the author of the dissenting opinion, states his interpretation in the following language:
“The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States do not compel the conclusion that a state court is powerless to refuse jurisdiction of any action brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. § 51. On the contrary, in its most recent interpretation of that legislation, five members of the court were of the view that the venue provision (section 6) does not compel a state to open its forums to all cases arising under the statute under all circumstances. Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra. And consistent with that view are a number of prior decisions. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690, 78 L. Ed. 1227; Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 S. Ct. 152, 76 L. Ed. 295; Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. Ed. 747; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49 S Ct. 207, 723 L. Ed. 470; Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct. 485, 71 L. Ed. 905; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe. R. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101, 44 S. Ct. 469, 68 L. Ed. 928; Davis v. Farmers’ Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 906.
“In the Miles case, Justices Frankfurter, Boberts, Byrnes, and Chief Justice Stone were of the opinion that ‘Section 6 did not give the state courts compulsive jurisdiction,’ and Justice Jackson, in sharing that view, stated: ‘It is very doubtful if any requirement can be spelled out of the Federal Constitution that a state must furnish a forum for a non-resident plaintiff and a foreign corporation to fight out issues imported from another state where the cause of action arose.’ Under this construction of the statute, it was the duty of the trial judge in the present litigation to hear and determine, upon the merits, the railroad company’s motions for a continuance, exercising a sound discretion as to whether, upon the facts presented, and the trials of the two actions should be continued for either an indefinite or a stated period.”
The Supreme Court of Missouri in one of the latest cases we have been able to find, State ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W. 2d 105, 109, held that the the doctrine of forum non conveniens was inapplicable in F.E.L.A. cases. The court there analyzed the United States Supreme Court’s decision and concluded that the state *331courts were required to assume jurisdiction and after such assumption, to exercise it to the end that the courts must be kept open for litigants from other states. Justice Tipton, speaking for the court in that case, makes the following observations:
“Thus it is clear that under the Kepner and Miles cases, supra, a state court cannot dismiss a Federal Employers’ Liability case solely under the forum non conveniens doctrine. ‘The Federal Employers’ Liability Act, as interpreted by Kepner, increases the number of places where the defendant may be sued and makes him accept the plaintiffs choice.’ * * * Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra, 67 S. Ct. 839, loc. cit. 842, [91 L. Ed. 1055, 330 U. S. 501].
“Relators rely mainly upon the case of Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. Ed. 747. In that case a resident of Connecticut brought a suit in a state court of New York under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act against the defendant, a Connecticut corporation, for personal injuries inflicted in Connecticut. The trial court dismissed the action under a statute which it held gave it discretion in suits brought by non-resident plaintiffs. The trial court action was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. 248 N. Y. 580, 162 N. E. 532. This was the statute in question: ‘An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by another foreign corporation, or by a non-resident, in one of the following cases only: * * * 4. Where a foreign corporation is doing business within this State.’ Code Civ. Proc. § 1780.
“The Supreme Court of the United States held that this statute was not in violation of Article 4, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, as discriminating between citizens of New York and citizens of other states where construed as using the word ‘resident’ in the strict primary sense of one actually living in the place for a time, irrespective of domicile. Such was the construction placed upon this statute by the New York Court of Appeals. 248 N. Y. 580, 162 N. E. 532. It also held that state courts are not required to entertain suits under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, but are empowered to do so.
“We do not think this case sustains the relator. The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is not even mentioned in the opinion. In the first place, Missouri does not have a statute similar to the New York statute which the courts of the state have held to give them discretionary power to dismiss an action brought by a non-resident as distinguished from a citizen of another state. Also, Missouri permits citizens of this state to Federal Employer’s Liability cases in its courts. To deny the same privilege to citizens of another state would violate Article 4, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States.”
