulting from the diminution of such capacity.
“Damages recoverable for the loss of probable future earnings must be pleaded, and proved by introducing in evidence sufficient data upon which the jury, may base their finding.” Railway Exp. Agency v. Mathis, 83 Ga. App. 415, 422 (63 S. E. 2d 921). The measure of such damages “involves numerous considerations, *154among which are, first, the earnings before the injury, earnings after the injury, probability of increased or decreased earnings in the future, considering the capacity of the injured party, effects of sickness and old age, etc.” City Council of Augusta v. Drawdy, 75 Ga. App. 543, 547, supra. It is error “for the judge to charge the jury on this element of damages, unless there is some evidence upon which the jury can base with reasonable certainty a finding as to the amount of such damages.” Rome Ry. &c. Co. v. Duke, 26 Ga. App. 52 (105 S. E. 386). Any amount found for diminished future earnings should be reduced to its present cash value by the jury. Furney v. Tower, 34 Ga. App. 739 (7) (131 S. E. 177) and cases cited therein.
A great many of the cases on this subject are concerned with the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize a charge on loss of future earnings and to present a question for the jury as to the amount of such loss. In Southern Ry. Co. v. Groover, 41 Ga. App. 746 (4) (154 S. E. 706) it was held: “Where the trial occurred more than a year after the plaintiff’s injury, and the nature and character of the injury and his then present condition were fully described, with testimony that his injuries were in part permanent, and that his earning capacity had been permanently reduced, and where there was evidence as to his daily earning capacity and also as to what he had earned yearly before his injury, and as to- the kinds of work in which he had been engaged and was fitted for, it can not be said that the instruction upon the question of the plaintiff’s right to recover damages resulting from a diminution in his earning capacity was without any evidence whatever to warrant it.” In Pollard v. Gammon, 63 Ga. App. 852, 864 (12 S. E. 2d 624) this court held: “The jury were authorized to find from the evidence that tile plaintiff, as the result of the injury, was impaired in his capacity to do physical labor and to work. As a result thereof he was out of a job for a long while, and at the time of the trial was out of a job, and that after he was injured he performed temporary work for which he received less pay than he had been receiving as a flagman for the, defendant at the time of the injury. There was also evidence as to the nature and character of his injuries. His age appeared, and the mortality tables were in-evi*155dence. The evidence was therefore, sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the plaintiff’s earning capacity had, as the result of the injury, been impaired in an ascertainable amount of money as compensation therefor. It was not error for the court to submit this to the jury as an element of damage recoverable.” In Draper Canning Co. v. Dempsey, 91 Ga. App. 593, 597 (86 S. E. 2d 678) there was evidence “from which the jury was authorized to find that, after the plaintiff sustained his injuries, he was shifted from one civil service category as an employee of the City of Atlanta to another; that this shift was because he was unable to continue in the former category due to his injuries; that this resulted in a temporary increase in pay of $16.50 per month, but was temporary only, due to the fact that both jobs fell into classifications with specified increments based on length of service, so that within a 5-year period and from then on under such pay schedules the plaintiff would be losing $21 per month.” It was held that “there is some evidence here which authorized the jury to find diminished earning capacity with reasonable certainty, and accordingly this assignment of error is without merit.” It also appears that in cases where the injury is of such a patent nature that the jury may observe it and determine for themselves the extent to which the plaintiff’s capacity to labor, then or in the future, is diminished, such evidence, while somewhat general, wil-1 support a charge on the subject of loss of future earnings. O’Neill Mfg. Co. v. Pruitt, 110 Ga. 577, 579 (36 S. E. 59); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Culpepper, 142 Ga. 275 (4) (82 S. E. 659).
On the other hand, it has been held in a number of cases that there was no evidence which would furnish the jury a reasonable basis on which to estimate the loss or damage resulting from a diminution of capacity to earn money, and it was therefore error to give the charge excepted to. See Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Deal, 66 Ga. App. 211, 213 (17 S. E. 2d 592) and cases cited therein; City of Atlanta v. Feeney, 42 Ga. App. 135 (155 S. E. 370); West v. Moore, 44 Ga. App. 214 (3), supra; City Council of Augusta v. Drawdy, 75 Ga. App. 543, supra; Railway Exp. Agency v. Mathis, 83 Ga. App. 415, supra; Nipper v. Collins, 90 Gu. App. 827, supra; Western & Atlantic R. v. *156Hart, 95 Ga. App. 810 (6) (99 S. E. 2d 302); Harris v. Combs, 98 Ga. App. 418 (2) (105 S. E. 2d 760).
