delivered the Opinion of the Court.
As a general rule, statements of a juvenile made in the course of a custodial interrogation are not admissible against the juvenile unless a parent is present during the interrogation and both the juvenile and parent are first advised of the juvenile’s Miranda rights.1 See § 19-2-511(1), 6 C.R.S. (1999); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1222 (Colo.1999). In this case, the Morgan County District Court (trial court) ruled that the statements of a juvenile, J.D., made in the course of telephone conversations she initiated -with the police, were not admissible. The trial court so ruled because it found that the statements made by J.D. arose out of a “custodial interrogation.” Relying upon that determination, the trial court concluded that J.D. was entitled to but was not given her Miranda warnings nor the benefit of the presence of a parent.
On interlocutory review, we must decide whether the trial court erred when it suppressed J.D.’s statements. We conclude that the trial court did err. Under the totality of the circumstances standard, applying the factors announced in People v. Denison, 918 P.2d 1114 (Colo.1996), we conclude, as a matter of law, that the telephone interrogation of J.D., initiated at J.D.’s request while she was detained in a Nevada state juvenile facility, did not constitute a “custodial interrogation.”
We hold that a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the four-factor “ ‘restriction’ standard” announced in Denison, when determining whether a juvenile detained in a state facility has been subjected to a custodial interrogation because she is not “free to leave.” See id. at 1116. We also hold that the voluntary telephone statement of a juvenile should not be suppressed when given during the course of an encounter with police that does not amount to a “custodial interrogation,” even if the juvenile’s statement is made without the benefit of Miranda warnings. We further hold that because section 19-2-511 only covers statements that are made during a “custodial interrogation,” J.D.’s statements may not be suppressed merely because they were made outside the presence of a parent. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and return this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
This is an interlocutory appeal filed by the People (State) pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (1999). The facts of this case are not in dispute. We set forth those undisputed facts discussed in the trial court’s ruling and found in the briefs of the parties and in the record before us.
A.
On October 28, 1998, J.D., a juvenile,2 was detained in Colorado by Fort Morgan police and transported to a state juvenile detention center in Stateline, Nevada. The Fort Morgan police detained J.D. solely in connection with a probation violation in Nevada. At that time, Detective Keith Kuretich asked J.D. if she would answer questions regarding an armed robbery in Colorado. She refused. In response, Kuretich gave her his name and telephone number, in case she changed her mind and wanted to speak with him later.
On October 29, 1998, J.D. made a telephone call from the Nevada state detention facility to Kuretich in Fort Morgan. Because Kuretich was not available, J.D. left a message asking Kuretich to return her call.
The next morning, Kuretich returned J.D.’s telephone call and was able to speak directly to her. During the course of this conversation, J.D. told Kuretich that she wanted to talk with him about the armed robbery. In response, Kuretich told her that he would call again later and asked J.D. to make arrangements for someone she trusted to be present during their conversation.
*766After his conversation with J.D., Kuretich contacted J.D.’s mother. Kuretich provided her with a written Miranda warning and told her about J.D.’s telephone call to him. J.D.’s mother advised Kuretich that she knew J.D. wanted to talk to him and indicated her approval.
Later that same day, at about 2:00 p.m., Kuretich returned J.D.’s telephone call, as previously agreed, to allow J.D. to tell him about her participation in the armed robbery. Another detective, Nick Gardner joined Kuretich and listened through a speakerphone. Presumably as Kuretich had suggested earlier, J.D. arranged for two adults to be present during their telephone conversation, Steve Hagen, J.D.’s Nevada probation officer, and June Foster, a detention officer at the Nevada facility.
The telephone conversation lasted approximately forty minutes. At the outset of the conversation, Kuretich offered to “do what [he could] to dismiss” the other charges against J.D. for “resisting arrest, obstructing and criminal mischief.” Regarding the armed robbery, the trial court found Kure-tich “assured” her that under Colorado law she could be charged as an adult, but if she cooperated, “there would be minimal or no charges brought”; that is, she would be charged as a juvenile, which would make a big difference. As the trial'court characterized it, “[t]here was active encouragement directed by words toward the juvenile to cooperate and to give a full statement” and “the probation officer in Nevada was actively encouraging her to make a statement as he felt it would be in her interest to do that.” J.D. then agreed to proceed, asking Kuretich, “Well[,] do you want to know what happened, or not?” J.D. then discussed details of the armed robbery, including the identities of participants and the weapon used, a shotgun. At the end of the telephone conversation, Kuretich thanked J.D. for her help, to which she replied, “You’re welcome.” Kuretich also told J.D., Hagen, and Foster that J.D.’s mother had “agreed to th[e] interview” earlier in the day.