The following excerpts are taken from cases which we believe sustain the views expressed by us. These cases are *332likewise cited in chronological order but no effort has been made to collate the times of the decisions with those cited from the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the State of Ohio in Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1923, 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N. E. 94, 96, held that the venue provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act were not mandatory on the courts of the state of Ohio. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court said:
“The next question for determination is whether section 11273, General Code, applies to causes of action arising under the federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665 [45 U. S. C. A. §§ 51-59], and whether the provisions of that act relating to jurisdiction make it compulsory upon the courts of general jurisdiction in this state to hear such causes even though such suits may be begun in a county where the plaintiff does not reside or where the cause of action did not arise.
“It has already been seen that the language of the amendment is broad enough to exclude such actions. The federal act contains the following provision:
“ ‘The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this act shall he concurrent with that of the courts of the several states.’ 36 Stat. at L. 291; section 8074, Barnes Fed. Code; section 8662, U. S. Comp. Stat. [45 U. S. C. A. § 56],
“It is undoubted that the trial courts of this state have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of causes arising under the federal act, and that in all cases where the plaintiff is able to come within the terms of the amendment of section 11273, General Code, our trial courts have complete jurisdiction. While it is very clear that the Legislature of Ohio could confer compulsory jurisdiction upon the trial courts to hear all such cases, regardless of the residence of the plaintiff or the locality of the injury, it does not follow that the federal lawmaking power can thus confer compulsory jurisdiction; neither does it appear in the language above quoted that it has attempted to do so. The claims made by plaintiff in error lose sight of the clear distinction between creating a right and providing a remedy. The right is created by the enactment of the statute. The remedy is provided by establishing courts and declaring their jurisdiction.
“An Illinois statute provides that—
“ ‘No action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state, to recover damages for a death occuring outside of this state.’ Laws 1903, p. 217 {Smith-Hurd Stats, c. 70 § 2].
“The case of Walton, Adm’x v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2, L. R. A. *3331918 E, 914, was brought to recover upon a liability arising under the federal Employers’ Liability Act, and the question arose whether the Illinois courts were compelled to entertain an action where the death occurred outside of the state. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the action could not be entertained, and that jurisdiction of the subject-matter could not be conferred even by consent of the parties. The court further stated that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction upon any court which it has not created, and that the federal Constitution contains no restriction upon the power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, except that the state must give to the citizens of other states the same rights that it accords to its own citizens.”
In 1927, the State of New York, in the case of Murnan v. Wabash Railway Company, 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508, 509, 54 A.L.R. 1522, passed on the question of whether or or not the courts of that state could decline jurisdiction of an action brought under the F.E.L.A. by a non-resident of New York against, a foreign corporation. Mr. Justice Pound delivered the opinion of the court and stated:
“Although the rule prohibits a court of general jurisdiction from refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in its discretion, it has often been held that the courts of this state may refuse in their discretion to entertain jurisdiction over causes of action arising out of a tort committed in a sister state where both the plaintiff and defendant are non-residents. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & I. Co., 235, N. Y. 152 160, 139 N. E. 223, 32 A. L. R. 1, and cases cited. While no controlling reason compelled, the Special Term refused to assume jurisdiction. It refused, it would seem, for reasons of convenience, to hear the case, and vacated the service of the summons under the authorities referred to.
“The appellate division held that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act which conferred, or recognized, concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts, made it mandatory upon the state court not to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, when it had such jurisdiction, in any case brought under the act. It relied on the case of [Second Employers’ Liability Cases] Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A., N. S., 44 [1 N. C. C. A. 875]. The ease is authority for the bare proposition that, where the state courts would exercise their jurisdiction except for the fact that the action is brought under the act of Congress, they may not refuse to exercise jurisdiction because the action is brought under the laws of the United States. The court said:
“ ‘The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it. * * * We conclude that rights arising under the act in question may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion.’ * * *
*334“This general language read in connection 'with what was actually decided means nothing more than that the state courts must make no hostile discrimination against litigants who come within the act in question; that they must treat litigants under the federal act as other litigants are treated; that they are to act in conformity with their general principles of practice and procedure and are not to. deny jurisdiction merely because the right of action arises under the act of Congress.
