dissenting.
The controlling issue in this case is, as the majority opinion states, whether the finding of the trial court is contrary to the law and the evidence. Admittedly, there is evidence in support *285of the chancellor’s conclusion. It clearly is not incredible. There is no evidence of actual fraud. At most, there are circumstances sufficient to create a presumption of constructive fraud, a rebuttable presumption. The law is not in dispute. The burden of proof was on the appellee to overcome the presumption that the alleged gifts to him from his mother were constructively invalid because of the relationship between them. His testimony to that effect required corroboration.
The evidence was heard ore terms before the chancellor without the intervention of a jury, and certified to us. In such a case, the rule of decision is that “the judgment of the trial court shall not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. ’ ’ Code of Virginia, 1950, section 8-491.
The evidence shows the following uncontradicted facts:
Harry A. Shockey is a lawyer and has been engaged in the practice of his profession for nearly twenty-five years. He and his mother occupied the closest confidential relationship. He was a dutiful and helpful son, and she favored him above all of her children. From his early youth he had contributed largely to the support and welfare of his mother and her family. He assisted in educating his three sisters and brother, and out of his earnings paid the original purchase money mortgage on real estate which belonged to his mother. His father apparently was not frugal and contributed little or nothing to the maintenance of the home or the education of his children. None of the children aided their mother after they became wage-earners. One of the sons, Joseph A. W. Shockey, an appellant, constantly sought money from his mother. According to appellee and a disinterested witness, she upbraided that son for misappropriating funds belonging to her.
In 1925, Fannie C. Shockey made and executed her last will and testament. The will was not prepared by appellee and he did not see it until his mother’s death. By her will, Mrs. Shockey devised to her husband, “a one-half life interest” in her home property, and gave all of the rest of her property, subject to that life interest, to appellee as executor and trustee, with directions to distribute the estate or proceeds thereof between himself and her other children, in such proportions as he might “deem appropriate for them to have.” In expressing her feel*286ings towards appellee, she employed the following language in her will:
“This is my desire because I have full faith and confidence in his ability and intelligence.
“This power is to be left wholly within his discretion and not to be questioned.”
It was wholly natural and logical that, with this regard for her son, Mrs. Shockey consulted him in her negotiations with the Virginia Electric & Power Company for the sale of her property rights. She did not seek the guidance and advice of her husband and remaining children for reasons sufficient to her.
Three physicians testified that up to a few days before her death, her mind was clear. Others who saw her a short time prior thereto said that she was mentally alert, seemed to be an educated, woman, and was careful in her business transactions.
Regarding the deposits of the funds received from the Virginia Electric & Power Company, appellee testified as follows:
‘ ‘ My mother and myself- discussed that matter on the morning the deposits were made. She wanted to see Dr. Bowen that day to have a physical check-up, so I told her I would advise she fix that up in k checking account so that she and my father could check that out later. She said no. She said, ‘You know Joe got $1,900.00 or $2,000.00 from me. He got all my money.’
“Q. Her son?
“A. Her son, yes, and she said ‘You know how your father is. I don’t want him to take this money and squander it.’ She said ‘You know how he spends it.’
“Q. She said this?
“A. That was the conversation.
s& #
“Q.'You go ahead and finish.
“A. And she said ‘Whenever I get a cent of money, Joe is after it or Ruth is after it.’ She didn’t complain about Margaret and Catherine.
“I am very reluctantly telling this, but I am telling the truth and she said she wanted to keep it. She said I would have to sign with her so she would tell these children and my father we would open up a joint account and both of us would have to sign the checks together, and she said ‘I feel it is due to you, all you have done on this farm and this home that' the home exists today, and if it wasn’t for you, it would not be here today and I *287want this account opened in the manner it is and I want you to have this money in the event of your father’s death or my death. ’ * * *
“Q. Yes, I want to know the reasons.
“A. Well, her reasoning of.it was she felt in view of all that I had done for her and made it possible that the property existed and also put this deal through which she was very much elated over, that I should have it in the event of either of them dying. My suggestion to her in answer to that was: ‘Mother, I think you should go to work and put it in a checking account so you would have half of it in your name and half in my father’s name, so each of you can check on it.’