Kuretich did not give J.D. her Miranda warnings at any time during the telephone conversation. At no time during the conversation about the robbery did J.D. ask to terminate their discussion or otherwise indicate any unwillingness to talk about her role in the subject robbery.
B.
As a result of J.D.’s detailed statements describing her participation in the armed robbery, she was arrested. Consistent with Kuretich’s “assur[ance]” at the beginning of the telephone conversation, J.D. was not charged as an adult. The State did, however, initiate delinquency proceedings against her for acts that would constitute felonies if they had been committed by an adult, including acts that would constitute aggravated armed robbery.3
On February 19, 1999, J.D. filed a motion to suppress the statements she made to Kuretich and Gardner. Specifically, J.D. claimed that her telephone statements should be suppressed because they were the products of a custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of a Miranda warning. Moreover, J.D. argued that because she was interrogated outside the presence of a “parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian,” her statements could not be admitted in her delinquency proceedings in accordance with section 19-2-511(1), 6 C.R.S. (1999).4 J.D. *767also claimed that her statements should be suppressed because the officers made promises to her.
A brief motions hearing was held on February 26,1999, at which only Detective Kure-tich testified and, in accordance with the agreement of both parties, the transcript of the telephone conversation was admitted into evidence. During the motions hearing, the trial court inquired as to whether J.D. was “[i]nitially ... detained for [the robbery]?” Defense counsel replied, “That is correct, your Honor.” In addition, the trial court asked whether “[t]here was an arrest warrant actually executed in the case.” Defense counsel stated, “There was.” However, J.D.’s motion to suppress states that she “was detained by the Fort Morgan [Colorado] [p]olice ... to transport her to the Douglas County Juvenile Detention Center in Stateline, Nevada, in connection with a probation violation in that jurisdiction.” Kure-tich testified that J.D.’s detention and transfer to Nevada authorities were not related to the robbery charges pending in Colorado.
On March 19, 1999, in open court, the trial court issued its ruling. The trial court suppressed the statements made by J.D., concluding that, under the “factors of particular significance” adopted in People v. Denison, and “look[ing] to the level of restriction involved as to an inmate,” this was a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and within the meaning of 19-2-511. Thus, because J.D. was in a juvenile detention center at the time of the interrogation and under its application of the Denison factors, the trial court found that J.D. had been subjected to a custodial interrogation. The trial court further reasoned that J.D.’s statements were not only inadmissible because she was not given her Miranda warnings, but were also inadmissible because “no parent or parental figure [was] in attendance at the time of the interrogation,” contrary to section 19-2-511. The State timely filed this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s ruling.
II.
The State claims the trial court erred when it concluded that J.D.’s statements were made in the course of “a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and within the meaning of [section] 19-2-511.” The State further argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that because Kuretich failed to give a Miranda warning to J.D. and failed to interview her in the presence of a parent or adult, “it’s necessary to exclude [J.D.’s] statements ... from the evidence presented at trial.”
Before the trial court and here on appeal, the State argues that the totality of the circumstances standard is the correct standard to be applied to Kuretich’s telephone conversation with J.D. Therefore, the State reasons that the crucial determination as to whether J.D. was “in custody” during the interrogation by Kuretich does not rise or fall based solely on the fact she was detained at the time of the interrogation. Applying that standard here, the State argues that as a matter of law, the telephone conversation could not constitute a “custodial interrogation.” Hence, the State posits that the absence of Miranda warnings and the requirements of section 19-2-511(1) cannot stand as the basis for suppressing J.D.’s statements.