“The court seems to make this meaning clear. It says, in substance, that it is advised by decisions of the supreme court of errors that the Superior Courts of the state of Connecticut are not only empowered to take cognizance of actions to recover for personal injuries and death, but are accustomed to exercise that jurisdiction in cases where the right of action arises under the laws of another state. It says further: ‘We deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts, or to control or affect their modes of procedure, but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to the occasion, and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the act of Congress, and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure.’ * * *
“The courts of New York exercise their discretion in all other cases where a tort action is brought by one non-resident against another under the laws of another state. The practice may be anomalous, but it is well established. That Congress has undertaken to regulate the exercise of jurisdiction by our courts by making compulsory what in other similar cases is discretionary seems an unreasonable conclusion and a resulting invasion of the powers of our tribunals as heretofore exercised. We conclude that a litigant who brings his action under the federal Employers’ Liability Act stands before the court in no different attitude than a litigant who brings his action under the statute of a sister state. He may not be cast out because he is suing under the act of Congress. He may not enforce his rights merely because he is suing under the act.”
The Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey in 1940 held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable to the practice in that jurisdiction. In Anderson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 11 A. 2d 607, 608, 18 N. J. Misc. 153, Mr. Justice Wolber, speaking for the court said:
“It is contended, however’, for the reasons stated, that our courts have the power to consider the circumstances of each particular case and to exercise their discretion to decline jurisdiction in such actions if it appears improper .to entertain the same. It is asserted that the facts in the instant case are such that require that discretion to be exercised against these plaintiffs and accordingly remit them to the courts of their domicile.
*335“The doctrine invoked is something like the civil law plea of forum non conveniens. It has received extended treatment by the courts of this country. See extensive note following Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223, 32 A. L. R. 1 (resident v. foreign corporation for out-of-state tort), article, Blair, ‘The Doctrine of Forum, Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law’ (1929) XXIX Col. L. Rev. 1, and articles by Foster, ‘Place of trial in Civil Actions,’ 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, and ‘Place of Trial, Intrastate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment,’ 44 Harv. L. Rev. 41. Briefly stated, its rationale ife that the courts should not allow their time to be taken up with the burden and expense of trying actions which ought under the circumstances to be brought in the jurisdiction where the parties reside, where the cause arose and where the home courts of litigants are open and provide an effectual remedy for the settlement of their grievances. Collard v. Beach, 93 App. Div. 339, 87 N. Y. S. 884. This principile is often embodied in statutes of some states. It has been of such long standing in other states as to be evidence of the public policy of those estates. Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152, 87 A. L. R. 1407; Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 86 N. H. 341, 168 A. 895. It is applicable to actions in contract and tort, although the tendency is to apply it strictly in tort actions for personal injuries and moderately in commercial transactions. Werterheim v. Clergue, 53 App. Div. 122, 65 N. Y. S. 750; Davis v. Julius Kessler & Co., 118 Misc. 292, 194 N. Y. S. 9.”
It should be observed that the motion to dismiss was denied in this case because of the facts and circumstances indicating that the statute of limitations had run in the foreign jurisdiction and no real inconvenience was established.
In the case of Motley v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., unreported, decided December 16, 1949, Judge Robson, speaking for the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, in ruling on a motion to dismiss a cause on the ground of forum non conveniens, stated:
‘The Court desires to discuss two cases decided since the opinion by Judge Epstein.
“In the case of Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 944, 93 L. Ed. 1207, 10 A. L. R. 2d 921, the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the right of the Federal District Court to transfer a F. E. L. A. case under the new Federal Judicial Code, Title 28, Section 1404 (a). Chief Justice Vinson, in deciding the case, said on page 56: ‘In this case we must decide whether the venue provisions of the Judicial Code render applicable the doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions under the *336P. E. L. A.’ The Court, after a careful consideration of the statute decided it did have the right.
