This is a wrongful death action arising from a motor vehicle accident involving two vehicles. Decedent, a passenger in the vehicle driven by her husband, died as a result of the accident. Plaintiff, as personal representative of decedent’s estate, seeks recovery from decedent’s husband, defendant Clifford Hampton, and from the driver of the other vehicle, defendant Denise Jayne. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing her complaint against Hampton1 on the ground of spousal immunity. We affirm.
In the first claim, the complaint alleges that defendants were negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles and were both driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In the second claim, plaintiff realleges the specifications of negligence and intoxication and alleges:
“The acts of defendant Hampton, as stated above, were reckless and in complete disregard of the safety and well-being of Barbara A. Hampton, deceased.”
The third claim alleges:
“The acts of defendant Hampton as stated above were in complete disregard of the safety and well-being of Barbara A. Hampton, deceased, and amount to willful misconduct.”
Plaintiff makes essentially three arguments for reversal of the judgment. She first argues, under various headings, that the doctrine of spousal immunity should be abolished. Second, she contends that if not abolished, the doctrine does not apply in this case, because defendant Hampton’s conduct was reckless or willful misconduct. Third, she contends that the surviving beneficiaries of decedent’s estate are the real parties in interest and that application of the doctrine denies them a remedy in violation of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.
Plaintiff invites us, by a variety of cogent arguments, to abolish or severely limit spousal immunity. It is not judicial inertia but binding precedent that compels rejection of the invitation. The Oregon Supreme Court has determined that one spouse is immune from an action by the other for *719nonintentional torts. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or 374, 397 P2d 771 (1964); Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Or 45, 361 P2d 64 (1961); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or 286, 287 P2d 572 (1955); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or 242, 287 P2d 585 (1955). As in Winn v. Gilroy, 61 Or App 243, 656 P2d 386, rev allowed 294 Or 792 (1983), we cannot disregard the controlling precedent.
Plaintiff argues that her complaint states a cause of action for reckless or willful misconduct that is not protected by this doctrine of spousal immunity. The basis of her argument is Apitz v. Dames, supra, and Cowgill, Adm’r v. Boock, Adm’r, 189 Or 282, 218 P2d 445 (1950). In Apitz the husband intentionally shot and killed his wife and then committed suicide. The wife’s personal representative brought a wrongful death action against the husband’s estate. The court held that the doctrine of spousal immunity does not prevent a claim for an intentional tort. The exception to spousal immunity was clearly limited to intentional torts.
Plaintiff argues that Cowgill provides a conceptual basis for recovering in this case. It involved the application of immunity from actions by children against their parents for tortious injury. There, the father, who was intoxicated, refused to allow his 17-year-old son to drive him home and forced the son to ride in the car while he drove. The vehicle was involved in an accident, and both the father and son were killed. The personal representative of the son’s estate brought a wrongful death action against the father’s estate. In discussing the concept of parental immunity, the court held that there was an exception to the doctrine for willful or malicious misconduct on the part of the parent. The court said:
“The evidence in the instant action certainly shows that the decedent-father was guilty of willful misconduct.” 189 Or at 301.
In Chaffin v. Chaffin, supra, the court explained its holding in Cowgill:
“* * * [W]e conclude that an act by a parent, whether described as willful or malicious or wanton, which will pierce the veil of parental immunity, is an act which is done with an intention to injure the child or is of such a cruel nature in and of itself as to evidence not a reasonably normal parental mind, but an evil mind, malo animo. * * *” 239 Or at 387.
*720In discussing the necessary allegations of a complaint, the court said:
“We reach the conclusion then that for a petition of a minor child to state a cause of action against a parent, even under the modified rule of Cowgill v. Boock, supra, the complaint must allege facts from which a conclusion can be drawn that the parent committed an act so cruel in its nature as to denote a wicked intent to cause injury to someone.” 239 Or at 388.
Even assuming that the modified rule of Cowgill respecting parental immunity is readily transferrable to spousal immunity, plaintiffs complaint does not state a claim. The complaint alleges in a conclusory fashion that defendant Hampton’s acts amounted to reckless or willful misconduct. The specific allegation of defendant Hampton’s conduct control over the general allegation of recklessness or willfulness. Chaffin v. Chaffin, supra. The acts alleged constitute ordinary negligence, with the additional allegation of intoxication. Those specifications are no more than allegations of gross negligence, which is not sufficient to pierce the veil of immunity.
Plaintiffs constitutional argument was answered adversely to her claim in Smith v. Smith, supra.
Affirmed.
The court entered a final judgment pursuant to ORCP 67B as to defendant Hampton.