Strickland v. Strickland

Justice PLEICONES:

I concur in the majority’s disposition of this appeal, but write separately because the fact the obligation sought to be *90enforced arises by virtue of a court order does not, in my opinion, preclude a plea of laches. While I appreciate the majority’s sensitivity to the dignity of court orders, I do not see that interposing either laches or equitable estoppel in any way undermines a court’s authority. These bars he to prevent a party from enforcing a stale order, while the court’s authority is vindicated through its contempt powers. Further, I do not agree with the application of equitable estoppel to these facts. The former husband was aware from the May 1992 consent order that he was obligated to pay his former wife $1200/month alimony and to make up arrearages as the parties agreed, and was aware that for many years his former wife had accepted less alimony than she was entitled to under this order. Assuming his former wife meant for him to believe that she was satisfied with the underpayments when she in fact was not, and assuming he relied upon her “false representation,” this does not change his actual or constructive knowledge of the “true facts”: he had, for years, failed to meet his court-ordered alimony obligation.

I would affirm the family court order barring the request for alimony arrearages on the ground of laches, affirm the refusal to terminate alimony under the “continual habitation” statute, and reverse the order barring future alimony payments on the ground of laches.