concurring.
Because there is ample appropriate evidence and no prejudicial error, I concur with the majority, namely, Daniels’ convictions must be affirmed. However, in affirming Daniels’ convictions for first degree sexual assault, this court continues *858to adhere to a suspect evidentiary requirement, an anachronistic remnant of an era which lacked the procedural protection and safeguards now available to an accused in the adversarial process of our criminal justice system.
In reaching its decision the majority has again recognized the “complaint of rape” rule, which is nothing more than a form of required corroboration of a victim’s testimony before a conviction for first degree sexual assault may be sustained.
Required corroboration of a victim’s testimony was unknown at common law in prosecution of a charge for the crime now known as sexual assault. See 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2061 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978).
Much of the problem resulting from the requirement of corroboration in a sexual assault case is laid at the feet of Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench from 1671 to 1676, whose writings were posthumously published in 1736. According to Hale, in a rape case there should be “concurrent evidence to make out the fact,” because sexual assault “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.” See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 874, 538 P.2d 247, 254, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126 (1975). This court in Mathews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 27 N.W. 234 (1886), adopted Hale’s rule, casting suspicion over testimony from any victim in a sexual assault trial, and acknowledged that Hale, 200 years earlier, had laid “down rules for testing the credibility of the principal witnesses, which are as applicable to-day in trials [for sexual assault] as when announced.” Id. at 335, 27 N.W. at 236.
In historical perspective, Hale’s rule was formulated when
“[t]he fundamental precepts of due process, that an accused is presumed innocent and is to be acquitted unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . were recognized as desiderata in Hale’s era but had yet to crystallize into rights. . . . The rights of an accused to present witnesses in his defense and to compel their attendance, subsequently ' enshrined in the Sixth Amendment, were barely nascent in the 17th century. . . . Most importantly of all, in the context of a rape case, one *859accused of a felony in Hale’s day had no right whatsoever to the assistance of counsel. . .
People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra at 878, 538 P.2d at 256-57, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29. In Hale’s era, therefore, trial on a sexual assault would force “an accused, on trial for his life, to stand alone before a jury inflamed by passion and to attempt to answer a carefully contrived story without benefit of counsel, witnesses, or even a presumption of innocence.” Id. at 878, 538 P.2d at 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
“The arguments most often heard in support of the rule of corroboration involve many factors, such as the jury’s outrage at testimony of sex offenses, the difficulty in defending against such charges, the dangers of falsification, and the severe penalties involved.” State v. Cabral, 122 R.I. 623, 626, 410 A.2d 438, 440 (1980).
Notwithstanding Hale’s skepticism concerning testimony from a victim in a sexual assault case, jurisdiction after jurisdiction has renounced any court-made rule requiring corroboration of a victim’s testimony in a sexual assault trial before a conviction for that crime may be sustained. For instance, in State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981), the Supreme Court of Idaho, noting that only two states, Idaho and Nebraska, categorically required corroboration in “sex crime cases,” abolished Idaho’s court-made rule of corroboration for a victim’s testimony, thereby leaving Nebraska the somewhat dubious distinction of being the only jurisdiction still holding that “corroboration of the victim’s testimony is necessary in order to support a conviction” in every case of sexual assault. Annot., 31 A.L.R.4th 120, 136 (1984). As mentioned in the majority’s opinion, Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295 (D.C. 1982), restricted the requirement of corroboration to a case involving a sexual assault on a child versus a case involving a mature victim, but even that suggested distinction has inherent incongruities.
The requirement for independent corroboration in sex-offense cases has been the subject of ever increasing criticism. Contemporary empirical studies suggest that the factors employed to support the corroboration requirement do not justify the rule. There is a great *860reluctance to report a rape. [Citations omitted.] Juries generally tend to view rape charges with skepticism and suspicion, especially when there is a suggestion of willingness or agreement on the part of the victim [citations omitted], and convictions, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, are the exception rather than the rule.
State v. Cabral, supra at 627, 410 A.2d at 441.
After observing that testimony from a sexual assault victim would have been sufficient without corroboration to support a conviction for the crime of simple battery, the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Byers, supra at 164, 627 P.2d at 793, commented:
[W]e agree that an absolute rule in all sex crime cases requiring corroboration both as to the fact of the crime and the perpetrator thereof is no longer justified. ... It is difficult to see a sound basis for continuing the philosophy that rape is distinctive from other crimes to the extent that corroboration is a necessary requirement.
The trier of fact in a sexual assault case will consider several relevant factors or circumstances in determining credibility of any witness, including the victim; for example, the demeanor of a witness, the apparent fairness exhibited by a witness, and the reasonableness or unreasonableness of statements of a witness. See NJI 1.41. By instruction in a jury trial and argument of counsel, the trier of fact may also consider existence or absence of any prompt report of a sexual assault as an additional factor affecting credibility of a victim or weight to be accorded a victim’s testimony. Further, the trier of fact may consider whether the victim had a motive to falsify the particular charge against a defendant and whether there is any inconsistency within the victim’s testimony or resulting from the testimony of another witness.
Abolishing the corroboration requirement would not jeopardize the rights of an accused. Frequently, the State produces evidence in addition to a victim’s testimony. However, in a case where the only evidence about a sexual assault is the victim’s testimony, a court must still determine whether the victim’s testimony is discredited as a matter of law, that is, *861decide whether a victim’s testimony is so inherently self-contradictory to the point of untrustworthiness or otherwise unbelievable that a sexual assault case cannot be submitted to a jury for disposition. See State v. Beck, 286 S.E.2d 234, 242 (W. Va. 1981) (uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim is sufficient, unless such testimony is “inherently incredible”).
The rule of required corroboration of a victim’s testimony in a sexual assault case entered Nebraska’s criminal justice system before adoption of the Nebraska Evidence Rules in 1975. Under Neb. Evid. R. 104 (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-104 (Reissue 1985)), whether a person is qualified to be a witness is a preliminary question to be determined by the trial court. Further, as provided in Neb. Evid. R. 601 (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-601 (Reissue 1985)), “Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.” None of the Nebraska Evidence Rules refers specifically to competency or credibility of a sexual assault victim. In State v. Joy, 220 Neb. 535, 371 N.W.2d 113 (1985), we recognized that a defendant’s conviction for first degree murder “may be supported by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Id. at 537, 371 N.W.2d at 115. Yet, the corroboration requirement in sexual assault cases is judicial predetermination concerning credibility of a class of witnesses, that is, a victim of a sexual assault is not entitled to the same credibility accorded a victim testifying about a crime other than a sexual assault. If, as some surmise, corroboration is required for a defendant’s protection in a trial on a sexual assault charge, logically one must ponder and inevitably conclude that corroboration of a victim’s testimony is indispensable to sustain a conviction on any criminal charge.
Finally, present law in Nebraska prohibits a trial judge from commenting on the evidence submitted to a jury. See NJI1.01. Thus, a trial court cannot comment or express its view on the credibility of a witness or weight to be given to any particular evidence. Nevertheless, implicit in the requirement of corroboration is judicial depreciation of the testimony from a victim of a sexual assault.
I believe the outdated and discriminatory rule of required *862corroboration of a victim’s testimony regarding a sexual assault should be eliminated from the Nebraska criminal justice system.
Krivosha, C. J., and White, J., join in this concurrence.