“She said: ‘Oh, no. I have had experience with Joe and my children and I know what the results are. If I leave it in my name so I can check on it, Joe and the girls, if they find out about it, I won’t have a penny very long. It will be gone.’ And she told me about Joe having taken her bonds and cashed them and not giving her any security for them, and she said that was not fair. She said: ‘You know that was not right, Harry.’ I said, ‘Well, that’s your business.’ She says, ‘As to your father, if he had his way about it, he would squander every cent. He was never able to save or keep a cent. ’
“I might add one other thing. She also mentioned one thing. She said: ‘After the girls finished school and got their education, those girls went to town and kept their money and instead of contributing money to the home, they went to work for the Government and paid room rent and board in Washington instead of contributing to the home.’ She said they were very anxious- to stay at home while they were going to school and getting their education, but after they got their education, they stayed in town.”
It will be observed that in making the deposits of the funds received from the power company, she carefully divided it into two parts, one of which she gave to her husband and her son, the appellee, and the other she provided for herself and appellee. The similarity between these deposits and the provisions of the will is marked. Two days after making the deposits, she executed a deed in fee simple conveying her homestead estate to appellee. All of this strikingly points to her desire to do more for appellee than for any one else. It is clear that she did not desire to make any provision for her remaining children. Her *288written expression of gratitude, evidenced by her will, the deposit signature cards, and the deed testify in the strongest manner to her feeling of appreciation and gratitude towards appellee. She evidently thought .that she had the right to dispose of her property as she pleased.
To say that Mrs. Shockey did not understand and comprehend the purpose and effect of the transactions with her son is a gratuitous reflection upon her intelligence, not warranted by a single fact or circumstance in evidence. She was not required to make a written claim of intelligence and understanding.
.The comments on the testimony of Mrs. Lyle have no value. It is not unusual for an employee of a bank to fail to remember the circumstances of a deposit- made during the busy hours of employment. We should not be critical about appellee’s dealing with his father so as to prevent the latter from squandering the funds provided for him. The donor did not want them wasted. There was nothing despicable in the dealings between the appellee, his brother and sisters.
The suggested contradictions and inconsistencies in his testimony were explainable as due to the lapse of time and the change of circumstances in the several proceedings concerning his mother’s estate. His actions were those of an obedient, dutiful, considerate and affectionate son towards his parents, in contrast' to the concern manifested by his brother and sisters. His reward was natural and logical. Appreciation and gratitude are among the noblest of human traits, and when exhibited should be allowed effect.
In consideration of the evidence, we must bear in mind that the chancellor saw and heard the witnesses testify, and observed their manner and attitude. All of the facts and circumstances surrounding the negotiations and conferences between the appellee and his mother were presented to him in a more vivid picture than a printed record can show. He, of course, was aware of the interest of each party and the influence their interest had upon the testimony. That he gave consideration to the inconsistencies in the appellee’s testimony is indicated by the language of his decree. “His conclusions on questions of.fact are entitled to peculiar weight and consideration, and we must accept them just as we accept a jury’s verdict, sustained by evidence which it might have believed. ’ ’ First Nat. Bank v. Roanoke *289Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 192 S. E. 764; Wyckoff Pipe, etc., Co. v. Saunders, 175 Va. 512, 9 S. E. (2d) 318.
The chancellor accepted the testimony of the appellee as he had the right to do, and we are faced with the presumption that his conclusion was correct. The burden was on appellants to show error. Smith v. Alderson, 116 Va. 986, 83 S. E. 373.
It is conceded that the same weight should be given to the decision of a chancellor as if it were the verdict of a jury. In a large number of cases which have come to this court, we have uniformly refused to set aside verdicts as contrary to the evidence where there was involved the credibility of witnesses whose testimony the jury might reasonably believe, or the weight to be given to their testimony, or the question of a mere preponderance of the evidence. Whatever may have been our view as to the preponderance of the evidence, we have refused to set aside the judgment of a trial court unless we were able to say that the judgment was plainly wrong or without any evidence to support it. Varner v. White, 149 Va. 177, 140 S. E. 128. We considered the cases very much as upon a demurrer to the evidence. Updike v. Texas Co., 147 Va. 208, 136 S. E. 591; Virginia Elec., etc., Co. v. Blunt, 158 Va. 421, 431,163 S. E. 329.
Even doubts as to its correctness are not sufficient to bring a reversal in this court. Graham v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 808, 103 S. E. 565; Bragg v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 645, 112 S. E. 609.