“Much stress is laid by able counsel for the plaintiff on the recent decision of Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, et al., [359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W. 2d 105], of the Supreme Court of Missouri. To give credence to this decision would place our courts in the position of allowing the Congress of the United States to regulate our jurisdiction and to control and affect our modes of procedure. This, our court has consistently refused to do and is sustained in its position by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. 279, U. S. 377, [49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. Ed. 747]; Second Employers Liability Act cases (Mondou v. N. Y. H. & H. R. Co) 223 U. S. 1, 56 and 57 [32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A., N. S. 44]; Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 315 U. S. 698, 704 [62 S Ct. 827, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A. L. R. 1104], Missouri apparently has no announced doctrine of forum non conveniens. Illinois does. Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185 [79 N. E. 2d 593]; Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563 [115 N. E. 2, L. R. A. 1918 E, 914].”
Plaintiff contends that if this court were to embrace the doctrine of forum non conveniens we would violate Section 2, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States and the Fourteenth Amendment in that plaintiff would be denied the same privileges and immunities granted to citizen of this and other states; and further, that he would be denied the equal protection of the laws. It would be necessary to sustain plaintiff’s contention if we were to hold that the doctrine was applicable only in cases arising under federal acts or if we were to discriminate against him by refusing to enforce a right granted by a federal statute. Furthermore, the same complaint would be legitimate if we did not accord to plaintiff substantially the same access to our courts we accord our own citizens. However, we are of the opinion that if the doctrine is applied in this cause and applied in all instances when a cause of action arises out of the state and the residence of one party or all parties makes the doctrine applicable, we do not run afoul of the federal constitutional provisions under such an interpretation and procedure. We accord to every litigant the right to institute a suit in the courts of this state subject to the right of the other party to enter a plea of forum non conveniens when the cause of action *337arises outside the jurisdiction of this state. It may be conceded that the doctrine may have little or no application if one of the parties resides in this state, but because one litigant may not be able to sufficiently establish inconvenience does not render the application of the principle in other cases unconstitutional.
In support of the claim of unconstitutional application plaintiff cites to us many cases in which this court has entertained causes of action arising in other jurisdictions under federal or state acts. We concede that the district courts of this state have consistently accepted jurisdiction of these cases and proceeded to try the cases. Moreover, this court has passed on the legal principles involved. There would be force to this contention if in any of the cases to which we are referred the doctrine of forum non conveniens had been in issue and this court had announced a holding contrary to the one adopted in this decision. A review of the many cases cited shows that a plea of inconvenience has not been interposed and this court has never been called upon to pass on the precise question. The absence of the plea may be accountd for because the amount of litigation arising in foreign jurisdictions and previously imported into the state was so insignificant that the doctrine was not considered. Modern times, with rapid communications, speedy travel, fertile grounds in certain localities for large verdicts, and centralization of legal representation have brought about a large influx of personal injury cases to many states, including this one, and the number of cases imported into a particular state is in direct proportion to the size of the verdicts rendered. The venue provisions of the F.E.L.A. have permitted injured employees to try their cause at any place where substantial verdicts can be obtained and where competent counsel trained in personal injury litigation are available. In a sense, the act encourages shopping for the most generous jurisdiction, and while we believe injured émployees should be afforded reasonable opportunity to *338present their causes to their best advantage, we do not believe the courts of this state are powerless to slow up a bargain day rush. The move of litigation to this jurisdiction has greatly increased the necessity of this court now entertaining pleas of inconvenience and now declining to exercise jurisdiction which was previously accepted in similar cases but under different circumstances and different issues.
In an article in 56 Yale Law Journal, page 1234, the writer gives the history and development of this doctrine and perhaps suggests a reason why the plea is now becoming common-place in this type of litigation:
“In court battles, as in warfare, new weapons of attack tend to be neutralized by new defenses. State laws giving courts jurisdiction over nonresidents in certain circumstances have resulted in increased maneuverability for plaintiff by providing a wider choice of forum. To counter this advantage defendants have increasingly been allowed to reply on the doctrine of forum non conveniens to restrict the plaintiff to the appropriate state court. Both Congress and the judiciary have, during the past few years evidenced a desire to bestow the doctrine upon the federal courts, and in two decisions of the past term the Supreme Court has approved dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds.