In the instant case recovery is sought, among other things, for the loss of future earnings. It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff helps her husband in his combination grocery store and filling station; that she runs a sandwich stand at the store and what she makes selling sandwiches is hers to keep. In the collision with defendant’s car, the plaintiff suffered a broken leg, injuries to her knee and various cuts and lacerations. Her doctor testified that as a result thereof she had suffered about a ten percent disability; “it will limit her work to a certain extent, the length of her work, the duration of time in which she could work.” The plaintiff herself testified that she was away from the store for several months because of her injuries, during which period she lost about $800 as a result of not being able to work. She further testified: “I was not able to do anything around the store before I got back to doing my regular duties. I am at the store now. I have been back there since about two weeks before people started chopping cotton. I don’t know what time they started chopping cotton, but I have been back two weeks before they started chopping cotton. I make the sandwiches myself. Just fix hamburgers and hot dogs.” (Emphasis added).
While this evidence does indicate that the plaintiff has suffered some degree of physical disability, it not only fails to show what pecuniary loss, if any, will result therefrom but on the contrary indicates that the plaintiff has been able to resume, her regular duties in the store and continue the operation of her sandwich stand, with no showing that her profits from this enterprise have diminished since her return.
This case therefore differs from Callaway v. Pickard, 68 Ga. App. 637, 647 (23 S. E. 2d 564) where the evidence showed that the plaintiff “was unable to perform the physical acts and manual labor that he had been able to perform before his injury.” It is true that in the case at bar the plaintiff did testify that her leg hurt when she had to stand on it while working; that it was stiff and she could not put her weight on it while standing straight up. While such effects may be evidence of pain and suffering, they are not sufficient to show an inability to perform the physical *157acts and labor which her employment necessitates to such an extent that her earnings are reduced.
It is further contended that the ruling of the trial court must be affirmed under the decision of this court in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Hansford, 85 Ga. App. 507 (4), 512 (69 S. E. 2d 681). In that case however, it is specifically stated: “Under the pleadings and evidence in this case, the plaintiff was not suing for loss of future earnings as an item of special damage, but he did allege and prove facts which would authorize the jury to find a diminution in his earning capacity.” This being true, the case involves no more than a loss of ability to work and labor and the charge of the court requiring the jury to reduce the reasonable value of lost earning capacity to its present cash value was actually favorable to the defendant. It is further observed that the court restricted its ruling to- “the circumstances of this case” and further stated that it did not intend to imply “that loss of earning capacity is compensable where there is no evidence as to earning capacity based on past experience, and evidence must be introduced as to the extent to which the earning capacity has been diminished, and damages so found must be reduced to their present cash value.”
There being nothing in the evidence from which the amount of the plaintiff’s loss of future earnings, if any, can be determined, the court erred in instructing the jury as to such issue and in overruling the defendant’s amended motion for a new trial on this ground.
As I understand the majority opinion, it in effect holds that there can be a double recovery for pain and suffering, which should not be allowed under the principles stated above.
If the majority opinion means that the plaintiff suffered a loss of 10 percent in her future earnings because she had to work 10 percent harder or longer each day the conclusion is erroneous for the reason that there is no loss of future earnings and the fact that the plaintiff had to work harder or longer to earn the same amount of money would and should be charged to pain and suffering because the recovery of lost future earnings must be based on an actual loss of future earnings which the plaintiff here does not have. As I understand the majority opinion, and to me it is *158somewhat confusing, it authorizes a recovery in this case not only for pain and suffering because of the 10 percent incapacity, but also authorizes a recovery of lost future earnings without proof of such loss on the theory that such loss can be compensated for as special damages in addition to damages for pain and suffering. I cannot find any case which makes such a holding. I feel sure that the courts never intended to hold that a recovery could be had for pain and suffering because of decreased capacity to labor and in addition damages for lost future earnings without proof from which the amount of lost future earnings could be reasonably ascertained. I think the list of cases cited below, which is by no means exhaustive, demonstrates my contention, and especially significant are the citations in some of the cases which clarify and explain earlier rulings. Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 500, 508 (16 S. E. 49); Atlanta St. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 88 Ga. 647 (15 S. E. 825); Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. Haralson, 133 Ga. 231 (65 S. E. 437), citing 77 Ga. 192, 200, 88 Ga. 647, 90 Ga. 500, 508, 107 Ga. 70 (see the exception to the charge in this case); Railway Exp. Agency v. Standridge, 68 Ga. App. 836, supra, citing in addition to cases next- above, 111 Ga. 464 (8), 122 Ga. 82 (2), 136 Ga. 591, 139 Ga. 389, 155 Ga. 579 (4), 13 Ga. App. 386, 44 Ga. App. 214 (2), 60 Ga. App. 567, 569; City of Manchester v. Beavers, 38 Ga. App. 337, supra, citing 125 Ga. 354, 357; Wall Bealty Co. v. Leslie, 54 Ga. App. 560, supra, citing 145 Ga. 656 (2); City Council of Augusta v. Drawdy, 75 Ga. App. 543 (2), supra, and citations. See especially Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Gardner, 122 Ga. 82 (2) (49 S. E. 818).