concurring specially.
After considering carefully the overall statutory scheme of Code Ann. §§ 56-3403b (b) and 56-3404b (a)(2) and in view of the analysis of the purpose of these provisions as set forth in Cannon v. Ga. Farm &c. Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 479 (241 SE2d 238) (1978), I am constrained to agree with the majority’s resolution of the issue presented in this case and with the majority’s construction of the applicable — but less than explicit — statutory language relevant to this appeal. As our Supreme Court has “interpreted the law, the provision for survivor’s benefits for a surviving spouse and children is not a limitation on no-fault benefits, but rather an extension. The law creates new benefits for such individuals.” (Emphasis supplied.) Cannon, supra, 481. Thus, it appears that the legislature has not enacted a true “survival statute” whereby a claim assertable by one person survives the death of that person for the benefit of others who stand in the shoes of the deceased. Rather, the law under consideration has created a new and separate right belonging solely to and assertable only by the spouse or dependent children of a deceased injured person. If, upon the death of the injured person, there are no persons who qualify as beneficiaries designated by the statute, no claim for “survival benefits” ever arises. Cannon, supra, 481. If, however — as in the instant case — there is a claim assertable by a surviving spouse at the time of the death of the injured person, that claim ceases to exist upon the death of that spouse if there are no other living persons to whom the legislature has granted this additional right to benefits. There being no dependent children surviving Mrs. Beebe, all claims for “survival benefits” died with Mr. Beebe.
On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee correctly notes in her motion for rehearing that appellant attacked on appeal only those portions of the trial court’s *298judgment awarding survivor’s benefits. The reversal, therefore, extends only to that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding survivor’s benefits. Although we believe this should be clear from the opinion, we want to eliminate any potential confusion on the part of the trial court and the parties. The remaining aspects of appellee’s motion for rehearing are without merit and the motion, accordingly, is denied.
Rehearing denied.