dissenting.
I certainly understand and share the majority’s sympathy with the plaintiff who was injured after receiving assurances from her landlord that the conditions which ultimately caused her injury would be remedied. However, I do not believe that the existing case law in this state will allow this plaintiff to avoid summary judgment when, on the basis of uncontradicted evidence, an essential element of her cause of action has been negated. In the beginning of the portion of the majority opinion containing the legal reasoning, it is clearly recognized that “the true basis for a landlord’s liability to a tenant for injuries resulting from a defective or hazardous condition existing on the premises is the landlord’s superior knowledge of the condition and of the danger resulting from it.” (Majority opinion, page 205.) The majority then proceeds to cite and discuss numerous cases enunciating and applying this principle. Auerbach v. Padgett, 122 Ga. App. 79 (176 SE2d 193) (1970); Vizzini v. Blonder, 165 Ga. App. 840 (303 SE2d 38) (1983); Hearn v. Barden, 115 Ga. App. 708 (155 SE2d 649) (1967); Taylor v. Boyce, 105 Ga. App. 434 (124 SE2d 647) (1962); Bixby v. Sinclair Refining Co., 74 Ga. App. 626 (40 SE2d 677) (1946). While acknowledging that the cases clearly applying the superior knowledge test have not been overruled, the majority then proceeds to disregard this superior knowledge requirement in the instant case. In this case, it is undisputed, and clearly shown by detailed testimony of the plaintiff herself, that plaintiff had at least equal — and probably superior — knowledge of the defects and danger in connection with the staircase.
Although I can understand the majority’s zeroing in on the fact that the landlord in this case had knowledge of the defect and had specifically promised to remedy the situation, unfortunately, proof of this promise by the landlord simply does not substitute for compliance with the requirement that the tenant show that the landlord had knowledge of the defect which was superior to that of the tenant. The majority reverses the grant of summary judgment in this case “in reliance on Plant v. Lowman [134 Ga. App. 752 (216 SE2d 631) (1975) that a material issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiff’s conduct in continuing to use the stairs was so unreasonable as to preclude her from any recovery] as a matter of law.” However, in Plant — unlike the instant case — there was an issue as to knowledge because, in Plant, the plaintiff “incorrectly thought there was a bannister and reached out for it but no bannister existed . . .” Plant v. Lowman, supra. In this case, it is recognized by the majority that the plaintiff knew the nature and extent of the danger of the staircase. “This case is controlled by Taylor v. Boyce, [supra], and Alexander v. Rhodes, 104 Ga. 807 (30 SE 968) [1898], which held that even though the plaintiff alleged that the route chosen was one of necessity, yet where *209the plaintiff knew of the danger [she] assumed the risk and was guilty of such negligence as would bar recovery.” Hearn v. Barden, supra at 710. See also Clements v. Blanchard, 141 Ga. 311 (80 SE 1004) (1913). In view of the undisputed knowledge of the plaintiff of all defects and dangers, it is my opinion that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Judge Birdsong and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.