Appellant Sandra Vines (Vines) appeals an Order granting summary judgment to Respondents (Hospital). We affirm.
FACTS
On November 2, 1988, Vines was injured while riding as a passenger in a van operated by Hospital when the driver ran over a curb.1 On October 21, 1991, she served Hospital with a summons and complaint, alleging negligence in Hospital’s operation of the van.
Hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. (Tort Claims Act). Vines opposed summary judgment, arguing that: (1) she substantially complied with S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-80 and 15-78-110, which provide a three-year statute of limitations to a plaintiff who files a verified claim for damages within one year of the loss; and (2) Hospital is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.
Trial Court granted summary judgment, holding that the two-year statute of limitations was binding upon Vines.
ISSUES
1. Was substantial compliance sufficient to entitle Vines to the three-year statute of limitations?
2. Is Hospital estopped from asserting the statute of limitations?
DISCUSSION
A. Verified Claim
The Tort Claims Act contains a two-year statute of limitations for actions brought against the State. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110 (Supp. 1992). However, if a plaintiff files a verified *307claim within one-year of the loss or injury, the statute of limitations is extended to three-years. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-80, 15-78-110 (Supp. 1992). The verified claim must set forth “the circumstances which brought about the loss, the extent of the loss, the time and place the loss occurred, the names of all persons involved if known, and the amount of the loss sustained. . ..” Filing is accomplished by receipt of certified mail or by compliance with service of process. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-80 (Supp. 1992).
Vines alleges that she is entitled to the three-year statute of limitations, contending that she substantially complied with its provisions notwithstanding she admittedly failed to file a verified claim. Hospital does not challenge that it had notice of Vines’ claim, but argues the notice was defective for lack of verification.
Following her injury, Vines completed claim forms, not notarized, with Hospital personnel. These forms are not a part of the record, nor can it be determined from the record what information required by the Act was supplied to Hospital. 2
A claim against a state entity under the Tort Claims Act must be verified to entitle a plaintiff to the three-year statue of limitations. Substantial compliance is not sufficient. Rink v. Richland Memorial Hospital, — S.C. —, 422 S.E. (2d) 747 (1992); Cochran v. City of Sumter, 242 S.C. 382, 131 S.E. (2d) 153 (1963), overruled on other grounds, McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E. (2d) 741 (1985); Searcy v. Dep’t of Educ., Transp. Div., 303 S.C. 544, 402 S.E. (2d) 486 (Ct. App. 1991). If strict compliance with the Act is not required, as the Dissent urges, every case in which the statute of limitations has run will be subject to litigation. To the extend that Braudie v. Richland County 3 holds that substantial compliance is sufficient, it is overruled.
The requirement that a claim be verified is imposed by the General Assembly. Had our legislature intended that unverified notice suffice to invoke the extended statute of limitations under the Tort Claims Act, it could have so provided.4 It chose *308to make verification a condition precedent. Moreover, the Tort Claims Act specifically reads that it [the Act] “must be liberally construed in favor of limiting the liability of the State.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(f) (Supp. 1992).
Finally, as observed in Searcy, supra, “a verification serves to discourage the filing of false claims because verification permits a prosecution for perjury if the claim is fraudulent.” 303 S.C. at 546, 402 S.E. (2d) at 487.
This Court is not without sympathy for Vines and her injuries. However, it is not within the province of this Court to modify the clear statutory language set forth by the legislature.
B. Estoppel
Vines contends that Hospital is estopped from asserting its statute of limitations defense on the ground that the assistance of Hospital employees in completing the claim forms “caused her to believe she had done all that she needed to do.” We disagree.
A defendant may be estopped from claiming a statute of limitations defense if “the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute has been induced by the defendant’s conduct.” Dillon Co. Sch. Dist. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal, 286 S.C. 207, 218, 332 S.E. (2d) 555, 561 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. dismissed, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E. (2d) 613 (1986). This may consist of either an express representation that the claim will be settled without litigation or by conduct suggesting a lawsuit is unnecessary. Dillon, supra; Clements v. Greenville County, 246 S.C. 20, 142 S.E. (2d) 212 (1965). Settlement negotiations commenced, but not finalized, will not bar a defendant’s assertion of the statute of limitations. Gadsden v. Southern Railway, 262 S.C. 590, 206 S.E. (2d) 882 (1974).
Here, there is no showing that Vines delayed filing suit in reliance upon Hospital’s conduct. Indeed, upon Vine’s discharge from Hospital, her husband informed *309Hospital personnel that he did not intend to release it from liability. Further, Vines employed an attorney to investigate her claim prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation.
Generally, the issue of whether estoppel bars a defendant from claiming the statute of limitations is a jury question. Dillon, swpra. However, where the record contains no evidence of conduct on the defendant’s part warranting estoppel, summary judgment is proper. Gadsden, supra. The record here is devoid of any showing that Hospital induced either Vines’ noncompliance with the verification requirement or her delay in filing suit. Accordingly, on these facts, summary judgment was proper.
Affirmed.
Harwell, C.J., and Moore, J.,concur. Toal and Finney, J.J., dissenting in separate opinion.At this time, Vines was being treated in the Hospital for depression. However, she makes no claim that she was under any type of mental disability.
The Dissent states that Hospital conceded Vines substantially complied with the Act. Nothing in the record supports this statement. Hospital merely agreed that it had notice of Vine’s alleged injury. However, there was no showing of substantial compliance on this record.
219 S.C. 130, 64 S.E. (2d) 248 (1951).
The Dissent states: “If the legislature had intended for the absence of a verification to be a complete bar to the longer statutory period to file a lawsuit, as in Cochran, they could have written the statute to so provided.” We disagree. Such an interpretation would surely have the effect of requiring the General Assembly to specify, in every statute, that it intended compliance with its plain language provisions.