dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The evidence is to be viewed most favorably toward Harrison, see Eddie Parker Interests v. Booth, 160 Ga. App. 15, 17 (285 SE2d 753) (1981).
1. Appellant claims that there was no evidence at trial that an agency relationship existed between it and Allied. It asserts that there was no evidence that its “conduct, representations, course of dealing, or knowledge of material facts” led Harrison to believe that such an agency relationship existed and that this, coupled with denial of agency by Canal and Allied, required a finding of no agency as a matter of law.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the evidence does not conclusively show a denial by Allied of the agency relationship with Canal. In fact, in his deposition introduced at trial, Wright stated, when questioned about whom he represented in the transaction: “When I first called Canal, I represented Jack Harrison. But after I consummated permission with Canal to quote this insurance and bind it, *685then I may have been representing Canal then.” Also, when he stated there was no “explicit authority” he went on to explain that “It is on a case by case basis. In other words, we have no blanket authority from Canal.” Thus, Wright did not unequivocally deny that he became the insurer’s agent during the course of the transaction with plaintiff Harrison.
Furthermore, there was evidence that Canal accepted the actions of Wright on its behalf in the dealings with Harrison. The insurer accepted the premiums, issued the policies bearing its name as the insurer, sent its chosen adjuster to investigate the claim, and authorized repair pursuant to the estimate.
It is true that “[independent insurance agents or brokers are generally considered the agent of the insured, not the insurer. [Cit.] [But] [i]n many cases, the nature of the relationship between the parties [is] a jury question. See, e.g., Wright Body Works v. Columbus &c. Ins. Agency, 233 Ga. 268 (210 SE2d 801) (1974); Stewart v. Boykin, 165 Ga. App. 868 (303 SE2d 50) (1983); Johnson v. Pennington Ins. Agency, 148 Ga. App. 147 (251 SE2d 116) (1978).” European Bakers v. Holman, 177 Ga. App. 172, 173 (2) (338 SE2d 702) (1985).
Even the bare assertion of the existence of an agency relationship is a statement of fact when made by one of the purported parties to the relationship. Salters v. Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, 124 Ga. App. 414 (184 SE2d 56) (1971); accord Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes, 126 Ga. App. 444, 453 (191 SE2d 121) (1972); Oglesby v. Farmers Mut., 128 Ga. App. 387, 389 (5) (196 SE2d 674) (1973); Stone v. First Nat. Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 814 (4) (285 SE2d 207) (1981). The assertion as well as the denial of agency by a party may not be disregarded by the trial court. Commercial Union Ins. v. Taylor, 169 Ga. App. 177, 180 (312 SE2d 177) (1983).
There was evidence that at a specific point in the transaction with Harrison, Canal gave Allied the authority. “ ‘An essential characteristic of an agent is his ability to bind his principal. [Cit.]’ General Warranty Corp. &c. v. Cameron-Hogan, Inc., 182 Ga. App. 434, 436 (356 SE2d 83) [1987].”
Inasmuch as there is some evidence of agency, the nature of the relationship between Allied and Canal became a question for the jury. European Bakers, supra.
The trial court properly refused to direct a verdict for the insurer on this issue, OCGA § 9-11-50 (a), and instead fully instructed the jury on the legal principles of agency applicable here.
2. Appellant contends that even if there was an agency relationship between itself and the broker, the policy did not provide coverage for the mishap because the policy contained exactly the same information, including particularly the geographical limitation, as the *686application signed by the insured.
The problem with appellant’s argument is twofold. Although the insurer maintained that the insurance application was filled in when it was sent to Harrison for his signature, including the one-hundred-mile limitation at issue, Harrison claimed that it was blank when he received it. While generally, “[i]f a writing is signed with blanks left to be filled in by the other party, the person signing is bound by it. [Cit.]” Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Savings &c. Assn., 152 Ga. App. 40, 42 (262 SE2d 230) (1979), the person is not bound if some type of fraud prevented him from reading the document. Haralson v. Pope Chevrolet, 180 Ga. App. 650, 653 (3) (350 SE2d 255) (1986). It was for the jury to determine whether Wright’s statements to Harrison regarding the coverage constituted misrepresentations, and if so, whether such misrepresentations induced Harrison “ ‘to pursue some course which he would not otherwise have pursued except for the fraud.’ ” Id.
In addition, the policies were not sent to Harrison until after the accident, so he had no notice prior to then of the restriction in the policies. If the jury determined that Harrison had given truthful answers to agent Wright’s questions about the scope of his business and his insurance requirements and that the agent mistakenly or fraudulently recorded the requirements on the application, Harrison would not be charged with knowledge of the policies’ contents. See O’Kelly v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 455 (305 SE2d 873) (1983), which applies these principles to life insurance.
“ ‘ “In an action on a contract of insurance, the insurance company is generally considered estopped to deny liability on any matter arising out of the fraud, misconduct, or negligence of an agent of the company. If either party must suffer from an insurance agent’s mistake, it must be the insurance company, his principal. . . Id. at 457.
3. Appellant contends that a finding of bad faith could not be authorized by the evidence.
“ ‘In an action to recover penalties and attorney’s fees for the refusal of an insurer to pay a claim it must be shown that the refusal was in “bad faith,” [OCGA § 33-4-6 ...]..., and the burden is on the insured to show that such refusal was made in bad faith. [Cits.] “Bad faith” . . . means “any frivolous and unfounded refusal in law or in fact to comply with the demand of the policyholder to pay according to the terms of the policy.” [Cits] ....’” Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Avery, 165 Ga. App. 703 (1) (302 SE2d 605) (1983).
Construing the evidence described above in favor of the verdict, it supported a finding of misrepresentation on the part of the insurer’s agent, which led to the unfounded refusal to comply with Harrison’s demands for payment under his policy. “ ‘ “(T)he proper rule is that the judgment [for bad faith penalties and attorney’s fees] *687should be affirmed if there is any evidence to support it unless it can be said as a matter of law that there was a reasonable defense which vindicates the good faith of the insurer.” ’ [Cit.]” Id. at 707 (1). Since the latter is not the case, the court did not err in denying a directed verdict to insurer on this issue.
Decided December 5, 1988 — Rehearing denied December 20, 1988 Gray, Gilliland & Gold, John B. Austin, for appellant. Nicholas E. Bakatsas, for appellee.