Appellant/plaintiff, Wendy Sue Brown, filed this action against her landlord, RFC Management, Inc., following her fall down a flight of steps in the apartment building where she rented an apartment. Brown alleged in her complaint that RFC failed to keep the premises in repair or perform regular maintenance, and as a result there existed hazardous defects in the lighting and carpeting in the common areas in her apartment building. On January 24, 1984, Brown was using the stairway to go to and from her apartment and the basement to use the washer and dryer. She had taken her clothing to the basement and placed them in the washer and returned to her apartment. After a short period of time, she returned to the basement and removed her washing and placed it in the dryer and returned to her apartment. Allowing sufficient time for drying, Brown again returned to the basement, removed her clothing from the dryer, placed them in her laundry basket and started ascending the stairs. On the way up the stairs, she slipped and fell to the bottom of the stairwell and was injured. There was no light illuminating the stairwell, and the carpeting was threadbare and fit loosely to the stairs. Brown could not say what caused her to slip and fall. RFC moved for and was granted summary judgment and Brown brings this appeal. Held:
Appellant has enumerated three errors. Although she stipulated she had knowledge of “the dangerous condition of the lighting and carpet in the stairwell,” she alleges the trial court erred: (1) in making these facts “the determinative factor in granting summary judgment to the Defendant,” (2) “in finding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendant’s breach of legal duty to Plaintiff,” and (3) “in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the legal and factual cause of Plaintiff’s injury.” In sum, *604appellant argues it was error to grant summary judgment to her landlord.
Contrary to appellant’s allegations, the trial court made no specific findings as to any determinative fact, or breach of any legal duty, or the legal or factual cause of her fall. The trial court entered the standard statutory wording in granting summary judgment to RFC. Thus, in essence, the only issue before this Court is whether the grant was proper. As in every summary judgment in actions involving.allegations of negligence, we start our analysis from the accepted standard that “[generally, issues of negligence, and in particular the related issues of contributory or comparative negligence, assumption of the risk, lack of ordinary care for one’s own safety and lack of ordinary care in avoiding the consequences of another’s negligence and similar matters are not proper for summary adjudication.” Morris v. Pulliam, 168 Ga. App. 442, 444 (309 SE2d 423). Likewise, in order for a movant defendant to obtain summary judgment in its favor it is necessary that it produce evidence which conclusively negates at least one essential element of the opponent’s case. Vizzini v. Blonder, 165 Ga. App. 840 (303 SE2d 38). Hence, movant must pierce plaintiff’s pleadings to show the court the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, irrespective of any other issues of fact with regard to the other essential elements. Morris, supra at 444; see also Waldrep v. Goodwin, 230 Ga. 1, 2 (195 SE2d 432).
“To state a cause of action for negligence in Georgia, the following elements are essential: ‘(1) A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and, (4) some loss or damage flowing to the plaintiff’s legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal duty.’ ” Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200 (296 SE2d 693). Appellee landlord owed the legal duty to his tenants to keep the premises in repair. OCGA § 44-7-13. Additionally, the landlord is responsible for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair. OCGA § 44-7-14. However, in order to recover, a tenant is required to show not only that the landlord breached his statutory duty to keep the premises in repair, but that such breach was the proximate cause of her injury. Absent such cause-effect connection, plaintiff’s action would be lacking one essential element. We find the evidence presented to the trial court establishes the absence of a causal relationship between the alleged acts of negligence of the defendant landlord and the injuries incurred by the plaintiff tenant.
Appellant was questioned extensively as to the cause of her fall. “Q. What did you fall on, if anything? A. I don’t know. Q. Did you trip over anything? A. I don’t know. I just lost my footing. . . . Q. *605What do you remember happening? A. Just going up the stairs. It was dark . . . real dark, and I just remember losing my footing. I remember landing at the bottom of the stairs. . . . One minute, I was going up the stairs. The next minute, I was going down them.”
Our Supreme Court has held that “ ‘proof of nothing more than the occurrence of the fall is insufficient to establish the proprietor’s negligence.’ ” Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 624 (272 SE2d 327). There must be a causal relationship between the breach of the statutory duty and the plaintiff’s injuries. “ ‘To presume that because a [tenant] falls in [an apartment complex’s common passageway] that the [landlord] has somehow been negligent would make the [landlord] an insurer of his [tenant’s] safety which he is not in this state.’ ” Key v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Ga. App. 176-177 (299 SE2d 895). See Phelps v. Consolidated Equities Corp., 133 Ga. App. 189 (2) (210 SE2d 337) as to a landlord not being an insurer of a tenant’s safety.
Because the evidence presented to the trial court .established there was no causal connection between appellant’s fall and the alleged failure of the landlord to keep the premises in repair, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee. Jenkins v. Storey Trucking Co., 184 Ga. App. 672, 673 (362 SE2d 466); see also Motes v. 6 “S” Co., 186 Ga. App. 67 (366 SE2d 358) and Garnett v. Mathison, 179 Ga. App. 242, 243 (345 SE2d 919).
Judgment affirmed. Been, P. J., Banke, P. J., Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur.
McMurray, P. J., Carley, Benham, and Beasley, JJ., dissent.