dissenting.
The majority holds that a telephone company’s intrastate access rates are “locked-in,” i.e., deemed just and reasonable and no longer subject to traditional Commission regulatory authority, on the date alternative regulation takes effect. Because OCGA § 46-5-165 (d) specifically provides that all existing rates, terms, and conditions for services provided by a company electing alternative regulation are deemed just and reasonable on the date a company elects alternative regulation, I respectfully dissent.
In 1995 the Georgia legislature passed the Georgia Telecommunications and Competition Development Act (the “Act”), OCGA § 46-5-160 et seq., in order to create market-based competition for local exchange telephone companies. This legislative goal is accomplished in part by authorizing competition for local exchange services and permitting existing local telephone companies to elect market-based alternative forms of regulation. OCGA § 46-5-161 (a) (2, 3) and (b) (1, 5). To elect alternative regulation, the Act requires a local telephone company to file a notice of election of alternative regulation with the Commission. OCGA § 46-5-165 (b). The Act further provides:
On the date a telecommunications company elects the alternative regulation described in this article, all existing rates, terms, and conditions for the services provided by the electing company contained in the then existing tariffs and contracts are deemed just and reasonable.
Id. at (d).
When construing a statute a court must first look to the literal *109meaning of the act, and if the language is plain and does not lead to absurd or impractical consequences, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it, but must construe it according to its terms. Diefenderfer v. Pierce, 260 Ga. 426 (396 SE2d 227) (1990); Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 SE2d 430) (1981). Under OCGA § 46-5-165 (d), a company’s rates are deemed just and reasonable “on the date a telecommunications company elects the alternative regulation.” (Emphasis supplied.) As defined by the Act, the date a company elects alternative regulation is the date the company files a notice of election with the Commission. See id. at (b) (a company “may elect [alternative regulation] upon the filing of notice with the commission and committing to provide basic local exchange services upon reasonable request”). Subsection (d) is clear and unambiguous on its face and expressly deems a company’s rates just and reasonable upon the filing of a notice of election with the Commission. Had the legislature intended to extend the authority of the Commission to review rates until the date a company becomes subject to alternative regulation, it clearly would have used such specific language as it did in OCGA § 46-5-166 (b), in which rates for basic local exchange services are established as of “the date the local exchange company becomes subject to alternative regulation.”
Despite the clear language of § 46-5-165 (d), the majority holds that a company’s rates are deemed just and reasonable on the date alternative regulation becomes effective, thereby violating basic rules of statutory construction precluding courts from placing a different construction upon the terms of an unambiguous statute. See Diefenderfer, supra. The majority refuses to interpret § 46-5-165 (d) consistent with its plain language, finding such an interpretation would “eviscerate the PSC’s traditional role” and would be inconsistent with the Act’s goal of protecting the consumer during the transition to a competitive telecommunications market. Majority opinion at 107. This analysis fails to recognize that it was the primary intent of the legislature, through passage of the Act, to move away from the Commission’s traditional regulatory authority and to rely instead on market forces to establish efficient pricing. See OCGA § 46-5-161 (a) (1). Moreover, interpreting § 46-5-165 (d) to deem a company’s rates just and reasonable on the date it elects alternative regulation does not thwart the legislative purpose of protecting consumers during the transition to a competitive market and does not leave consumers without protection or the Commission without authority to review and adjust intrastate access rates. The legislature has not entirely deregulated local exchange services by passing the Act, but has instead created a new regulatory model for telecommunication services based on its determination that market-based regulation is in the public interest. OCGA § 46-5-161 (a) (1).
*110Decided October 5, 1998 — Reconsideration denied November 5,1998. Long, Aldridge & Norman, Albert G. Norman, Jr., Edgar H. Sims, Jr., Bruce P. Brown, Larry C. Dowdy, for appellants. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Brenda H. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Harold D. Melton, Alan Gantzhorn, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Helen O. Leary, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, William K. Whitner, C. Christopher Hagy, David I. Adelman, King & Spalding, Joseph R. Bankoff, Lisa W. Greene, amici curiae.In addition to the protections afforded consumers through market-based competition, the legislature provided other protections within the Act, including the continuing but more limited authority of the Commission to regulate the intrastate switched access rates of companies electing alternative regulation. OCGA § 46-5-166 (f) (2). Under alternative regulation, the Commission is still charged with the responsibility of protecting consumers by insuring that rates are fair and nondiscriminatory, OCGA § 46-5-166 (e); requiring compliance with the rate adjustment provisions of the Act, OCGA § 46-5-168 (6); and preventing companies from engaging in any anticompetitive act, including price squeezing, price discrimination, predatory pricing, or tying arrangements. OCGA § 46-5-169 (4).
Although, like the majority, I have concerns regarding ALLTEL’s retention of overearnings authorized by the Regulatory Plan, I believe the majority errs in refusing to follow the plain language of § 46-5-165 (d). I would hold that it is the date a local telephone company elects alternative regulation, not the date alternative regulation becomes effective, that controls in determining when the Commission loses traditional regulatory authority over a company’s rates. Applying this interpretation, I would find the Commission was without authority to regulate ALLTEL’s rates under its traditional regulatory scheme after ALLTEL filed its notice of election of alternative regulation on June 14, 1996.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.