dissenting.
After reviewing the record on appeal, I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that respondents-appellants failed to include a proper notice of appeal in the record on appeal. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion states that the notice of appeal contained in the record is from the Board of Adjustment decision. Apart from the fact that the appellant Board of Adjustment would not file a notice of appeal from its own decisión, I believe the notice of appeal properly appeals from the superior court order. The notice of appeal states: “Defendants give notice of their appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina of the judgment in this action which was entered on 26 April 2006.” The order of the superior court was entered on 26 April 2006. This notice of appeal complies with N.C.R. App. R 3(d) because it “specifies] the party or parties taking the appeal; . . . designate^] the judgment or order from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken; and [is] signed by counsel of record for the party or parties taking the appeal. . . .”
Although the caption of the notice of appeal does, for reasons unknown, refer to the “BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT” in the upper right hand comer under “IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE,” I cannot see how that error transforms a notice of appeal that appeals “the *681judgment in this action which was entered on 26 April 2006” into a notice of appeal by the Board of Adjustment from its own order signed on 16 February 2006. I would, therefore, hold that the notice of appeal properly appeals from the decision of the superior court.
The majority opinion next states that the notice of appeal does not show that it was filed with the Clerk of Superior Court of Ashe County. The record on appeal, however, contains a Rule 9(a)(1)(b) statement specifically stating that the notice of appeal was “filed on 3 May 2006 with the Clerk for the Superior Court for Ashe County.” Petitioner-appellee stipulated to the record on appeal and thus stipulated to this statement. The record on appeal, therefore, contains an adequate statement as to the date that the notice of appeal was filed, as required by N.C.R. App. P. 9(b)(3).
Finally, the majority opinion relies upon Ribble v. Ribble, 180 N.C. App. 341, 637 S.E.2d 239 (2006), and In re C.T. & B.T., 182 N.C. App. 166, 641 S.E.2d 414 (2007), to hold that the appeal must be dismissed for .failure to include the certificate of service for the notice of appeal. This issue, however, has been specifically addressed and resolved by our Supreme Court contrary to the position taken by the majority opinion in this case.
In Hale v. Afro-Am. Arts Int’l, Inc., 110 N.C. App. 621, 623, 430 S.E.2d 457, 458, rev’d per curiam, 335 N.C. 231, 436 S.E.2d 588 (1993), the majority held, precisely like the majority in this case: “Without proper service of notice of appeal on the other party as required by Rule 26(b), and proof pursuant to Rule 26(d) in the record before this Court that such notice was given, this Court obtains no jurisdiction over the appeal.” Judge Wynn, dissenting, wrote: “[WJhere the ap-pellee failed, by motion or otherwise, to raise the issue as to service of notice [of appeal] in either the trial court or in this Court and has proceeded to file a brief arguing the merits of the case, I vote to hold that he has waived service of notice and, thus, the failure to include the proof of service in the Record is inconsequential.” Id. at 626, 430 S.E.2d at 460 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Our Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion reversing, in which it wrote:
Judge Wynn, dissenting, concluded that failure to serve the notice of appeal was a defect in the record analogous to failure to serve process. Therefore, a party upon whom service of notice of appeal is required may waive the failure of service by not raising *682the issue by motion or otherwise and by participating without objection in the appeal, as did the plaintiff here. Judge Wynn concluded that plaintiff had thereby waived service of the notice of appeal and that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of the appeal and should consider the case on its merits.
For the reasons given in Judge Wynn’s dissenting opinion, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing defendants’ appeal and remand the case to that court for consideration on the merits.
Hale, 335 N.C. at 232, 436 S.E.2d at 589.
In this case, petitioner-appellee stipulated to the record on appeal, did not raise any issue as to service of the notice of appeal in the superior court or in this Court, and filed a brief in this Court addressing the merits of the appeal. The issue regarding the notice of appeal was raised sua sponte by this Court. This case cannot meaningfully be distinguished from Hale. Hale requires that we hold that the appellee has waived the issue, and the failure to include a certificate of service in the record on appeal does not warrant dismissal. 110 N.C. App. at 626, 430 S.E.2d at 460 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Neither Ribble nor C. T. leads to a different conclusion. In Ribble, the Court found “plaintiff in the instant case has not filed a brief or any other document with this Court or otherwise participated in this appeal. This record does not indicate plaintiff had notice of this appeal and plaintiff has not waived defendant’s failure to include proof of service in the record before this Court.” 180 N.C. App. at 343, 637 S.E.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
In C.T. & B. T., DSS and the guardian ad litem filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the appeal for failure to timely file the notice of appeal and for failure to properly serve the notice of appeal. 182 N.C. App. at 167, 641 S.E.2d at 414-15. On appeal, the two parties also filed a motion to dismiss in this Court asserting the same grounds. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 415. This Court specifically noted that neither DSS nor the guardian ad litem had waived the failure to include proof of service and, based on that lack of waiver, concluded that Ribble was “indistinguishable from the case before us, and therefore dismissed] Respondent’s appeal.” Id. at 168, 641 S.E.2d at 415.
Thus, there was no waiver of the certificate of service issue by the appellee in either Ribble or C. T. Those two cases were distinguishable from Hale, while this case is not. The majority is not apply*683ing Ribble and C. T., but rather is seeking to extend them so as to completely overrule Hale. To the extent that the majority argues that Ribble and G.T. hold that Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (2005) (per curiam), overruled Hale, any such discussion is at most dicta and not controlling in this case in which the appellee has waived any issue regarding the certificate of service.
Moreover, Viar does not specifically address the issue at hand. Hale is directly on point. I am not comfortable broadly assuming that the Supreme Court has sub silentio overruled its own prior decisions — or in construing as controlling authority mere dicta suggesting such a possibility. It is inconsistent with the concept of precedent to dismiss an appeal that fully complies with a prior Supreme Court decision on the basis that a subsequent opinion of the Supreme Court — not specifically addressing the issue — silently overruled that prior opinion. It is particularly inappropriate to do so sua sponte without notice to the appellant and without any opportunity to correct the purported error by moving to amend the record on appeal.
In sum, the record on appeal contains a notice of appeal from the superior court order and states the date upon which that notice of appeal was filed. Hale holds that a failure to include a certificate of service for the notice of appeal does not support dismissal of the appeal if, as here, the appellee has waived the issue. Accordingly, I would not dismiss the appeal, but rather, as the Supreme Court mandated in Hale, would address the merits.