(concurring). I agree with the court of appeals that "a person has no right to make a transcript of the proceedings before a family court commissioner"; I would affirm the court of appeals on that basis. I would not extend to the parties a general right to record such proceedings.
The proceedings before a family court commissioner are usually very informal. This informality allows the parties to release and thereby diffuse hostile emotions, which in turn may lead to the beneficial result of the parties' agreeing to the contents of the commissioner's temporary order. Interposing a party's recording mechanism adds an element of adversariness to the proceedings and makes it more difficult for the family court commissioner to serve in his or her role as conciliator. See, Strandberg v. Strandberg, 27 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 135 N.W.2d 241 (1965).
The majority does not pretend that it derives a party's right to record proceedings before a family court commissioner from statutory law. I note, however, that sec. 767.13(1m), Stats., specifically gives the moving party the right to de novo review of the family *331court commissioner's "decision, order or ruling." It is at this point in the proceedings — when the parties are in a court of record — that they are entitled to make a record. To allow a party the right to record the proceedings before the family court commissioner not only will destroy the beneficial effects of the informal nature of the proceedings, it also will be superfluous, given that sec. 767.13(1m) provides for de novo review.
The majority posits that the right to record the proceedings before the family court commissioner follows from the right of public access to court proceedings (at page 327). I am unpersuaded that the general concept of public access to the courts supports the holding that parties have the right to record proceedings before the family court commissioner; I divorce myself from that reasoning.