We agree. In light of the facts set forth on this record and applying the totality of the circumstances standard as set forth in Deni-son to assess J.D.’s freedom of movement within the Nevada detention facility, we conclude that J.D. was not subjected to a “custodial interrogation.”
A.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United *768States Supreme Court held that a suspect’s statements made during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the suspect received adequate advisement of his constitutional rights. See People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Colo.1995). “Before a Miranda advisement is required, the following two prerequisites must be satisfied: the person to whom the advisement is given must be in custody at the time of the advisement, and the statements being made by the person must be the product of a police interrogation.” People v. Dracon, 884 P.2d 712, 716 (Colo.1994).
In determining whether an individual has been subjected to a custodial interrogation, the relevant inquiry is “whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider herself deprived of her freedom of action in a significant way at the time of the interrogation.” Id. at 716-17; see also People v. Trujillo, 785 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Colo.1990). In arriving at this determination, a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. See Dracon, 884 P.2d at 717. The totality of the circumstances test is also applicable to circumstances involving the rights of juveniles. See § 19-2-511(2); see also People in the Interest of J.C., 844 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Colo.1993).
B.
Under our totality of the circumstances standard, a person under detention or incarcerated for unrelated purposes is not necessarily subjected to a “custodial interrogation” solely because he or she was questioned while so detained. See People v. Denison, 918 P.2d 1114 (Colo.1996). In determining whether an inmate has been restricted to the extent that she is “in custody” for Miranda purposes, a trial court must apply the four factors set forth in De-nison. The four Denison factors are: (1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt; and (4) the additional pressure exerted to detain him. See M. at 1116. Denison is applied as a “ ‘restriction’ standard” in the detention or prison setting “[ijnstead of the traditional ‘free to leave’ standard for custody.” Id. Thus, the four factors are applied solely to determine whether the detainee has had a change in surroundings “that results in an added imposition on [her] .-freedom of movement.” 5 Id. -
The inquiry, then, may not necessarily end with the factors as set forth in Denison. Other circumstances that a court may consider in determining whether an individual has been further restricted include, but are not limited to, the following:
[T]he time, place and purpose of the encounter; the persons present during the interrogation; the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; the officer’s tone of voice apd general demeanor; the length and mood of the interrogation; whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and the defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to such directions.
J.C., 844 P.2d at 1189; see also Dracon, 884 P.2d at 717. In the criminal or delinquency context involving a juvenile, a trial court may also consider, as one circumstance among the totality of circumstances, whether the juvenile’s parents were present or had knowledge of the interrogation. See J.C., 844 P.2d at 1189.
Where a trial court utilizes the correct legal standard, and its conclusion is supported by evidence in the record, we will not reverse its ruling on appeal. See People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo.1990); see also People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 792 (Colo.1990) (stating that our role on appeal is to “determine whether ... the court applied the correct legal standard to those findings *769in resolving the issue before it”). However, when a trial court fails to fully apply the correct standard, here the totality of the circumstances standard, its ruling cannot stand. See People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Colo.1987) (stating that a court’s application of an erroneous legal standard to the facts of the case is subject to correction by a reviewing court). Where the findings are sufficient and supported by the record, an appellate court can review the matter and decide the issue as a matter of law. See People v. Romero, 953 P.2d 550, 555 (Colo.1998) (“Trial court’s legal conclusion is subject to our de novo review.”).
III.
In light of the foregoing, the result in this case turns on whether J.D., then located in the Nevada juvenile detention center, was “in custody” while interrogated, compelling that Miranda warnings be given and that the protections of section 19-2-511(1) attach.6
A.
We begin by resort to our recent holding in People in the Interest of J.C. There, we held that a telephone call alone does not constitute a “custodial interrogation.” See J.C., 844 P.2d at 1190.
' In J.C., a police officer placed an investigatory telephone call to a juvenile suspect regarding a robbery. The telephone call took place outside the presence of a parent, guardian, or other responsible adult. Examining the totality of the circumstances, we held in that ease that a telephone call inquiry does not constitute “custodial interrogation.” See id. at 1190; see also People v. Corley, 698 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo.1985) (determining that “[njotwithstanding that the investigation may have focused on the defendant, the questioning of her by a policeman over the telephone” was not custodial for purposes of Miranda). We based our holding in J.C. on the principle that “when the interrogating officer is not in the physical presence of the accused, that officer cannot exercise immediate control over the actions of the accused such as to trigger Miranda concerns.” J.C., 844 P.2d at 1190. We also stated that “[i]t is not reasonable, even for a [juvenile], to believe that a police officer will be able to directly control one’s actions over the telephone.” Id.
