concurring generally and specially.
I fully concur in Divisions 1, 2 (a) and (b), 3, 4, 5, and 6 and in the judgment. I concur specially in Division 2 (c), because it does not address the changed standard of appellate review required by the General Assembles 1987 enactment of OCGA § 51-12-5.1. That statute required that the evidence be “clear and convincing.”20
The appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s failure to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages.21 The majority, in asserting that conflicting evidence presented a jury issue under a clear and convincing standard cites decisions which depend ultimately on precedents decided before the 1987 amendment. For example, the majority cites Paul v. Destito,22 a 2001 decision citing Crosby v. Kendall23 and Home Ins. Co. v. Wynn.24 Crosby also relies on Home Ins. Co., as well as Caswell v. Jordan,25 a case that is physical precedent only. Significantly, Home Ins. Co. does not mention OCGA § 51-12-5.1 or the necessity for clear and convinc*805ing evidence. It relies on two cases, neither of which mentions the requirement that the evidence for punitive damages be clear and convincing.26
Decided November 22,2002 Reconsideration denied December 11,2002 Decker & Hallman, Richard R Decker, Stacy L. Edelstein, for appellant.Before the Tort Reform Act of 1987,27 the quantum of evidence required for an award of punitive damages was a preponderance of the evidence, and the standard of appellate review was whether there was “any evidence” to support the award.28 Most relevant decisions of this Court do not evince any change in the standard following the enactment of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 in 1987.29 By contrast, there is at least one panel decision in 2001, Kodadek v. Lieberman,30 which affirmed the grant of a j.n.o.v. to a defendant on the issue of punitive damages although there was some evidence to support the award.31 Kodadek relies in part on our full bench decision in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford,32 although, as argued in a dissent to that opinion, “the ‘majority’ does not have a majority of votes for its position that the punitive damages award is unsupported.”33
I concur specially rather than dissent because the evidence in the case at bar probably met either the pre-1987 test of “any evidence” or the higher standard required by Kodadek. For example, the evidence was undisputed that the defendant violated Georgia law by not keeping the required records, and numerous Cobb Electric Membership Corporation employees testified that the pesticides were sprayed in the open air rather than merely into cracks and crevices. But at some time, in an appropriate case, we should reconcile the conflicting lines of precedent.
*806Owen, Gleaton, Egan, Jones & Sweeney, W. Seaborn Jones, Phi-lippa Tibbs-Ellis, for appellees.Regarding “clear and convincing evidence,” see generally Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861 (440 SE2d 165) (1994).
Neither the enumeration of errors nor the appellant’s three supplemental briefs challenge the punitive damages as being excessive. Therefore, the landmark decision of Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., 254 Ga. App. 598 (563 SE2d 178) (2002), is not applicable to the case at bar.
250 Ga. App. 631, 639-640 (7) (550 SE2d 739) (2001).
247 Ga. App. 843, 848 (2) (b) (545 SE2d 385) (2001).
229 Ga. App. 220, 223 (2) (493 SE2d 622) (1997).
184 Ga. App. 755, 760 (7) (362 SE2d 769) (1987) (physical precedent only).
Daniell v. Clein, 206 Ga. App. 377, 383 (3) (425 SE2d 344) (1992); Byrne v. Reardon, 196 Ga. App. 735, 736 (3) (397 SE2d 22) (1990).
Ga. L. 1987, pp. 917-919, § 5.
Read v. Benedict, 200 Ga. App. 4, 7 (2) (406 SE2d 488) (1991); Petrolane Gas Svc. v. Eusery, 193 Ga. App. 860, 862 (1) (389 SE2d 355) (1989).
See, e.g., Crosby, supra (“the controlling question for the appellate court is whether there was any evidence to support [the] award”).
247 Ga. App. 606, 610 (2) (545 SE2d 25) (2001).
Deciding whether punitive damages should have been allowed may be one of those rare occasions when an appellate court must weigh the evidence. Weighing evidence de novo at the appellate level is sometimes required, for example, in criminal appeals. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
218 Ga. App. 248, 255 (3), n. 2 (461 SE2d 877) (1995), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 267 Ga. 226 (476 SE2d 565) (1996).
Ford, supra at 279 (Pope, P. J., dissenting).