This action was instituted by plaintiff-appellant against the defendant-respondent, George Howard, Jr., as the principal, and defendant James Hallums, as Howard’s agent, to recover damages sustained from a gunshot wound which rendered appellant a paraplegic. The respondent Howard alone moved for summary judgment. His motion for summary judgment was granted by the lower court upon the ground that there was no evidence upon which to base the conclusion that defendant Hallums was his agent at the time of the alleged assault, which showing was, admittedly, necessary in order to fasten liability upon respondent. This appeal is from the order for summary judgment.
In determining whether summary judgment was properly granted, we consider the testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to appellant. We stated in Gardner v. Campbell, 257 S. C. 209, 184 S. E. (2d) 700, that, even where there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, but only as to conclusions or inferences to be drawn therefrom, summary judgment should not be granted. Our statement of the facts is governed by these principles, and no attempt is made to recite the conflicting testimony.
Respondent is the owner of Howard’s Party Shop and defendant Hallums was employed by respondent as the man*387ager. Appellant operated the Chocolate City Lounge and on two or three prior occasions had brought quantities of beer and wine at respondent’s Party Shop on credit until such time as he could sell the beer and wine in his lounge. On each occasion appellant dealt with defendant Hallums who was the manager of the respondent’s business. When appellant sold the beer and wine, he customarily returned to respondent’s place of business and paid the purchase price to the manager (Hallums) who put the money into the cash register. There was never any indication to appellant that his credit purchases of beer and wine from defendant Hallums were not direct purchases from respondent’s Party Shop.
In December 1975, appellant purchased on credit another quantity of beer and wine from respondent’s Party Shop, dealing with the manager Hallums under the same procedures as in prior purchases. This purchase was in the amount of $189.00. Subsequently the beer and wine purchased in December 1975 was stolen from appellant’s place of business and he was unable to pay for it as he had agreed. After two prior attempts to collect, defendant Hallums and one Marvin Morgan went to appellant’s apartment in January 1976 in a further attempt to collect for the beer and wine purchased at respondent’s Party Shop. When appellant failed to pay, defendant Hallums handed a pistol to Morgan, which had been furnished by respondent to him for use about the business, and instructed Morgan to kill appellant; whereupon Morgan shot appellant and rendered him paraplegic.
This action was thereafter brought against respondent and his store manager Hallums to recover for appellant’s injuries, upon allegations that defendant Hallums was acting as the agent of respondent in the efforts to collect the debt from appellant. We think that there was evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that defendant Hallums was acting as respondent’s agent at all pertinent times; and the lower court was, therefore, in error in granting the motion for summary judgment.
*388Although respondent denies the authority of defendant Hallums, as his store manager, to sell goods on credit to appellant and asserts that the credit sale in question was a transaction between Hallums and the appellant, in which he was not involved or in anyway liable, it is nevertheless inferable from the testimony that defendant Hallums, as respondent’s store manager, sold the beer and wine on credit to appellant and that at the time of the assault and battery upon appellant, Hallums was on a mission to collect the debt due respondent’s Party Shop. It is, therefore, inferable that Hallums was acting for the store owner (respondent) in the collection of the debt, so as to render respondent liable for the assault and battery committed upon appellant. Jones v. Elbert, 211 S. C. 553, 34 S. E. (2d) 796.
The conflicting testimony and reasonable inferences therefrom prohibit the resolution of the issue of agency on motion for summary judgment.
In reaching the decision herein, we find it unnecessary to determine the issues raised relative to the admissibility of testimony.
Judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Littlejohn, Rhodes and Gregory, JJ., concur. Ness, J., dissents.