Here, neither the transcript of the telephone conversation, nor Kuretich’s testimony indicate coercion or control by the Fort Morgan police. Nor do we see any indication of control exercised by the two adults present with J.D. — Hagen, her probation officer, and Foster, a detention officer at the Nevada facility. J.D. was in control from the outset, initiating telephone contact with Kuretich on October 29, accepting the return telephone call from Kuretich, and obtaining his agreement to dismiss certain pending charges and not to prosecute her as an adult for the robbery offense in exchange for her cooperation.
We conclude that the telephone call with Detectives Kuretich and Gardner alone did not constitute a “custodial interrogation.” Next we must determine whether the interrogation of J.D. while detained in the Nevada juvenile facility necessarily constituted a “custodial interrogation” so as to require Miranda warnings.
B.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, notwithstanding a “coercive environment,” there is no custody for Miranda purposes unless the questioning takes place “in a context where [the questioned person’s] freedom to depart [is] restricted.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). In other articulations of the custody standard, the inquiry has focused on any limitation of movement or “whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, *77077 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, in cases involving persons in the custody of the state for other purposes, i.e., persons detained for some unrelated offense, “custodial interrogation” determinations are not resolved by the mere fact that the citizen was imprisoned or otherwise physically detained at the time the questioned statements were given. See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1116. Such “in custody” determinations do not lend themselves to easy analysis under the traditional formulations of the Miranda rule or through standard totality of the circumstances analogies. Certainly, a person in custody for unrelated matters, such as a detainee incarcerated by the state or, as here, by some other jurisdiction, will always perceive that her freedom of movement is restrained. Hence, a detainee will certainly sense that she is not otherwise at liberty to leave or depart from the general area that also serves as the location of an interview conducted by an officer in a detention facility. See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir.1985). Even without the police intrusion subject to review here, J.D., a detainee in the Nevada facility, was not free to leave.
A preexisting limitation upon a person’s freedom of movement, therefore, should not control the analysis under our totality of the circumstances standard. To allow this single factor to be outcome determinative would result in a per se rule that a person who is incarcerated or otherwise detained is “in custody,” for all purposes.
Under that reasoning, our entire jail and prison population would be entitled to a per se finding of custody for purposes of Miranda. See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1116 (citing Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir.1978)). We clearly rejected that result in Denison, a result that neither our totality of the circumstances standard nor reason will ordain. We have wisely rejected such a bright-line approach in the past and today reaffirm our fidelity to the totality of the circumstances standard, even when an interrogation involves a person detained in a government facility for purposes unrelated to the matter under investigation.
In this case, the trial court considered the evidence submitted at the suppression hearing, the statements of counsel, and the transcript of the telephone call in determining the facts surrounding the interrogation. In its oral ruling from the bench, the trial court concluded that a reasonable person in J.D.’s position would have considered herself deprived of her freedom of action during the police questioning.
The trial court found that it was necessary to exclude J.D.’s statements based on “the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to which the juvenile is confronted with evidence of guilt during the conversation, and any additional pressures that might have been exerted to detain that person.” While we do not question the trial court’s decision to apply the totality of the circumstances standard, we disagree with the legal conclusion it reached, finding that J.D. was “in custody.”
In Denison, we set forth four factors or elements that must be considered when determining whether a person who is interrogated while incarcerated is “in custody,” subjecting one to a “custodial interrogation.” Those four factors include: (1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the individual was confronted with evidence of his guilt; and (4) any additional pressure exerted to detain him. See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1116.
Applying the four elements of the Denison test, in particular, whether any additional pressure was exerted to detain J.D., and based on the trial court’s factual findings, none of which are in material dispute, we conclude otherwise. Unlike the trial court, we do not view the offer of reduced charges, an inducement to cooperate to be sure, as “pressure exerted to detain” J.D. Pressure to detain is different from pressure to speak. While pressure to speak may be considered in determining the voluntariness of the statements, only custody is at issue here, not voluntariness.