We accept as true all facts favorable to the party in whose favor .judgment has been entered. Virginia Elec., etc., Co. v. Blunt, supra.
Where the evidence consists of circumstances and presumptions, a new trial will not be granted merely because we would have arrived at a different conclusion. Davis v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 525,110 S. E. 252.
This case is not one of that exceptional character where we can say that the record discloses that the finding of the chancellor was plainly wrong and unjust. The gift to the appellee was not unusual under the circumstances recited. The undisputed facts provided a natural and logical basis for Mrs. Shockey’s action in favor of appellee. The presumption of invalidity created by the relationship of the mother and her lawyer son was fully overcome when the chancellor became convinced *290that the evidence clearly and satisfactorily showed Mrs. Shockey had a full understanding of the nature of the transactions.
What constitutes clear and satisfactory evidence upon any given question is dependent upon various considerations, circumstances, viewpoints, and, especially in the case of oral testimony, upon the opportunity to see, hear, and observe the witnesses testify. Men and judges may differ in their evaluation of testimony; but greater weight is and ought to be given to the conclusion of the one who has had the benefit of the opportunity to give consideration to all of the factors.
It is settled law of this State by cases too numerous to cite that the corroboration required when one party is incapable of testifying depends on no hard and fast rule, but upon the facts in each case. Trevillian v. Bullock, 185 Va. 958, 40 S. E. (2d) 920.
Section 8-286 of Code of Virginia, 1950, only requires such corroboration as would confirm and strengthen a belief in the testimony of the adverse witness. Varner v. White, supra; Krikorian v. Dailey, 171 Va. 16, 197 S. E. 442; Shenandoah Valley Nat. Banh v. Lineburg, 179 Va. 734, 20 S. E. (2d) 541.
Nor it is necessary that the testimony be corroborated in all material points. Davies v. Silvey, 148 Va. 132, 138 S. E. 513; Morrison v. Morrison, 174 Va. 58, 4 S. E. (2d) 776; Heath v. Valentine, 177 Va. 731,15 S. E. (2d) 98; Rorer v. Taylor, 182 Va. 49,.27 S. E. (2d) 923.
In Morrison v. Morrison, supra, we held that Mrs. Morrison’s testimony of loans made to her husband was corroborated by the production of cancelled checks for the precise amount, the dates of which corresponded to the bank’s record of the credit of the amount to her husband’s account, and by a provision in the will of her husband for the payment of debts due to his wife. Between the two there existed the most confidential of relationships.
In the present case, evidence of corroboration is stronger than in most of the cited cases. Here corroboration of the gift to appellee was expressly shown by the character of the deposits in his behalf, and by her actual signatures on the deposit cards. The signature cards of themselves constitute documentary evidence of the highest character. The repeated expression of her feeling of gratitude towards appellee served but to confirm and strengthen a belief in appellee’s testimony that she willingly *291favored him, with full knowledge of the effect of her acts. That she did act intelligently and of her own free will is confirmed by the evidence of independent witnesses concerning the relationship which had long existed between appellee and his mother. Nothing that she did runs counter to common experience under like circumstances. Her actions were in accord with the impulses of appreciation and gratitude.
It is only where the narrative to be corroborated runs contrary to common experience, that more is required than where it is in line with common experience. Trevillian v. Bullock, supra.
The evidence strongly indicates that Joseph L. Shockey was not fully competent to handle money to the best advantage. This accounts for the manner and means provided by Mrs. Shockey for his welfare, and likewise supports the action of appellee in refraining from telling his father that the deposit to their joint account could not be checked on without the signature of both.
Joseph L. Shockey did not appear in the proceeding or answer the pleadings. He makes no claim that he was misinformed or deceived as to his rights by appellee. He does not ask that the latter be required to replenish the deposit in his favor, nor complain that the fund has been improperly dissipated.
When we disregard the statutory rule of decision, by weighing conflicting evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses in arriving at a conclusion opposite from the one reached by the chancellor, and modify our former construction of Code, section 8-286, we begin to multiply the difficulties we will hereafter encounter in the practical adjudication of cases coming within the purview of those statutes.
Appellants, under established principles, come to this court with the presumption that the decree of the chancellor is correct. The burden upon them to show that it .is plainly wrong has not, in my opinion, been successfully borne.
I would affirm the decree appealed from.