❖ * & * * *
“The growth of forum non conveniens in this country was long hindered by decisions indicating that state courts were required by the federal Constitution to hear actions between residents of other states. The right to sue in a state court was said to be one of the ‘Privileges’ which each state must extend to the citizens of the several states. It is now settled that jurisdiction may be refused on forum non conveniens grounds, though state courts have not until recently employed the Latin tag.”
In a footnote to the article there is a comment that “Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed. 1940) did not include the phrase, but it is now contained in the pocket supplement.”
Since the doctrine was stagnant until recent years it can be understood why in the many cases reaching this court litigants have not sought to have the policy of this state declared. This is not to say that the precept was entirely overlooked as the legislature, by virtue of Section 104 — 4—9, U.C.L.A. 1943, acknowledged the desirability of such a procedure within the state as that *339section permits a court to transfer a cause of action from one district to another for the convenience of counsel or in the interests of justice. It would appear from this enactment that the legislature intended the courts of this state to have the right to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in those instances where a more convenient forum was available within the state. If the principle can be applied against all persons within the state, there is no good reason why the doctrine should not be extended to causes of action arising outside the state if it is applied equally as to all litigants. Accordingly, we hold that to permit a dismissal because of forum non convenience does not offend against the Federal Constitution.
The last contention made by plaintiff questions the sufficiency of the showing made by the defendant to bring itself within the rule. This assignment requires consideration of the evidence presented to the trial court.
Granting discretionary power in the trial court to dismiss the cause for reasons of inconvenience, the power should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances and when an adequate showing has been made that the interests of justice require a trial in a more convenient forum. The mere fact that another court is more convenient for one party is not sufficient to justify a refusal to act, as any party who is a nonresident or foreign corporation can always show some good reason why a trial of the action is not convenient. The closing of the courts of this state to this plaintiff results in limiting what he considers a substantial right granted unto him. By doing so, the court acts against what plaintiff believes to be his best interests as the cause would not be instituted in this jurisdiction unless he believed he could obtain a more favorable judgment than if he were required to litigate his case in another or different forum; and the defendant would not make the motion unless it believed a less liberal jury could *340be secured in the other forum as the amount of present day verdicts make the amount of costs fade into insignificance. The discretion should not be exercised in those cases where the underlying purpose is to stall, delay, or handicap persons seeking compensation for personal injuries. Only when the factors which establish there is real imposition on our jurisdiction weigh strongly in favor of the defendant should the trial court deny to the plaintiff his choice of forum.
We are convinced that at the time this matter was heard the trial court and counsel gave little heed to the factual background necessary to sustain a plea of inconvenience. The contents of the affidavit filed by the defendant were controverted and the attorney for the company requested that the matter be set down for hearing on the facts. Apparently, this request was not acted upon as plaintiff’s counsel stated they would have no objection to the competency of any evidence given by counsel for the defendant and he proceeded to testify. As a result, much of the evidence on many of the factors needed to justify the decision is incomplete and missing and a substantial amount of that adopted by the court is hearsay. For instance, while the record shows it may be necessary for the defendant to call ten witnesses, three of whom it was claimed would be physicians and surgeons, the name, residences, and substance of their testimony could not be given. Likewise, as to the doctors: Who they were, where they resided, and the necessity for their presence and the substance of their testimony could not be given. The attorney testifying thought the burden placed on the defendant would be greater and prejudicial because the jury could not view the premises or the equipment. However, the cause of action was founded upon a defective hand brake and no good reason is shown why the equipment could not easily be made available to a local jury. Moreover, it is impossible to understand from the allegations of the complaint as to the manner in which the accident hap*341pened, how, or in what way, a view of the locality where plaintiff claims to have fallen to the ground would be helpful. The attorney claimed it would cost approximately $1,-500.00 for the railroad company to try the case here, but how the