Applying the totality of the circumstances standard here, we conclude that J.D. was not “in custody” within the meaning of Miranda; *771therefore, we hold that J.D. was not subjected to a “custodial interrogation” when she voluntarily confessed to her participation in the subject robbery. Since she was not “in custody” while interrogated, Miranda warnings were not required. Likewise, without “custody,” our juvenile statute, section 19-2-511(1), does not apply.
Our application of the totality of the circumstances standard in this case considers whether J.D. was deprived of her freedom of movement within the detention facility through additional restrictions. We apply the Denison test to determine whether J.D. was “in custody” during the interrogation. To better understand our application of the Denison test, we briefly revisit Denison.
In Denison, the trial court suppressed the suspect’s statements after an assault that occurred in the jail where the suspect was awaiting trial. There the sheriff confronted the suspect in his cell and asked questions to discover who was hurt. See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1115. We reversed the trial court’s ruling. In Denison, we held that an inmate is not automatically “in custody” and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings merely by virtue of his prisoner status. See id. at 1116; of. People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 588 (Colo.1981) (custodial interrogation found where the suspect was in police custody for a separate offense and officers subjected the suspect to three face-to-face interrogations without Miranda warnings). We further held that under the circumstances in that case, the interrogation of the defendant was not custodial. See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1116. In a prison situation, restriction “implies a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement.” Id. Integrating De-nison into our totality of the circumstances standard here, J.D.’s surroundings — her detention in the Nevada facility at the time of the questioning — alone, will not support the trial court’s ruling. Under Denison, a trial court should consider four factors when deciding whether the interrogation of an incarcerated person is “custodial” because she “has been restricted so as to require the advisement of Miranda rights.” Id. Again, the four factors we consider are: (1) the language used to summon J.D.; (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which J.D. was confronted with evidence of her guilt; and (4) any additional pressure exerted to detain her. See id.
In the present case, although J.D. was detained in the Nevada facility, application of our totality of the circumstances standard, as set forth in Denison, will not support the trial court’s legal conclusion that J.D. was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. First, J.D. was not summoned, but in fact, initiated the telephone contact that led to the incriminating statements. J.D. spoke with Kuretich voluntarily after being informed that she should have someone she trusted present with her during the conversation. In addition, prior to the telephone conversation, Kuretich contacted J.D.’s mother, gave her a written Miranda warning, and only returned J.D.’s call after he was aware that J.D.’s mother knew that J.D. intended to speak with the officers and that she did not object to such a telephone interrogation.
Second, the interrogation occurred over the telephone while J.D. was in Nevada and without any adverse change in J.D.’s physical surroundings during the interrogation.7 J.D. was not subjected to a face-to-face questioning by which Kuretich could exercise control over her and there were other adults present during the interrogation whom J.D. trusted, i.e., her probation and detention officers, who were present only at J.D.’s request.
As to the third Denison factor, we agree that it militates against the State’s argument. Clearly, Kuretich confronted J.D. with evi*772dence of her guilt, including photographs of J.D. taken during the robbery.
The final Denison factor, however, requires a different result. While the record indicates that at the outset of the interrogation J.D. was “pressured” to cooperate by Kuretich’s offer to drop the unrelated charges and not charge her as an adult for her part in the robbery, there is no evidence whatsoever of any “additional pressure exerted to detain her.” She was not told at that time that she was under arrest for the robbery and she was not handcuffed. Her physical surroundings were not altered during the course of the interrogation, she was not segregated from the general population at the facility nor was she threatened with such a segregation.8 Nor does our examination of the record reflect any other restraint or limitation on J.D.’s freedom. There was simply no “restriction” placed on J.D. that resulted in an added imposition on her freedom of movement nor pressure “exerted to detain her.” Under the cireumstarices, the presence of Hagen and Foster did not exert a pressure to detain sufficient to have caused a reasonable person to believe her freedom of movement had been further diminished.
