(concurring in the result)—I depart from the majority opinion to the extent that it incorrectly states the second issue as: "whether the indemnification provision is unenforceable as against public policy because it shifts liability for Northwest's sole negligence onto Hughes." This issue is not before us. Whether Walquist's injury was caused by the sole negligence of Northwest has not been determined at this stage of the proceedings.
In its complaint for indemnification, Northwest alleged that Hughes' injured employee, Walquist, was contributorially negligent in causing his injury. Under the doctrine of *350respondeat superior, the conduct of an employee acting within the scope of employment is chargeable to the employer. Miller v. Alaska S.S. Co., 139 Wash. 207, 214, 246 P. 296 (1926). Therefore, if Walquist was contributorially negligent, this case would concern the concurrent negligence of Hughes and Northwest rather than the sole negligence of Northwest.
I am aware of the holding in Wicklund v. Gus J. Bouten Constr. Co., 36 Wn. App. 71, 674 P.2d 184 (1983), but do not find it persuasive. Generally, the claimed negligence of an employer/indemnitor arises from the conduct of the injured employee; in only a few cases is the claimed negligence limited to the acts of a fellow employee. I see no reason in logic or precedent to preclude imputing the negligence of the injured employee to the employer.
This court has, in several unpublished opinions, and in Gibson v. Port of Seattle, 28 Wn. App. 508, 515, 624 P.2d 1168, review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1022, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 941, 70 L. Ed. 2d 249, 102 S. Ct. 477 (1981), held that under an indemnity agreement, the employer/indemnitor is accountable for the negligence of the injured employee if the employee was acting within the scope of employment.
It is undisputed that Walquist was acting within the scope of employment when injured. Whether Walquist was contributorially negligent is a disputed question of fact which at this stage of the proceedings remains unresolved. Granting a summary judgment of dismissal was therefore improper.
Reconsideration denied June 27, 1984.
Review granted by Supreme Court October 5, 1984.