dissenting.
The majority holds that State Farm is entitled to a judicial declaration that it is not liable for damages resulting from the January 1, 1990, collision. I concur in Division 1 and dissent to the extent set out herein, with respect to Division 2.
First, as it relates to the facts here involved, it is implied but not stated that Steedley filed an action against Robert Drawdy seeking a recovery for personal injuries and property damage.
State Farm moved for summary judgment on three grounds: the collision occurred before the effective date of the policy issued on the truck, and Steedley’s access to $15,000 in uninsured motorist coverage renders its defense based upon lack of notice by Drawdy under both the auto and truck policies fully effectual. State Farm sought partial summary judgment as an alternative. It urged that, due to the lack of notice, it would not be liable for any amount exceeding $15,000, which represents the single person liability limit under Georgia’s compulsory automobile insurance law.
In resolving the question of whether Steedley’s access to $15,000 in uninsured motorist coverage renders State Farm’s defense based upon lack of notice fully effectual, we must first determine whether the public policy underlying our compulsory automobile liability insurance law renders that defense unenforceable in an action by a third party against the insured.
That question was answered in the affirmative in Ginn v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 196 Ga. App. 640 (396 SE2d 582) (1990). The rea*244son is the protection of the interest of accident victims in having access to insurance funds to satisfy their judgments. See Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 248 Ga. 350, 352 (282 SE2d 115) (1981); see generally Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 340-341 (1) (329 SE2d 136) (1985), which identified three public interests to be balanced: (1) that of insureds, to limit the insurer’s risks and thereby keep automobile insurance premiums as low as possible; (2) that of members of the public in general to improve safety on the highways; and (3) that of accident victims, to have access to insurance funds to satisfy their judgments.
We must next determine whether the victim’s access to uninsured motorist coverage rejuvenates an otherwise unenforceable defense by the defendant’s liability insurer.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 211 Ga. App. 613, 614 (1) (440 SE2d 242) (1994), and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 193 Ga. App. 864 (389 SE2d 370) (1989), support State Farm’s argument that public policy does not mandate that the defendant have liability insurance where the victim has access to uninsured motorist coverage. See also Neese, supra at 341. These cases involve the enforceability of exclusionary clauses in automobile liability insurance policies in actions by third parties against the insureds.5
In Neese, the victim had no automobile insurance and thus no uninsured motorist coverage. 254 Ga. at 341. The Court noted that even if he had had liability insurance, under our law he could have chosen not to purchase uninsured motorist protection. In footnote 13, the Court then stated, “We leave to a proper case the question of whether the existence of uninsured motorist coverage would affect the outcome in such a case.” Progressive Preferred and Auto-Owners were such cases. There we held that the victims’ access to a recovery through uninsured motorist coverage validates an otherwise unenforceable exclusion in the liability insurance policy of the party who caused the accident. However, in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 260 Ga. 235, 238 (392 SE2d 3) (1990), which postdated Progressive Preferred but predated Auto-Owners, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that uninsured motorist coverage averts the victim’s need for the defendant to have liability insurance, stating that a motorist is not required to purchase such coverage and that the policy behind uninsured motorist coverage is to protect the insured’s assets and not the public.
Under Starnes, the trial court correctly denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment on its second ground. To the extent that *245they are inconsistent with Starnes, Progressive Preferred and Auto-Owners should no longer be followed.
Decided March 31, 1995. Dillard, Bower & East, Bryant H. Bower, Jr., Robert W. Lamb, for appellant. Robert T. Drawdy, pro se.Nonetheless, Neese, supra at 341-342 (2), and Starnes v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ga. App. 320, 322 (1) (390 SE2d 419) (1990), aff'd on other grounds, Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Starnes, supra, continue to support State Farm’s argument that its defense based on lack of notice by its insured is unenforceable as against public policy only to the extent of the $15,000 mandatory liability coverage provided by the policy. This issue was not addressed in Ginn, supra. It was error to deny State Farm’s motion for partial summary judgment.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Compare Protective Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 256 Ga. 713 (1) (352 SE2d 760) (1987), and Snow v. Atlanta Intl. Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App. 1 (354 SE2d 644) (1987), involving the enforceability of notice defenses in actions by the insureds against their insurers.