dissenting in part, and concurring in part.
I would deny the petition for rehearing en banc and adhere to our original disposition. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the amended opinion that reverses Bailey’s firearm possession convictions. I concur in the portion of the amended opinion that adopts and incorporates by reference Sections I, II and III.A of our prior opinion. I join the majority in revising and amending the factual summary.
In response to defendant Bailey’s pro se petition for rehearing en banc, we have supplemented the previously filed appellate record by directing counsel to furnish us with additional portions of the trial transcript not included in the Joint Appendix. (See generally Fed. R.App. P. 30 and former 6th CiR. R. 30.) As the majority *951notes correctly, the supplemented transcript reveals, after some uncertainty, that the district court allowed Elizabeth Stanford’s written and oral on-the-scene statements to the police to be admitted at trial only for the limited purpose of impeachment. Accordingly, we revise and amend the factual background recited in our previous opinion.
However, I disagree and respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that, after excluding all of Stanford’s on-the-scene statements as substantive evidence, the evidence is insufficient for any rational juror to find Bailey guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1
In this regard, on the issues of actual or constructive possession, the majority’s opinion appears more in line with Judge Moore’s dissent in United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc), than with the majority en banc Arnold opinion. I believe, however, that when the principles of the Arnold majority decision are properly applied to the case at bar, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the evidence admitted at trial. Bailey fled from the police in a stolen vehicle that he operated and controlled. At the time, Bailey possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. The owner of the car testified that she did not own a handgun and that there was no handgun in the car at the time it was stolen. Finally, the police discovered a loaded and unholstered .357-magnum revolver within Bailey’s reach underneath his driver’s seat.
It is well settled that, on appeal, a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a “very heavy burden.” United States v. Chavis, 296 F.3d 450, 455 (6th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 424 (6th Cir.2000)). Specifically, “[w]hen reviewing an insufficient-evidence claim, this court must decide whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 710 (6th Cir.2007) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Humphrey, 279 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir.1999)). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
In applying this standard, we do not “weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or substitute [our] judgment for that of the jury.” United States v. Ferguson, 23 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 1994). We will reverse a judgment on insufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds “ ‘only if [the] judgment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence upon the record as a whole.’ ” United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir.1984)). “If the evidence, however, is such that a rational fact finder must conclude that a reasonable doubt is raised, this court is obligated to reverse a denial of an acquittal motion.” United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1210 (6th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Collon, 426 F.2d 939, 942 (6th Cir.1970)).
We have held that a defendant’s mere presence near a firearm is not enough to show constructive possession, Arnold, 486 F.3d at 183; see also Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 449-50 (6th Cir.2007). However, proximity coupled with other incriminating *952evidence may “ ‘show the requisite knowledge, power, or intention to exercise control over’ the gun to prove constructive possession.” Arnold, 486 F.3d at 183 (quoting United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103, 107-08 (6th Cir.1976)). Consequently, proximity plus “evidence of some other factor” such as “proof of motive” may suffice to establish constructive possession. United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C.Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We recently applied this rationale in United States v. Castano, 543 F.3d 826 (6th Cir.2008). In Castaño, the police stopped the defendant while he was driving a truck with his girlfriend, who was riding in the passenger seat. A search of the vehicle revealed a box containing marijuana in the truck bed and a loaded .44-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver discovered “in the truck’s center console, positioned within easy reach of the driver.” Id. at 828. The defendant argued that the government did not introduce sufficient evidence to establish that he had constructive possession of the firearm. Specifically, he asserted that the government failed to show that he knew the gun was present in the vehicle. Id. at 837-38. At trial, several officers testified regarding “the frequency of finding firearms when making arrests for drug trafficking offenses and about the need for drug traffickers to protect themselves.” Id. at 838. On appeal, we noted that drugs were found in the truck in close proximity to the defendant and that the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Ultimately, we affirmed the defendant’s § 922(g) conviction, concluding that the “evidence demonstrated that Cas-taño had a strong motive to possess a firearm to protect himself and his drugs during the planned drug transaction.... ” Id.
There are clear parallels between Castaño and the case at bar. Both cases involved possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs, and police officers testified in each case regarding the proclivity of drug dealers to carry firearms. Thus, the defendants had the same motive to carry a firearm — as protection during their illegal drug-distribution activities. See United States v. Rhodes, 2008 WL 4809488, *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2008) (unpublished) (“the drugs provided a motive for possessing the ammunition: protecting the drug stash.”); United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir.2001) (“This Court has held many times that guns are ‘tools of the trade’ in drug transactions.”).