amount was arrived at he did not know and the record is silent as to the cost if the action was transferred to Denver. The residences of the witnesses were not shown, except that they lived in Colorado, and it may be that they resided some considerable distance from Denver, and, if so, the company would be required to house and feed them in that city if the action was tried there. If, as the attorney claimed, the doctors required extra pay to testify in Salt Lake City, there is no showing that the company would not be required to pay the same daily expert’s fee to have them report to the Denver court. They could have been subpoenaed to appear in Denver, but it was admitted a professional fee was paid when the doctors testified regardless of the locale of the action. As to how far these doctors would be required to travel and the time to be consumed in that and attendance at court in either city is not shown. It is claimed that the company was required to pay the Wages of its employees while travelling to or in attendance at court, but without their places of residence being shown the time to be consumed in travelling to either forum is not known to us. Construing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, the most that can be said is that some extra costs must be borne by the defendant solely because of the fact that additional travel time is involved if the witnesses attend court in this state. Little weight need be given in this case to the state lines and lack of process as the witnesses are all either employees of defendant or doctors closely associated with the company and all are available if paid at the same rate they would be paid for attendance in Denver.
Another desirable factor which might be considered by a court in determining whether or not to exercise its discretion and dismiss a case is the condition of the court cal*342endar of the jurisdiction which may subsequently be required to hear the cause. There is a total lack of evidence to establish this factor. We are entirely unadvised as to the condition of the calendar in the federal and state courts of Denver, and, while we cast no reflection on their condition, it might be that the plaintiff in this action would be required to wait an unreasonable length of time before his case would be brought to issue in that jurisdiction. The evidence as to this is readily available and could have been presented to the trial court. It hardly comports with our understanding of convenience to require a litigant to institute his suit in a jurisdiction where it might be many months before he can obtain any redress. Delayed justice does not afford an injured employee the right he should be entitled to under the Federal act. By way of illustration, we call attention to the fact that in the case of Motley v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, supra, the opinion shows that in Cook County, Illinois, jury cases had increased from 4,385 in 1942, to 9,249 in 1949, and the court was two and one-half years behind in the call of its calendar. If a litigant were driven to that jurisdiction by a dismissal here such a ruling might not be a reasonable and judicious exercise of discretion.
As to the inconvenience of the trial court, while plaintiff was afforded no opportunity to meet the evidence used as a foundation of the findings of fact on this factor because the court apparently took judicial notice of the condition of the calendar, any prejudice resulting therefrom is not material because we hold the evidence insufficient. The most that can be said for the evidence recited in the findings is that it establishes a total of 165 civil cases at issue and set for trial for the month of June, 1949, and that only about half that number could be disposed of during the month. Whether this is unusual or whether the number of cases at issue was substantially the same as they had been in previous periods is not disclosed. Whether the district courts in that *343district were running behind in the disposition of cases is not shown and the length of time before a matter might be tried is left undisclosed. While we know that suits under the F. E. L. A. are increasing in number in this jurisdiction, we do not know whether or not the 17 referred to are sufficient in numbers to interfere seriously with the transaction of the judicial business in the courts of the Third Judicial District. A certain number of these cases are settled prior to trial. Admittedly, to permit these actions to be litigated in our courts has a tendency to burden the taxpayers "with some additional costs and require our citizens to perform their jury duties more often. However, unless the interference becomes such as to interfere seriously with the business of. the courts the additional costs, expenses, and services should not out-weigh the right of a person to use the courts of this state. The facts presented to us do not suggest the trial court was justified in finding a serious interference with the courts or an excessive burden on the taxpayers.
We are not convinced by the present record that this is one of those exceptional cases which should be dismissed. Accordingly, the judgments is reversed with directions to permit both parties to present evidence in support of or in opposition to the motion, if they so desire. Costs to appellant.
WOLFE, and McDONOUGH, JJ, concur.