Lumpkin v. State Highway Department

Eberhardt, Judge.

A new trial was granted in this case because of the inclusion in the charge of an instruction to the jury that compensation should be awarded for the condemnee’s loss of access rights to the proposed limited access highway. Grant of the new trial was squarely upon the authority of State Hwy. Dept. v. Ford, 112 Ga. App. 270 (144 SE2d 924).

Pretermitting the matter of whether the condemnee has access rights that must be condemned in the taking of his land for a limited access highway (see Code Ann. § 95-1704a), the charge as given was authorized by the allegations of condemnor’s petition. While it is error to charge upon an issue made by the *146pleadings but unsupported by the evidence (Western & A. R. Co. v. Branan, 123 Ga. 692 (51 SE 650)), only the opposite party can urge it as error, for invited error is harmless as to him who invites it. Noxon Rug Mills v. Smith, 220 Ga. 291, 293 (138 SE2d 569). The allegation that it sought to condemn access rights was an invitation by the condemnor to the court to include that matter in the charge.

It is immaterial that the petition for condemnation is brought by the State or its agency, for “A State is bound by her judicial pleadings and admissions, the same as private persons, and is entitled to no greater right or immunity as a litigant than they are. The doctrine of estoppel applies [in this respect] to the State just as it does to individuals.” 1 Herman, Law of Estoppel, § 197, cited with approval in Central Bank &c. Corp. v. State, 139 Ga. 54, 57 (76 SE 587).

A lack of evidence as to the access rights is a matter about which the condemnor cannot complain, for it made the allegation and had the burden of proof. State Highway Dept. v. Smith, 111 Ga. App. 292 (4) (141 SE2d 590).

Consequently, the grant of a new trial was error.

Judgment reversed.

Felton, C. J., Bell, P. J., Hall and Deen, JJ., concur. Nichols, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur specially. Jordan and Pannell, JJ., dissent.