dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as to Division 1. In affirming the trial court’s denial of a directed verdict in favor of the Department, the majority essentially abrogates the law of premises liability developed over the course of many years by Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980), and its progeny. Moreover, the majority ignores the clear application of Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 28 (1) (343 SE2d 680) (1986), to the many contradictory statements made by Thomas.
In a “slip and fall” case, “not only must the plaintiff show that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the foreign substance, but the plaintiff must also show that he was without knowledge of its presence. The customer must exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the merchant’s negligence after it becomes apparent to him or in the exercise of ordinary care he should have learned of it. He must make use of all his senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to him.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Alterman Foods v. Ligón, supra. We assume, without deciding, that the Department had actual knowledge of the hazard in question. However, if a plaintiff is unable to prove either element of the Alterman test, a failure of proof results. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga. App. 808, 810 (406 SE2d 234) (1991). In this case, the evidence demands a finding that Thomas failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety.
The facts omitted by the majority and the special concurrence are crucial to the disposition of this case. Thomas had worked at the West Central Georgia Regional Hospital for over 18 years, and she had eaten at the cafeteria almost every day during that time. She testified that the cafeteria was not like an ordinary restaurant “where you have people in their right mind.” She knew that the mental patients were careless with food and drink and that the hospital had changed from carpet to tile in the cafeteria because the patients spilled things so frequently.
Three other witnesses in the area of the spill saw and avoided the spill immediately before Thomas fell. The witnesses and Thomas described it as a “humplike something” or “blob” about a foot square, covered with a pile of paper towels. Thomas originally testified the spill was about 12 inches square, although she later testified she did *182not know how large it was. Thomas passed the spill for the first time while going to a table. She acknowledged that on this earlier occasion nothing prevented her from seeing the spill “because nobody was standing there,” but she did not look down at the floor because she was looking straight ahead.
After returning to the area of the spill for a second time,3 Thomas stood, leaning against the wall, for three or four minutes “right there at” the spill. During this time, she watched other customers, spoke to a friend, and waited for the cashier to call her to pay for her order. However, she did not look down. Even while walking or standing in pedestrian traffic, Thomas had a duty to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. Colevins v. Federated Dept. Stores, 213 Ga. App. 49, 52 (3) (443 SE2d 871) (1994). Moreover, “ ‘[w]hen a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting therefrom. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Lea v. American Home Equities, 210 Ga. App. 214 (435 SE2d 734) (1993).4 Thomas’s testimony “is fatal in this case.” Jester v. Ingles Market, 206 Ga. App. 327, 329 (425 SE2d 323) (1992).
Thomas’s testimony at trial, which is heavily relied upon by the majority and special concurrence, varied substantially from her deposition testimony on virtually every material issue, including such matters as whether she knew of the frequency of spills in the cafeteria, whether she could have seen the spill, how long she stood beside it, and whether or not she was distracted. Such contradictory testimony must be construed against her. “Where the favorable portion of a party’s self-contradictory testimony is the only evidence of his right to recover or of his defense, the opposing party is entitled to a directed verdict. [Cit.]” Prophecy Corp., supra. Thomas’s attempted justification for one of these many material variances, cited by the majority, does not address or explain the variance on the basis of a *183different legal burden of proof, Broomberg v. Hudgens, 206 Ga. App. 797, 799 (2) (426 SE2d 617) (1992), or on the basis of newly discovered or recollected facts, Prophecy Corp., supra at 31 (3). In essence, she offers as explanation that her deposition testimony was the result of persistent cross-examination by opposing counsel. This is not a reasonable explanation as a matter of law. Nor does it address the many other material variances in her testimony.5
Contrary to the majority’s contention, carrying a tray in a cafeteria, like pushing a shopping cart in a grocery, was a normal and customary task, well known to Thomas, and it did not relieve her of the obligation to watch her path. Minor v. Super Discount Markets, 211 Ga. App. 123, 124 (438 SE2d 384) (1993). Nor did the presence of other patrons relieve her of her duty to look where she was going. Colevins, supra at 52. Moreover, Thomas’s contention that she did not see the spill, in the testimony quoted by the majority, does not end the inquiry. The issue is not whether she in fact saw the spill, but whether she should have seen it in the exercise of ordinary care.
Thomas contends she was distracted from the spill by other patrons the first time she passed it, and by watching the cashier the second time. The focus of the “distraction doctrine,” however, is whether the defendant created the distraction or reasonably could have anticipated its existence. Riggs v. Great Atlantic &c. Co., 205 Ga. App. 608, 609 (423 SE2d 8) (1992). In Riggs, the plaintiff claimed she was distracted from a box in a grocery store aisle by her husband, who called her attention to the product she was seeking. This court held that the distraction created by plaintiff’s husband “was not induced by defendant but was in the nature of being self-induced.” Id. at 610. Thomas passed a large and clearly visible spill once, then returned to the same place and stood for three to four minutes watching the cashier at the register, watching other people, and speaking to a friend without seeing the spill within a few feet of her position. Any “distraction” Thomas claims resulted from these ordinary events occurring around her was self-induced rather than due to any conduct of the Department, and it does not relieve her of her responsibility to look where she was going. “To say otherwise would permit customers to barge heedlessly around a store looking . . . anywhere but in their paths, with no care for their own safety and the safety of others. This would render the proprietor an insurer of his customers’ safety, which he is not. [Cit.]” Minor, supra at 124.
The spill was large and clearly visible to three other witnesses. Thomas passed it twice and stood immediately next to it for three or *184four minutes, and nothing prevented her from seeing it if she had looked. The circumstances she claims constituted “distractions” were created not by the Department but by her own conduct. Moreover, she was thoroughly familiar with the premises and aware of the unusual risk for spills in the area. Under these circumstances, Thomas has failed to carry her burden under Alterman of showing exercise of due care for her own safety. The trial court improperly denied the Department’s motion for a directed verdict. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Decided March 17, 1995 Reconsideration denied March 31, 1995 Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Grace E. Lewis, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. Richard F. Dodelin, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Andrews and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.
Contrary to the contention in the special concurrence, Thomas testified on her deposition in response to the question “Did you pass by that spot where the spill was,” “I turned and yeah I would have passed by the spot....” Only at trial did she change her testimony to contend that she did not know if the spill was there when she passed it for the first time. This illustrates the danger of ignoring the safeguards established by Prophecy Corp., supra, and accepting without question the “improved” and contradictory testimony of a party witness at the trial of a case. Moreover, regardless of whether Thomas passed the spill on a previous occasion, it is undisputed that she stood next to it for three or four minutes without looking down.
Contrary to the majority’s contention, Lea and the decisions upon which it relies are not confined to cases of actual knowledge on the part of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunwoody North Driving Club, 176 Ga. App. 210, 211 (335 SE2d 451) (1985) (constructive knowledge of debris at edge of tennis court inferred from plaintiffs opportunity to observe over time). Cedartown-Polk County Hosp. Auth. v. Watwood, 195 Ga. App. 321, 322 (393 SE2d 476) (1990), is inapplicable because Watwood traversed two different routes upon entering and exiting the premises.
The special concurrence contends that we must construe the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. However, this is not the case when evidence has been improperly submitted for the jury’s consideration over the prohibition of Prophecy Corp.