concurring specially.
1. On previous occasions this Court rejected claims that OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) is being enforced discriminatorily against African-Americans. See Hailey v. State, 263 Ga. 210, 211 (429 SE2d 917) (1993); Hall v. State, 262 Ga. 596, 597 (422 SE2d 533) (1992). In so doing, we noted that the statistical evidence of selective enforcement was insufficient to meet the intentional discrimination test.
OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) provides the same enhanced punishment, a life sentence, for all who are convicted of a second or subsequent sale of certain controlled substances. Despite the fact that the statute provides for only one sentence, a mandatory life sentence, we are *362presented once again with the claim that OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) is being used in a discriminatory fashion. This time, we are introduced to statewide statistical information which must give us pause: From 1990 to 1994, OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) was used to put 202 out of 1,107 eligible African-Americans in prison for life. During that same period, the statute was used to put 1 out of 167 eligible whites in prison for life. A life eligible African-American had a one in six chance of receiving a life sentence. A life eligible white had a 1 in 167 chance of receiving a life sentence. An African-American was 2,700 percent more likely to receive a life sentence than a white. Stated another way, a white was 2,700 percent more likely not to receive a life sentence under the same statute, a statute which provided for only one sentence — a life sentence. These statistics are no doubt as much a surprise to those who work and practice within the judicial system as to those who do not.
Statistical information can inform, not explain. It can tell what has happened, not why. However, only a true cynic can look at these statistics and not be impressed that something is amiss. That something lies in the fact that OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) has been converted from a mandatory life sentence statute into a statute which imposes a life sentence only in those cases in which a district attorney, in the exercise of his or her discretion, informs a defendant that the State is seeking enhanced punishment. See Mays v. State, 262 Ga. 90, 91-92 (414 SE2d 481) (1992); State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853, 854-855 (310 SE2d 526) (1984); OCGA § 17-10-2.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279 (107 SC 1756, 95 LE2d 262) (1987) provides a workable test for determining whether the death penalty statute is being applied discriminatorily. McCleskey should continue to be applied in death penalty cases where there is a system of checks and balances to ensure that death sentences are not sought and imposed autocratically. Likewise McCleskey should be applied in other cases where the courts have discretion to determine the length of time to be served. However, McCleskey probably should not be applied where a district attorney has the power to decide whether a defendant is sentenced to life, or a term of years. That is the case here: Once a defendant is informed that the State is seeking a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), and he is convicted of a second offense under that statute, the sentencing court has no alternative but to impose a life sentence. OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).
I am persuaded that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), could be used to supply a general framework in analyzing cases of this kind. This, however, will need more careful study. Nevertheless, it is my considered view that the judgment in this case must be affirmed because the defendant has failed to meet his burden even under a Batson-type analysis.
*363In order to establish a prima facie case under Batson, a defendant must prove systematic discrimination in his particular jurisdiction. Batson, supra at 94. Although the statistics presented by defendant are indicative of a statewide pattern of discrimination in the use of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), the Hall County statistics are insufficient to make such a case. They simply show that all the persons in Hall County serving a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) are African-Americans. They do not show how many African-Americans were eligible to receive a life sentence under the statute; nor do they show how many whites were eligible. Moreover, they offer no information concerning the record of the district attorney in this case. Thus, upon careful review, I must conclude that this defendant, in this case and on this record, failed to prove a pattern of systematic discrimination in his jurisdiction.
2. The legislature enacted OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) with the expectation that unrepentant drug sellers would be imprisoned for life. But that is not happening. Statewide, approximately 15 percent of eligible offenders receive a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).
The statistical evidence presented in this case serves as notice to the General Assembly of Georgia that the mandatory life sentence provision of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) has been repealed de facto. With such notice, there are at least three courses of action the legislature might now choose to pursue.
(1) The General Assembly could choose to leave the mandatory life sentence on the books realizing that it is being used in a small percentage of the eligible cases. Militating against this course of action is the fact that all laws passed by the legislature should be followed. Contempt for and failure to follow any law breeds contempt for and failure to follow other laws.
(2) The General Assembly could reaffirm its commitment to a mandatory life sentence by requiring district attorneys to inform all defendants of prior convictions and thus enforce OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) with respect to all life eligible offenders. Militating against this course of action is the fact that mandatory life sentences are not favored by the prosecuting bar or by the defense bar. That is evidenced by the fact that from 1990 to 1994 only 203 out of 1,274 life eligible defendants actually received a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). Thus, nearly 85 percent of those convicted of a second or subsequent sale received a sentence of something less than life. Clearly, mandatory life sentences for this offense are not favored.
(3) The General Assembly could choose to change the mandatory life sentence penalty to one of several sentencing options which the court could impose. For example, the penalty for a second or subsequent sale could be imprisonment for not less than five nor more than thirty years, or life. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 16-6-1 (b); 16-8-41 (b). The *364judge would then have the option to enter a sentence up to and including a life sentence. Any use or abuse of a life sentence would then be subject to review and correction, if necessary. See OCGA § 17-10-6.
Of course, the General Assembly could find other ways to address the problems posed by OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). It is my concern that these problems be resolved in whatever way the General Assembly deems best and that, thereafter, the prosecutors and the courts carry out that legislative will.