In sum, we find very little to support a determination that J.D. was “in custody.” In fact, the uncontroverted facts militate against such a conclusion. J.D. initiated the contact with Kuretich, indicating her desire to discuss the robbery. There is no evidence to indicate that J.D. was unable to terminate the telephone conversation at any time. Moreover, a review of the record reveals that J.D. spoke freely and her statements consumed a substantial portion of the conversation. The extent to which she responded to the questions is consistent with her expressed desire to discuss the robbery. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including J.D.’s detention in the Nevada juvenile facility, we are unable to uphold the trial court’s conclusion that J.D. was “in custody” and subjected to a custodial interrogation.
IV.
Having so held, we now turn to the question of whether parental presence was required as set forth in section 19-2-511(1). By its plain language, section 19-2-511(1) only excludes statements or admissions “made as a result of a custodial interrogation,” without the presence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian. It does not apply to non-custodial situations. See J.C., 844 P.2d at 1188. Because we reverse the trial court’s ruling that J.D. was “in custody,” we likewise reverse its ruling that her parents were required to be present. Therefore, we hold' that a juvenile’s noncustodial statements may not be suppressed merely because they are made outside the presence of a parent. See id.
V.
In conclusion, we hold that Kuretich’s telephone questioning of J.D., while certainly a form of interrogation, did not constitute a “custodial interrogation” on this record. We also hold that because J.D.’s telephone statements were not made while she was subject to a “custodial interrogation,” Detective Kuretich was not required to give J.D. an advisement of her Miranda rights. Similarly, we hold that section 19-2-511(1), 6 C.R.S. (1999), applies only to “custodial interrogations.”
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court suppressing the statements made to the detectives and return this case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Justice MARTINEZ dissents, and Justice HOBBS and Justice BENDER join in the dissent.. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); People in the Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo.1981).
. The record indicates that J.D. was 16-years-old at the time of the interrogation.
. See § 18-4-302(l)(b), 6 C.R.S. (1999). In addition, the State alleged that J.D. is a violent offender and an aggravated violent offender. See § 19-2-516(3), (4), 6 C.R.S. (1999) (authorizing increased commitment pursuant to section 19-2-601, 6 C.R.S. (1999)).
. At the time she was questioned, section 19-2-511(1) provided in material respects:
No statements or admissions of a juvenile made as a result of a custodial interrogation ... shall be admissible in evidence against such juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile was present at such interrogation and the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian were advised of the juvenile’s [constitutional rights].
However, that statute was amended after our decision in Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo.1999). The General Assembly amended subsection (2) of that statute to provide:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile may be admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if the court *767finds that, under the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights and: (I) The juvenile is eighteen years of age or older at the time of the interrogation or the juvenile misrepresents his or her age as being eighteen years of age or older and the law enforcement official acts in good faith reliance on such misrepresentation in conducting the interrogation; (II) The juvenile is emancipated from the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian; or (III) The juvenile is a runaway from a state other than Colorado and is of sufficient age and understanding.
§ 19-2-511(2). Nicholas was decided under the statute prior to the amendment; therefore, we need not and do not address the statute as recently amended.
. The Denison factors are used to determine only whether or not there has been an undue "limitation of movement or other form of restraint ... placed on the defendant during the interrogation.” J.C., 844 P.2d at 1189.
. We find nothing in Miranda to suggest that a detainee is automatically “in custody” and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings merely by virtue of her status as a detainee in a juvenile facility. See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1116; see also United States v. Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (10th Cir.1984) (approving of the view that an inmate is not ipso facto "in custody”).
. Based on the transcript, it appears that J.D. arranged to receive the telephone call in a private room, accompanied by Hagen and Foster. This is certainly consistent with the fact that J.D.'s greatest concern was not whether she would cooperate but who would know that she cooperated. Her fear was so great that she stressed the importance of confidentiality and asked Kuretich to assure her that he would not inform any of the others involved of her cooperation. She stated adamantly, "I'm not gonna get shot."
. As we previously noted, the fact that the interrogation occurred while J.D. and the two adults she trusted were in a separate room is consistent with J.D.'s paramount interest and concern that others not know that she was cooperating.