dissenting.
As Oertel failed to provide sufficient evidence that Spencer’s owners should have known of his propensity to bite under either statutory or common law standards, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
In reaching its decision, the majority relies on OCGA § 51-2-7, which provides:
A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash.
In making this presumption of viciousness available to a plaintiff, this Code section varies greatly from Georgia’s long history of common law which requires a plaintiff to make the much more difficult showing that (1) the dog had the propensity to do the act which caused the injury and (2) the owner had knowledge of that propensity. See Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga. App. 635 (510 SE2d 120) (1998). Like other statutes which are in derogation of common law, OCGA § 51-2-7 must be strictly construed and limited to its explicit terms. See, e.g., Payne v. Kanes, 234 Ga. App. 524, 527 (1) (507 SE2d 266) (1998).
To raise the presumption of Spencer’s viciousness under OCGA § 51-2-7, Oertel had to prove the existence of an ordinance requiring Spencer to be at heel or on a leash, as specifically contemplated by that statute. Evans-Watson v. Reese, 188 Ga. App. 292, 294 (372 SE2d 675) (1988) (DeKalb County ordinance too broad to be type of ordinance contemplated by OCGA § 51-2-7). However, the record is devoid of the substantive provisions of the ordinance Oertel claims was violated. Without providing this Court with an admissible copy of the ordinance, Oertel has failed to make the requisite showing to *154trigger the statutory presumption of viciousness. “In the absence in evidence of a properly admissible copy of the ordinance involved, neither the trial court nor this court may take judicial notice of the existence of a local ordinance.” Dudley v. State, 161 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) (287 SE2d 763) (1982). “[T]he ordinance[ ] must be alleged and proved.” AT&T Wireless PCS v. Leafmore Forest Condominium Assn., 235 Ga. App. 319, 323 (3) (509 SE2d 374) (1998). Finally, the ordinance, in this case, must be the type to which OCGA § 51-2-7 speaks. Reese, supra. Oertel has made none of these showings of proof.
The fact that the record does contain a transcript of Steinke’s guilty plea to a violation of a “dog at large” and “vicious animal” ordinance does not change this result, as this transcript does not include a properly admissible copy of the ordinance involved. Additionally, the guilty plea, itself, cannot be used as an admission to circumvent the mandatory evidentiary requirement to prove the applicable ordinance.1 The majority supports its position by citing transcripts and depositions at length; however, parole evidence is insufficient to prove a municipal ordinance. Greenberg v. Rothberg, 72 Ga. App. 882, 883 (3) (35 SE2d 485) (1945). Moreover, without knowing the content of the laws to which Steinke pled guilty, this Court cannot assume what the substance of Steinke’s admissions against interest might be. A properly admissible copy of the ordinance is the only remedy for these evidentiary shortfalls. As such, Oertel’s assertion that Steinke admitted that Spencer was a vicious dog must be rejected.
While the standard for summary judgment allows this Court to draw favorable inferences based on the evidence which is present in the record, it does not allow this Court to assume the existence of evidence which is not in the record, whether by inference, supposition, or otherwise. The cited testimony is not sufficient to excuse Oertel’s failure to prove the local ordinance on which he relies.
Tassen v. Waffle House, 221 Ga. App. 755 (472 SE2d 545) (1996), cited by the majority, does not excuse a respondent to a summary judgment motion from proving the contents of a local ordinance on which his case relies. In Tassen, a rainy day slip and fall case, this Court does not address, either explicitly or implicitly, the necessity to prove a local ordinance, and it was not at issue in that case. Tassen, therefore, provides no precedential value here.
Oertel had the burden “to point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).” Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). The law requires proof of the ordinance relied on in addition to its contents. Otherwise, there is no proof that *155the ordinance has been violated. Oertel failed to meet this burden, and therefore, as such, he cannot rely on the powerful presumptions of OCGA § 51-2-7.
Decided July 16, 1999. John H. Ridley, Jr., for appellant. Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Dennis J. Webb, Brian J. Amero, Hawkins & Parnell, Anita W. Thomas, for appellees.There is also some evidence in the record that, prior to being bitten, Oertel slapped his foot against the ground in an attempt to frighten away Spencer. This testimony could support an inference that Oertel provoked the attack, thereby preventing his use of the viciousness presumption of OCGA § 51-2-7. However, as the nonmov-ant for summary judgment purposes, Oertel has the right to have the facts viewed in his favor, and, as such, his attempt to frighten Spencer, standing alone, would not support the grant of summary judgment against him.
Nevertheless, because the city ordinance which Oertel claims Spencer’s owners violated was not proven, Oertel’s claims may survive summary judgment only if the evidence shows, pursuant to common law, that (1) Spencer had the propensity to bite and (2) his owners had knowledge of that propensity. Hamilton, supra. The record shows, however, that Spencer had never bitten anyone before, and the defendants had no knowledge of any such propensity. As such, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment to the defendants. Hamilton, supra.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.
I must also note that there is no testimony reciting the contents of these laws or any reference pointing this Court as to where these laws would be found. In fact, Oertel does not even provide this Court with a citation to the ordinance in his appellate brief.