concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that DOT did not object either “to the fact that the response . . . was written” (maj. op. at 103) or to the method used by the trial court to respond to the jury’s questions. Furthermore, DOT did not object to the substance of the trial court’s response. Instead, DOT “limited its objection solely to the trial court’s giving of any response of any nature to the questions” of the jury. (Maj. op. at 102.) If DOT had raised an objection to the content of the trial court’s response, it would have been reversible error, in my opinion, for the trial court to fail to change its response to the jury’s inquiry, and this Court would be required to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. However, because DOT objected only to the trial court’s responding in any way to the jury’s inquiry rather than to the specific form or content of the trial court’s response, this Court correctly reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals did not base its reversal of the trial court solely on the “continuing witness” rule. An additional basis was that “the judge’s note also constituted his own characterization and summary of the expert’s testimony.” Department of Transp. v. Sharpe, 226 Ga. App. 354, 355 (2) (486 SE2d 619) (1997). In reversing on this additional ground, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the long-established principle that “ ‘it is error for the judge to state to the jury what a witness has testified, such a statement being in effect an expression of opinion as to what has been proved.’ [Cit.]” Department of Transp. v. Sharpe, supra. See also Nelson v. State, 124 Ga. 8,10 (52 SE 20) (1905); Suddeth v. State, 112 Ga. 407, 409 (3) (37 SE 747) (1900); Edwards v. State, 4 Ga. App. 167, 171 (2) (60 SE 1033) (1908). Compare Hathaway v. Bishop, 214 Ga. App. 870 (1) (449 SE2d 318) (1994); Miller v. Dean, 113 Ga. App. 869, 870 (3) (150 SE2d 191) (1966); Imperial Investment Co. v. Modernization Constr. Co., 96 Ga. App. 385 (2) (100 SE2d 107) (1957). The trial court’s response was tantamount to an improper charge that, if the jurors believed Limb, they should award the amounts to which he had testified. See Jarrett v. Arnold, 30 Ga. 323 (1860). Accordingly, if, in fact, DOT had raised an objection to what was written in the response, the trial court should have “merely had the expert’s testimony read back to the jury. *105[Cits.]” Department of Transp. v. Sharpe, supra at 355 (2).
Decided October 5, 1998 — Reconsideration denied November 5,1998. Daniel, Lawson, Tuggle & Jerles, Tom W. Daniel, William R. Jerles, Jr., for appellants. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, George P. Shingler, Deputy Attorney General, Cathy A. Cox-Brakefield, Assistant Attorney General, Sell & Melton, John A. Draughon, Tilman E. Self III, for appellee.As the majority points out, however, DOT’s objection was to the trial court’s giving a response in any form, whether by reading Limb’s testimony or by actually writing in the answer to the jury’s question. DOT subsequently confirmed that its objection was not to the manner in which the trial court responded to the jury’s inquiry, but to the making of any response at all. Thus, the transcript reveals that, in the trial court, DOT did not base its objection on and, thus, cannot now complain of, the asserted violation of either the “continuing witness” rule or the prohibition on a trial court’s improper summary of a witness’ testimony. Zappa v. Automotive Precision Machinery, 205 Ga. App. 584, 585 (4) (423 SE2d 286) (1992).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this special concurrence.