Significantly, Bailey fled when a police officer identified the stolen car and attempted to stop him. As previously noted, it is well established that proximity to a firearm, when accompanied by some other factor such as “proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise,” may be sufficient to demonstrate constructive possession. United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 610 (6th Cir.2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127). Flight from the police certainly qualifies as “evasive conduct.” See United States v. Newland, 243 Fed.Appx. 151, 154 (6th Cir.2007) (rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on proximity to the firearm coupled with, inter alia, fleeing from the police). As we explained in United States v. Motley, 93 Fed.Appx. 898 (6th Cir.2004)2:
*953Motley contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count Two of the indictment, which charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm on October 8, 1999. We use a deferential standard to review this claim. The test is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We are unpersuaded by Motley’s arguments that no physical evidence — such as a fingerprint— was introduced to link him to the gun found in the car he was driving and that the only evidence linking him to the weapon was his mere presence in the car. Evidence of constructive possession suffices to satisfy the requirement of proof that a defendant possessed a firearm, United States v. Clemis, 11 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1993), and “[c]ir-cumstantial evidence by itself can support a defendant’s conviction.” United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 600 (6th Cir.2003). “Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.” United States v. Kin-caide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir.1998). Motley’s mere proximity to the firearm does not, without more, constitute probative evidence that he was in constructive possession of the weapon. But in this case, the jury had more than Motley’s mere proximity to the weapon to consider. It is undisputed that Motley was driving the car, and proof that a defendant “has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located” contributes to a finding of constructive possession. Clemis, 11 F.3d at 601. Furthermore, the jury heard testimony that when police officers pulled up behind Motley on October 8, 1999, he tried to evade them by turning a comer at high speed, pulling into a stranger’s driveway, exiting the car, and attempting to flee. Because Motley was the driver, the jury was permitted to infer that it was his decision to take evasive action, and the jury could consider such action probative of his possession of the gun. Finally, the jury heard evidence that ... when police officers searched Motley’s bedroom ... they found a holster and ammunition clip matching the pistol found in the car. Cumulatively, the incriminating evidence just described constitutes sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to convict Motley on Count Two of the indictment.
Motley, 93 Fed.Appx. at 900-01 (emphasis added).
In the present case, the majority endeavors to discount Bailey’s evasive conduct: “[t]he attempt to evade arrest, however, proves little because Bailey might well have taken this action in an effort to evade detection of the two bags of crack cocaine found in his pants.” (Maj. Op. at 7.) While this “might” have been Bailey’s motivation, it is equally — if not more— reasonable to conclude that Bailey was fleeing because of the firearm or because of both the firearm and the crack cocaine. Regardless, Bailey’s motivation for his flight is a question for the jury, and a rational trier of fact could conclude that the firearm contributed to Bailey’s decision to flee from the police. See United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 895-96 (6th Cir. 2006) (“it is not necessary that such evidence remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.”).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we are required to do, Arnold, 486 F.3d at 180, *954United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir.2007), we assume that the jury-credited the car owner’s unrebutted testimony. Therefore, the jury made the logical and reasonable inference that because there was not a handgun in the car before it was stolen, but there was a loaded handgun in the car when Bailey was arrested, Bailey possessed the firearm found underneath his seat. As we emphasized in Arnold, “[t]he critical point is that the jury could have drawn different inferences from this evidence, and our mandate is to affirm when the jury’s choice was a rational one — which it was here.” Arnold, 486 F.3d at 182. Under the circumstances, “we must respect the jury’s inferences over our own.” Id.
The majority also believes that it is “[o]f particular significance” that “the government could not show that Bailey’s fingerprints were on the gun,” (Maj. Op. at 946), but cites to no authority requiring fingerprints to establish possession. Indeed, we specifically rejected this requirement in Motley and in Arnold: “Because ‘possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence,’ United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.1973), we cannot overturn the jury’s decision merely because it had to draw reasonable inferences to find Arnold guilty.” Arnold, 486 F.3d at 181. See also United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 373-74 (6th Cir. 2008) (“When engaged in this analysis, we are bound to make all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in support of the verdict.”); United States v. Kimbrel, 532 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir.2008) (“the government may indeed prove possession of a firearm by circumstantial evidence”) (citing Arnold, 486 F.3d at 181).
Having concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Bailey’s conviction for being a felon-in-possession of a firearm, I would also affirm his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The majority concedes that if Bailey possessed the gun, “then the fact that the gun was loaded and located underneath Bailey’s seat would likely demonstrate that Bailey possessed the gun in furtherance of his drug trafficking crime.” (Maj. Op. at 950.) As explained above, I believe the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Bailey possessed the gun, and I agree with the majority that the location of the gun would allow the jury to conclude that it was used in furtherance of drug trafficking.
It is worth noting that the district court sentenced Bailey to 60 months of incarceration for being a felon in possession of a firearm and 120 months of incarceration for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. However, this combined 180-month sentence was to be served concurrently with Bailey’s 360-month sentence for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. The majority opinion affirms Bailey’s cocaine charge. Therefore, on remand, the district court will presumably reimpose its 360-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and Bailey will continue his 360 months of incarceration.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
. Bailey’s conviction of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 360-month sentence are unaffected by the majority's amended opinion.
. Unpublished opinions of this court are not precedentially binding under the doctrine of stare decisis, but may be considered for their persuasive value. United States v. Lancaster, 501 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir.2007), and United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir.2007).